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 i 
Egoitz Gago ANTON 
THE IMPACT OF PEACE MOVEMENTS ON A SOCIETY IMMERSED IN 
CONFLICT:  
An analysis of the framing processes of the Basque peace movement 
ABSTRACT 
The Basque conflict has waged since the 1950s in its current form. However, 
with the arrival of democracy 36 years ago, the Basque Country has been the 
scene of an intense peace mobilization, dominated by two peace organizations: 
Gesto por la Paz, a group of community organizations that mobilize to publicly 
reject political violence, and Lokarri/Elkarri, an organization that includes a 
conflict resolution proposal based on dialogue between conflicting parties. 
While there is some literature on these organizations, none has analysed their 
extraordinary impact on Basque society.  
 
This research explores how the Basque peace movement has impacted on the 
social and political culture of the Basque conflict. It seeks to understand the 
nature of this impact and to determine the channels and methods by which it 
was achieved, using frame analysis. Three interlinked questions serve to guide 
the research, asking first if there is a Basque Peace Frame and if it could be 
considered a master frame, how this Basque Peace Frame has evolved, and, 
finally, how the Basque Peace Frame has impacted on other Basque Civil 
Society Organizations related to the conflict. This qualitative research spans the 
period between the March 2006 declaration of ceasefire by ETA and the end of 
fieldwork for this research in September 2008. The research includes 18 in 
depth interviews, written media, and analysis of seven notable Basque social 
organizations related to the conflict, in addition to the two peace organizations 
mentioned above.  
 
The research found the impact of the Basque peace movement in the Basque 
Country is significant and rich. The Basque Peace Frame developed based on 
the rejection of the use of violence as a political tool and identifies that violence 
as the main barrier to achieving an inclusive conflict resolution. The Basque 
peace movement organizations developed a specific kind of mobilization to 
enforce the Basque Peace Frame based on silent and symbolic acts. The 
objective was to counter the former dynamics of mobilization that were 
contentious and directed to promote Basque national rights. The Basque Peace 
Frame proposed a change in the way the political collective identity was 
constructed in the Basque Country, showing that an association between 
nationalism and violence is not obligatory. The Basque Peace Frame has 
evolved and spread between social organizations in the Basque Country, using 
sympathetic identity networks as the main channel of frame diffusion. Even 
organizations that did not reject the use of contentious methods of protest are 
now questioning the use of violence, signifying exciting prospects for the future 
of non-violent political action in the Basque Country.  
 
Keywords: Basque Conflict; Basque Country; Collective Action Frames; 
Collective Identity; Frame Analysis; peace movements; Peace Organizations; 
Social Movements; Social Movement Impacts.    
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION 
 The Basque Country is a tiny place compared to its neighbours, but it is 
prosperous, with a well-accommodated middle class and booming industry and 
commerce. Yet, this small area between the north of Spain and the south west 
of France is immersed in a violent political conflict that, in its current form, has 
prevailed for 50 years. The Spanish state and the armed organization ETA 
(Euskadi Ta Askatasuna; Basqueland and Freedom) are the two main actors 
engaged in this war that has left almost 2,000 people dead and countless 
others deeply affected. Perhaps the most enduring societal impact of the 
Basque conflict is the entrenched social unrest and the pervasive breakdown of 
community relations. For many years under the Franco dictatorship, these 
problems were concealed under a law of silence, an unspoken rule that 
inhibited Basque people from speaking publicly about the conflict. The public 
space that existed was used only to protest against the Spanish claims for the 
Basque Country, and this use was contentious in nature (Casquette, 2003).  
 The end of the Franco era and the beginning of democracy in Spain 
witnessed a corresponding transformation in Basque society. The private 
identity connections that allowed national ideas to persist in the times of the 
Dictatorship (Perez-Agote, 2008) became useful in the post-Franco era 
between people who rejected the use of violence. These groups perceived an 
opening that might allow them to use public space to protest against the 
conflict-induced suffering of the Basque people. Initially, they were local groups 
based in parishes and community centres, but soon they spread to almost every 
Basque town. In 1986, these groups came together to create an organization to 
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help coordinate their actions, and Gesto por la Paz1 emerged. This was the 
beginning of a new way of protesting in the Basque Country that deliberately 
broke with the past. Gesto por la Paz members renounced traditional methods 
of protest and instead adopted the strategy that had kept Basque society 
subjugated during the Dictatorship years: silence (Funes, 1998a; Funes, 
1998b). However, now the use of silence had a remarkable effect on Basque 
society, which began to perceive that public protesting was more than 
contentious actions against a political system. The main objective of Gesto por 
la Paz was to raise awareness of the dangers of political violence, which 
inspired the use of symbolic actions, like the Gesto, a silent demonstration 
following a politically motivated killing. However, with time, some sectors of 
Basque society already engaged in public mobilization started to question the 
limits of their peace mobilization. These sectors, with ties in the nationalist left2 
networks, but mixed with people from different socio-economic backgrounds, 
had one notion in common: the idea that protests against political violence 
could contain a political proposal. This group of people decided to create an 
organization, called Elkarri3, to promote a conflict resolution scenario based on 
dialogue and political agreement between parties. As a result, two of the main 
elements covered by a peace movement were in place: the rise of social 
problems and a concrete political agenda (Carter, 1992; Cortright, 2008). After 
15 years of activities, Elkarri changed its name and approach to Lokarri4, a 
smaller organization with an emphasis on new technologies, but with similar 
                                            
1
 Gesto por la Paz means „Gesture for Peace‟ in Spanish.  
2
 The nationalist left or Izquierda Abertzale is a term commonly used to designate radical 
Basque nationalism. Therefore, it is the term I have adopted for this research.  
3
 Elkarri means „Dialogue‟ in Basque.  
4
 Lokarri means „Bond‟ in Basque.  
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objectives and ethos. Gesto por la Paz and Lokarri are the two main 
protagonists of this research. During all the years they have been working for 
peace in the Basque Country, they have encountered enormous resistance by a 
social code of conduct that encouraged non-action against political violence. 
They have enjoyed success too. It is the contention of this thesis that Gesto por 
la Paz and Lokarri changed the opinions and perceptions of Basque society. 
Today, to understand the Basque conflict it is important to know the values and 
history of the Basque peace movement5, of which Lokarri and Gesto por la Paz 
are the two main organizations.  
The role of the Basque peace movement organizations in the 
Basque Country. A research overview 
This research is focused on the actions of the two main Basque peace 
movement organizations, Gesto por la Paz and Lokarri.  These two 
organizations were born in a moment of extreme polarization within Basque 
society. That moment witnessed how social groups started to use public space 
to demand and end to political violence in the Basque Country. These two 
organizations share the same principles of action, but they have several 
differences in methods and demands. Gesto por la Paz is an organization that 
tries to coordinate the efforts of several local groups against violence. The 
organizational ethos is highly social, trying to raise awareness of the importance 
of rejecting political violence and to demand attention for the more important 
and underlying issues regarding that violence. Lokarri, in the other hand, 
                                            
5
 In this research the term Basque peace movement is used to refer to the social movement 
against political violence consequence of the Basque conflict. For more information about the 
different categories of peace movements see OVERY, B. (1982) How effective are peace 
movements?, London, Harvest House. 
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incorporates something new into the peace mobilization: a political proposal. Its 
methods are more focused on obtaining political support for that proposal. The 
main undertaking of this thesis is to explore the different impacts of these two 
organizations on Basque society and my argument is that these organizations 
created a Basque Peace Frame, which has profoundly affected other social 
organizations related to the conflict in the Basque Country. This thesis sheds 
light on the power of the Basque peace movement in influencing Basque 
society perception of the conflict. For this purpose, the thesis uses social 
movement theory, especially frame analysis theory (Gamson, 1992b; Goffman, 
1974), (Johnston & Noakes, 2005; Snow & Benford, 2000; Hunt et al., 1994). 
Using frame analysis theory, I describe the Basque Peace Frame and I 
compare it with the perception of the conflict that is dominant in other social 
organizations related to the conflict. The substantive content covers most of the 
issues present in the conflict, including: victims of political violence (torture or 
terrorism)6, prisoners of ETA, and organizations devoted to peace in different 
ways, including research centres and peace education organizations. It was 
also possible in my research to interview and follow several organizations:  
 Bakeola7, a Christian organization involved in peace education and 
social work programs in the Basque Country.  
                                            
6
 During this research the use of term victim will vary. When the term victim of political violence 
is used, the term will gather all kind of victims, like torture or terrorism victims. The victim of 
terrorism term is used regarding victims of ETA only. This is an important clarification because 
some organizations only defend a particular kind of victim.  
7
 Bakeola is a constructed word in Basque using two concepts: Bakea (Peace) and Ola (To 
forge). The idea behind that is to remember that peace has to be constructed and forged 
between everybody.  
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 Baketik8, a peace research centre directed by the former director of 
Elkarri, which tries to promote an ethical approach to peace (Fernandez, 
2006).  
 Basta Ya9, an organization that defends a conflict resolution scenario 
where ETA must be defeated and no nationalist claims should be 
allowed, as well as defending the interests of victims of terrorism.  
 The EGK10, an institutional organization created to coordinate and help 
youth organizations in the Basque Country.  
 Etxerat11, an organization that defends the rights of ETA prisoners and 
their families.  
 Gernika Gogoratuz12, the oldest and most recognizable independent 
peace research centre in the Basque Country.  
 The TAT13, a group that defends victims of torture in the Basque 
Country, particularly those carried out by State security forces. 
Through analysis of these organizations, and Lokarri and Gesto por la Paz, I 
have addressed the research question and the hypotheses that are central to 
this research.  
Research question, hypotheses and results 
The different organizations and their objectives and approaches 
presented show a rich landscape for peace collective action research in the 
                                            
8
 Baketik means „from the peace‟ in Basque.  
9
 Basta Ya means „Enough‟ in Spanish.  
10
 EGK stands for Eusko Gazte Kontesilua  or „Basque Youth Council‟ in Basque. 
11
 Etxerat means „to home‟ in Basque.  
12
 Gernika Gogoratuz means „Remembering Gernika‟ in Basque.  
13
 TAT stands for Torturaren Aurkako Taldea  or „Team Agains Torture‟ in Basque.  
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Basque Country. The first step in analyzing social movement impacts is to 
identify categories of impact (Ajangiz, 2002: 40; Casquette, 1998: 205; 
Gamson, 1990: 20; Giugni, 1995; Giugni, 1998; Giugni, 1999; Lofland, 1996: 
345; Tilly, 1999: 269). Most of these categorizations assume at least two 
different categories of impacts: external or internal; cultural or institutional. I 
have focussed on the cultural impacts, particularly perceptions and changes in 
discourse that may have occurred as a consequence of peace action, which 
places this research within social movements theory. These consequences are 
the outcomes from the work of the Basque peace social organizations.  
To understand these outcomes, I studied those organizations, their 
mobilization nature and tried to correlate that with the change of perceptions in 
society. To do this, I chose a set of social organizations related to the conflict 
and studied the effects caused by the Basque peace movement, looking for 
common patterns between the Basque Peace Frame and the different 
organizations‟ discourse. For my analytical framework, I used a specific 
theoretical body within social movements research: the collective action frame 
approach. A frame is a mental schemata of interpretation that allows individuals 
to locate, perceive, identify and label occurrences in their life spaces (Goffman, 
1974: 21). In the field of social movements, this tool is used to understand the 
set of perceptions created by a given movement. It is a general and 
standardized tool that guides perception and allows knowledge production 
(Donati, 1992: 141). These structures of knowledge are the product of a shared 
experience between individuals, as well as the result of a negotiation process 
(Gamson, 1992b: 111). These presentations of reality are used to constrain, or 
guide, what should be considered important and usually advise on how to 
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mobilize for a specific issue (Johnston, 2005: 2). This approach is used to 
identify and understand moments of extensive mobilization and how social 
movements recruit for that mobilization.  
In this research, I try to go a step further and apply this concept to a 
whole process of social movement action, not to a specific point of action. Using 
this approach, I define the Basque Peace Frame and its evolution over time, 
and I compare it to the discourse of different social organizations in the Basque 
Country. The objective is to find similar points of connection between the frame 
and the discourse of the mentioned organizations and see if these similarities 
are a consequence of the actions of the Basque peace movement. With this in 
mind, the main research question is: How has the Basque peace movement 
impacted on the social and political culture of the Basque conflict?  
It is important to explain two limitations to this question. The first is an 
ontological limitation, as I take a group of social organizations as the actors 
where the impacts are analyzed. The second is the nature of the concept of 
impact in social movements. The study of that dimension faces a number of 
challenges, especially the following three (Casquette, 1998: 224), (Giugni, 
1995): first, it is important to understand the difficulty of demonstrating 
causation in social research, and specifically here in relation to the impacts of a 
social movement; second, the impacts assessment would be strengthened 
through longitudinal research, which is beyond the reach of this doctoral 
research; third, the objectives vary during a social movement‟s life, adding to 
the complexity of identifying and assigning actions to impact. As I present in the 
research, the effects detected are not directly tied to the Basque peace 
movement organizations‟ objectives and they occur after several years of 
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activity. Moreover, while those impacts can be traced to the Basque peace 
movement actions, they are also connected with the variations in the Political 
Opportunity Structure (POS). These dimensions must be taken into account 
when answering the research question. My central research question is 
explored through three sub-questions that guide this research and this thesis 
makes the following claims in response to those questions: 
1 – Is there a Basque Peace Master Frame? The Basque peace movement 
organizations have created a Peace Action Frame to understand the conflict. 
This Basque Peace Frame can be considered a Master Frame.  
2 – How has the Basque Peace Frame evolved? The Basque Peace Frame has 
evolved over time. This evolution was caused by the mutual interaction between 
Basque peace movement organizations and the interactions with other Basque 
Civil Society Organizations based on identity networks.  
3 – What is the impact of the Basque Peace Frame on other Basque Civil 
Society Organizations related to the conflict? The Basque Peace Frame created 
an impact on other Basque Civil Society Organizations related to the conflict. 
That impact was possible due to the existence of common collective identity 
networks between the Basque peace movement organizations and the Basque 
Civil Society Organizations.  
 This doctoral research has produced the data and analysis to answer 
these questions in the following way. The research argues that the Basque 
peace movement developed a powerful and articulated collective action frame 
that has some of the traits of a master frame, making it a reference point in 
peace activism. However, it is not possible, with the data at hand to assert that 
the Basque Peace Frame is a master frame. The interviews conducted with 
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members of the social organizations show that several of the concepts that 
appear in the Peace frame are inherent in Basque social mobilization regarding 
the conflict. The different results show that the Basque peace movement, 
because of its nature and the political opportunity structure it helped create was 
able to become a key actor in influencing perception of the conflict in the 
Basque country. The diagnosis that the Basque peace movement organizations 
make about the conflict is shared by all of the conflict-related organizations 
researched. Even the most ideologically driven organizations felt that the use of 
political violence was counterproductive. It is also possible to find traits that 
appear in the Basque Peace Frame in the other organizations, like the high 
level of awareness towards the victims of terrorism. In the beginning, the 
Basque peace movement organizations had to struggle against the widely held 
social idea that the conflict was something a person should not speak about. 
The victims were silent victims, with no social or political rights, but the Basque 
peace movement put the victims on the agenda and started to protest against 
their lack of rights and recognition. Today, the victims of terrorism‟ rights are a 
key part of any social organization that addresses conflict issues. More 
importantly, it is perceived within the social organizations that Basque peace 
movement organizations methods are only one way of carrying out peace 
related activism in the Basque Country. The political institutions use the Basque 
peace movement organizations methods when designing plans to mobilize 
society against political violence. During the fieldwork period, most of the 
Gestos were called by city councils as well as by Gesto por la Paz local groups. 
The research also shows that issues included in the Basque Peace Frame were 
transmitted through collective identity networks that were built at the beginning 
  10 
of the peace mobilization period. These channels of communication were 
necessary for the propagation of ideas and without them the frame would have 
encountered huge problems of transmission. These networks had to be similar 
in nature and in affinity. I show that the frame has continued to evolve since its 
inception, which has been made possible by both internal and external factors.  
 The internal factors relate to the relationship between the two peace 
organizations, Lokarri and Gesto por la Paz. Both organizations occupy a 
determined position in the Basque peace movement, with a defined role. Gesto 
por la Paz is an expressive and symbolic organization. Its members belong to a 
myriad of local groups and come from different political backgrounds. It started 
as groups protesting against violence and developed into a highly effective 
mechanism of creating and using symbolic resources to promote its goals. 
Lokarri, on the other hand, is an instrumental organization that defends a 
political solution to the conflict. It uses intellectual resources and methods that 
are closer to a pressure group than a social movement. Gesto por la Paz is 
more associated with the street, and Lokarri with the office (Funes, 1998b: 503). 
My research shows that the two organizations became dependent on one other, 
making them highly specialized in what they do. This was not a conscious 
decision, but more an unspoken agreement. Thes high-specialized roles 
produced, as a consequence, two organizations that are very efficient in what 
they do. Gesto por la Paz has a high mobilization potential and Lokarri has 
political weight in terms of creating a public discourse; together, they create a 
very powerful frame.  
 The external factors include the consolidation of democratic values in the 
Basque Country during the 1990s. These democratic values are one of the 
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issues that led to a social questioning of ETA and its methods while other 
externalities include the loss of social support for the armed struggle and the 
improved perception of democratic methods as valid means of achieving 
political goals. Other important external factors that appear during this research 
are the interaction between the Basque peace movement organizations and the 
social organizations mentioned before. Particularly important is the issue of 
defending victims of political violence. The rights of victims of terrorism is an 
issue championed by organizations like Basta Ya. They used the success of the 
Basque peace movement during the 1990s to take that rights issue and 
promote it in a more forceful way.  
 The answer to the research question is rich and complex. Basque society 
has changed since the days when the peace mobilization started. Many issues 
could be connected to the Basque peace movement, but making claims of 
direct causation is a difficult exercise. A number of issues, however, were 
publicised and promoted thanks to the Basque peace movement organizations. 
These issues are the rejection of violence, the use of public space to protest 
against political violence, victims‟ rights and the use of the peace agreement as 
a valid political tool. I argue these issues now have a place within the social 
organizations‟ ethos. These issues have been promoted, not only by the 
Basque peace movement organizations, but also by other social organizations, 
and they have been promoted during an active protest cycle and disseminated 
using shared collective identity networks. I show, using one of the organizations 
as example, the EGK, that without a collective identity connection point it is not 
possible to promote those issues through organizations. It is clear that the use 
of those issues and the Basque peace movement organizations‟ methods has 
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become a rule to follow in any social initiative related to peace in the Basque 
Country. That rule is present, not only in the social organizations, but in the 
political institutions as well. Finally, these are the most relevant issues that 
appear in other social organizations, but I demonstrate there is a feedback 
process that encourages the Basque peace movement organizations to 
promote issues that were not originally part of their ethos, but were present in 
other social organizations‟ ethos. The clearest example is the aforementioned 
issue of defending the rights of victims of terrorism. This is an old demand from 
the Basque peace movement, but now the intensity of the demand is not driven 
by the Basque peace movement organizations, but by some social 
organizations, like Basta Ya.  
The reasons behind this research  
There is a lack of objective approaches to the Basque Conflict in 
literature. Most of the works devoted to this issue are based on assumptions 
that defend one side of the conflict or the other. The same happens with the 
Basque peace movement organizations, where most of the writings behind 
them focus on the ideological component of those organizations. For example, 
one of the main authors used in this research, Maria Jesus Funes (Funes, 
1998a; Funes, 1998b) makes a correlation between Lokarri (or Elkarri in his 
work) with the Basque nationalist left, and Gesto por la Paz with a politically 
diverse mass of people representative of the vast majority of the Basque society 
against violence. This approach does not take into account most of the 
complexities of Basque society. Lokarri is as politically diverse as Gesto por la 
Paz, with some members having strong ties to the nationalist left, but those 
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members do not direct the organization. The main thread of their work is the 
need for a political proposal based on pacifist terms.  
The second issue is that, during the Dictatorship years, most of Basque 
society was not against political violence. It is important to remember that the 
Basque Country was one of the few regions in Spain that suffered a totalitarian 
regime, whereas the rest of the country had a milder authoritarian rule. A 
contentious national identity was present in Basque society (Perez-Agote, 
2008), (Zulaika, 1988). That national identity clashed with the perception that 
political means were enough to achieve those national goals, and opposed the 
use of violence. This is one of the reasons an approach that was not based on 
national identity was needed. Another reason is the lack of research about the 
social aspects of the Basque Conflict. There is a substantial literature about the 
political issues regarding the conflict (Clark, 1990; Douglass et al., 1998; Ibarra, 
1987; Ibarra, 2005b) (Letamendia, 1994b; Llera Ramo, 2003; Mata, 1993; 
Woodworth, 2001; Zirakzadeh, 1991), but only a few devoted to specific social 
issues related to the conflict (Casquette, 2003; Funes, 1998a; Funes, 1998b; 
Ibarra & Grau, 2007; Anton, 2007; Tejerina, 2001). The Basque social 
environment around the conflict is a vibrant one that needed further attention. It 
is interesting to note that there are several pieces of work about Basque social 
movements (Ajangiz, 2002; Barcena et al., 1998; De la Peña & Ibarra, 2004; 
Tejerina et al., 1995), but few about movements related to the Basque conflict. 
This is a symptom of how, traditionally, the conflict has been addressed in the 
Basque Country. This thesis also tries to deliver new ideas in the study of social 
movements‟ impacts. The comparative exercise adopted here is useful in 
understanding the way social movements promote their demands in social 
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networks and how a wider audience adopts these demands. I recognize that it 
is not a complete exercise, because this research is limited by the case study, 
but the ideas here might open doors to new approaches.  
Another important reason behind this research is the need to fill a gap in 
the research approach between the political sphere and the social sphere in the 
Basque Country. Traditionally, the approach to the conflict has the different 
political parties and political institutions as the main actors. This issue led me to 
the philosophical question of this research: What is the role and importance of 
civil society in a conflict resolution scenario? Social organizations could change 
the direction and nature of social perceptions in a conflict environment. This 
research shows that Basque peace movement organizations were able to 
embed some ideas into other layers of Basque society; and indeed these ideas 
reached the political parties and institutions. Today, in the Basque Country, it is 
very difficult, if not impossible, to engage in social action regarding a conflict 
issue without embracing the ethos of non-violence and the recognition of the 
collectives that suffered previously through violence. The results of this 
research and the nature of the Basque Peace Frame that is described suggests 
that any conflict resolution scenario implemented in the Basque Country will be 
in difficulties if it does not comply with those values. In the case at hand, it is 
clear that civil society played a fundamental role in understanding and changing 
the future dynamics of the conflict. Therefore, I suggest looking at the social 
values and the way they are promoted as a part of any conflict analysis 
research.  
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Personal reasons that led me to do this research 
I became interested in this project during the last year of my university 
degree in political science. As a person who was born in the Basque Country, I 
was shocked when the Spanish government at that time, represented by the 
Right wing Popular Party, used the 2004 Madrid train bombing to start a 
campaign (wrongly) blaming ETA for the terrorist attack. However, the response 
from Basque society, and wider Spanish society as well, condemned ETA‟s 
alleged actions. However, what shocked me more was the structured response 
that appeared from the Basque peace movement organizations. As had 
happened six years earlier, during the kidnapping and killing of Miguel Angel 
Blanco, a council deputy of a small town of the Basque Country, the social 
response articulated by the Basque peace movement organizations was 
tremendous. I could feel in that moment the anger of a collective of people who 
wanted to end political violence and demanded an end to ETA‟s actions and a 
settlement of the political conflict. While the bombs in Madrid turned out not to 
be part of the ETA strategy, they had ignited something that was buried below 
the surface of Basque society: a fatigue with political violence and its societal 
cost. Another outcome was that the Madrid bombings gave a visual image of 
the senselessness of violence. Basque society is accustomed to lonely corpses 
on the floor, covered by a blanket, or massive damage to buildings. The image 
from the Madrid bombing, of piles of bodies, covered in blood, was something 
that ETA was not prepared to defend. The images were too brutal, too difficult 
to justify. After I finished my masters degree, I became involved with peace 
groups, and through my work as a social worker, I could observe first-hand the 
problems the conflict created in local communities. During this time, I felt that 
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Basque society had a clear idea of how they wanted to resolve the conflict, but 
the political institutions were not listening.  
 My first approach to the issue was the idea of research and to determine 
what was the conflict resolution process that Basque civil society wanted. In my 
first year at the University of Bradford, I found two main challenges in my 
research. The first was a methodological problem, namely the difficulty of 
researching civil society. I found that a civil society is seldom a unitary body with 
a common goal, but a field of action where different forces collaborate or 
contend with one another. The second problem was that Basque civil society is 
complex and highly active. That made the idea for a doctoral thesis too broad. I 
therefore narrowed my focus to one part of Basque society: the Basque peace 
movement. In the Basque Country, there are two different kinds of peace 
mobilization present: a movement against the military (Ajangiz, 2002) and a 
movement against the political violence that emanates from the Basque conflict. 
From my past experience, I felt the movement emanating from the Basque 
conflict was the main protagonist of my research. During the process of 
research, I have refined the object of study, focusing on two organizations, 
Gesto por la Paz and Lokarri, and found the methodological tools to explore 
their impacts on social perceptions in the Basque Country. While I have diverted 
quite far from my initial objective, the results of this research help to determine 
the kind of responses to a violent conflict that we can find in a social 
environment. More importantly, the results suggest how these changes can 
affect the political parties and institutions that are in charge of that conflict 
resolution scenario.  
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Thesis structure 
This thesis is divided into nine chapters, each devoted to one aspect of 
the research. The first is the current chapter, introducing the guidelines for this 
research and the research questions and hypotheses that are tested in the final 
analysis, as well as the results of this research.  
Chapter two is my Conceptual framework. I explain the different 
approaches to the social movements theory. I explain the Resource Mobilization 
Theory approach with the subgroups attached, including the organizational 
approach and the political opportunity approach. I explain New Social 
Movements theory and I emphasize the identity components of social 
movements. Finally, I explain the frame analytical approach and the concept of 
collective action frame(s) and master frame(s). This is complemented by an 
exploration of the different issues regarding social movement impacts study. I 
explore deeper the cultural impacts dimension as it is an important part of this 
research.  
Chapter three is devoted to Methodology. Here I revisit the different 
social movement theory approaches focusing on the methodological 
implications that are inherent to them. After I explain why I decided to use a 
frame analytical approach in this research. I expose the different 
methodological issues that appeared during this research: the way I 
approached the fieldwork, the problems I encountered there, and how I dealt 
with those problems. I describe the issues for accessing the organizations and 
the problems and advantages that my situation as a Basque person brought. 
Finally, I explain the different ethical issues of my research: anonymity of 
interviewees, informed consent and the subjectivities involved.  
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The nature of the Basque peace movement and the two organizations 
that are the main object of study are explained in Chapter four. Gesto por la 
Paz and Lokarri are explained in detail using four different points: history of the 
organization, nature of the organization (its ethos), organizational structure, and 
repertoire of action. In this chapter, I describe the different approaches of the 
two organizations. Gesto por la Paz is a social and symbolic organization that 
advocates for social awareness. I describe the different symbolic resources that 
Gesto por la Paz uses, including the Gesto and the Blue Ribbon. Lokarri is an 
instrumental organization that advocates for a political solution and uses 
methods directed to convince the political elites. Its more important initiatives 
are described, such as the Consultation, or the Peace social observatory. 
In contrast, Chapter five is devoted to explaining the other part of the 
object of study: the Basque social organizations that appeared to address 
different conflict issues. The organizations discussed are: Bakeola, a catholic 
peace group focused on social and educational work; Baketik, a peace think 
tank directed by the former director of Elkarri; Basta Ya, a victims of terrorism 
organization with political objectives that does not recognize nationalist claims; 
the EGK, an institutional platform that coordinates youth groups; Etxerat, an 
organization that defends the rights of family members of ETA prisoners; 
Gernika Gogoratuz, a peace research institute that has many years of 
experience in the Basque Conflict; and the TAT, an organization that provides 
help to victims of torture. These organizations cover most of the relevant issues 
around the Basque conflict, including victims of violence rights, ETA prisoners, 
victims of state violence, and peace research.  
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Chapter six is devoted to the analysis and presentation of the Basque 
Peace Frame. I use the collective action frame approach. For this, I describe 
the different core framing tasks: diagnosis of the conflict, prognosis and 
motivation. I defend the idea that both organizations share the same principles, 
but they have subtle differences, mainly in the prognosis and mobilization 
framing efforts. These differences are because one organization, Lokarri, 
defends a political proposal and Gesto por la Paz does not. I describe how the 
two organizations tried to promote the Basque Peace Frame through different 
framing processes.  
Chapter seven describes the Basque Peace Frame dynamics between 
Gesto por la Paz and Lokarri. The chapter has three parts. The first part 
explains the frame dynamics during the period before fieldwork that started with 
the ETA declaration of a ceasefire in 2006. I found that period was a very good 
example of the mobilization dynamics of the Basque peace movement 
organizations. The second part is devoted to the changes that occurred during 
the fieldwork period. Finally, I explain how these dynamics inside the 
organizations had an effect on each other and how that interaction process 
affected the frame elaboration process.  
Chapter 8 focuses on how the Basque Peace Frame affects the different 
social organizations presented in chapter 6. For that exercise, I divided the 
organizations into four categories: Organizations that are focused on peace 
research and social work, nationalist left organizations, organizations that 
defend victims of terrorism rights, and institutional organizations. This division of 
organizations based on their nature responds to a methodological decision to 
make this comparative exercise clearer. That does not mean that the 
  20 
organizations respond to these boundaries in real life. Most peace researchers 
in the Basque Country are peace activists, and their organizations are definitely 
closer to the Basque peace movement. In this chapter, I describe the need for 
shared collective identity networks to understand frame propagation and how, 
without them, communication is extremely difficult in the Basque Country.  
Finally, I conclude my research with the last chapter where I reiterate the 
questions presented at the beginning of this research and the key findings 
described throughout, which are summarised at the beginning of this chapter. I 
also answer the main research question, explaining the nature of the impacts of 
the Basque peace social movement. I expose how this research fits inside the 
actual body of knowledge on social movements and I make some contribution 
towards answering the philosophical question: What is the role and importance 
of civil society in a conflict resolution scenario? 
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CHAPTER 2 – CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The main objective of this research is to understand the relationship 
between the Basque peace movement organizations and other Basque Civil 
Society Organizations, with the final aim of being able to describe the effects 
that occur in that relationship. Using theoretical approaches described later, this 
research intends to see how the Basque peace movement organizations 
affected the cultural framework of other Basque Civil Society Organizations. In 
particular how the Basque peace movement was able to create a peace frame 
(Basque Peace Frame) that had enough salience and resonance to evolve into, 
possibly, a master frame. With this idea in mind, then, the role of the researcher 
is to immerse them in the reality created by the interaction of the Basque peace 
movement organizations and Basque Civil Society Organizations and to define 
the Basque Peace Frame. This involves knowledge of the actors researched, in 
particular the organizational level of the social movements, and knowledge of 
the field; in other words, social movements, social movement organizations, 
frame analysis and social movement impacts. In this part I explore the 
theoretical foundations of this research. Note that in the next chapter, devoted 
to methodology, I revisit some of the theoretical approaches explained in this 
chapter, particularly the RMT and the New Social Movement approach. During 
that exercise I focus on the methodological implications of the mentioned 
approaches. That explanation complements the description given here.  
For the analysis of the social movement theories I use the works of Alain 
Touraine (1981), Alberto Melucci (1988; 1989; 1996), Casquette (1998), and 
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Zald and McCarthy (1987a; 1987b). I try to connect these different explanations 
with the Basque reality using the works of De la Peña and Ibarra (2004) and 
Funes (1998a; 1998b). For the analysis of the different approaches to social 
movement organizations, I use the cited works of Zald and McCarthy, Alain 
Touraine and Alberto Melucci. For frame analysis theory, the main authors are 
Snow et al. (1988; 1992; 2000; 1986), all based in the analysis made by Erwing 
Goffman (1974). Finally, social movement impact analysis uses Giugni (1999), 
Gamson (1992b; 1982), and Melucci (1988; 1989; 1993; 1996) to describe the 
cultural component of that dimension.  
Social Movement theory 
The principal actors of this research are the two main Basque peace 
movement organizations, Lokarri and Gesto Por la Paz. These are, because of 
their history and impact, the most important organizations in the Basque peace 
movement. Before going on, I would like to provide a brief note about the nature 
of the Basque peace movement. In the literature, there is little consensus about 
the definition of „peace movement‟, although some academics have tried to 
shed some light on it (Carter, 1992; Cortright, 2008; Overy, 1982). Mauricio 
Garcia Duran (2005) defines a peace movement as follows: „In a context of an 
armed conflict, a peace movement is a massive social mobilization, based on 
underlying organizations and networks with a varied repertoire of collective 
action and framing a mobilizing consensus; which makes claims rejecting war 
and demanding peaceful solutions in a way that challenges the opposing 
parties, both government and illegal armed groups. The emergence, evolution, 
and results of that mobilization depend on how the movement faces 
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opportunities and constraints in the political context, builds alliances, and 
promotes its specific goals‟ (Garcia Duran, 2005: 312).  
However, applying this definition to the Basque reality, some problems 
arise. First, the above definition fits perfectly in highly violent environments with 
an extremely high polarization around violence. The Basque case is regarded 
as a low level violent environment (Harbom & Sundberg, 2008), because the 
polarization is not set in the use of violence, but in the political ideas. The 
Basque peace movement emerged in moments of intense violence, during the 
early 1980s, with the Spanish State funded paramilitary organization Grupos 
Antiterroristas de Liberación (GAL)14 phenomenon on its height, and the 1990s, 
starting with the worst ETA action, the bombing of Hipercor in Barcelona in 
1987 and following the longest kidnappings of several people. The height of its 
mobilization was after the kidnapping and killing of Miguel Angel Blanco, a 
Popular Party (PP) councilman in Ermua, a small town in Biscay, one of the 
provinces of the Basque Country Autonomous Community. The Basque peace 
movement, mainly led by Gesto Por la Paz, in that time was intense, but nothing 
like massive in scale15. This is amongst other reasons, because most of the 
social action in the Basque Country was channeled through the Basque 
nationalist left, and the Basque peace movement also suffered appropriation by 
the Spanish political parties. 
 Another problem appears when we relate the concept of networks to an 
analysis of mobilization. In the Basque Country we find different organizations, 
                                            
14
 Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberacion (Freedom Antiterrorist Groups) see WOODWORTH, P. 
(2001) Dirty War, clean hands: ETA, the GAL and Spanish Democracy, Cork, Cork University 
Press. 
15
 About this period, the best reference is Funes, M (1998) La Salida del Silencio. 
Movilizaciones por la Paz en Euskadi 1986-1998. Akal: Madrid. 
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which, undeniably, work for peace and have ties with the Basque peace 
movement organizations, but their main goal is not to mobilize anyone. The 
most important for this research are Gernika Gogoratuz, a peace research 
centre based in the Biscayan town of Gernika, Bakeola, a catholic organization 
especilized in social work and peace education, and Baketik, created in 
September, 2006, directed by the former director of Elkarri, an organization that 
promotes a conflict resolution approach based on ethical principles instead on 
empathy principles (Fernandez, 2006). The latter is an interesting experiment in 
producing outcomes designed to build a culture of peace and conflict resolution 
with the support of one community of Catholic priests. These organizations are 
categorized as the Basque Peace Non-Movement Organizations because they 
share the same roots and collective identity, but their goals are different. A full 
analysis of the role of these organizations and their relation with the Basque 
peace movement can be found in Chapter 8. The main differences between 
them and the Basque peace movement organizations are the mobilization 
nature and the main social component of the latter. One of the problems that 
social movements now face in the Basque Country arises from shifts in the 
membership model, from the „militant‟ model to the „volunteer‟ model (De la 
Peña & Ibarra, 2004).  
 Returning to the Basque peace movement organizations, one of the first 
things to do to ground a theory is to find a definition of Social Movement 
Organization (SMO) that suits the case researched. It helps to ground the 
theoretical frame. One of the most complete definition of Social Movement 
Organization is the one given by Loftland (1996): „SMOs are associations of 
persons making idealistic and moralistic claims about how human personal or 
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group life ought be organized that, at the time of their claim-making, are 
marginal to or excluded from mainstream society - the then dominant 
constructions of what is realistic, reasonable and moral‟ (Lofland, 1996: 2-3). As 
well, Mario Diani and Donatella Della Porta ellaborate some of the main traits of 
the SMOs, like the mobilization of resources and the neutralization of 
opponents (Della Porta & Diani, 2006: 137). When trying to fit the definition 
above with the reality one big question arises. Yes, it is possible that before the 
cease-fire, with no part of the political spectrum defending a discourse of peace 
and understanding, the Lofland definition could be applied without many 
problems. But now, exists a general discourse of peace. So, let us analyze the 
definition.  
 Following Lofland, the important fact about this definition is the claim 
about reality. This is ‘at the time of its assertion, defined as improper, 
implausible, immoral, false, threatening, corrupting, seditious, treasonous, 
blasphemous, degenerate, despicable, or in some other manner not 
respectable or otherwise meriting serious consideration. Instead, the asserters 
and the realities they assert are, in mainstream views, best ignored, repressed, 
treated therapeutically as a sickness, or in some other manner kept excluded, 
marginal, or encysted.‟ (Lofland, 1996: 3). Of course, the peace claim must be 
taken with the more serious considerations, but following the words of Txema 
Montero, former prominent member of Herri Batasuna (nationalist left political 
party, close to ETA) the Basque peace movement is something „Beautiful. 
Beautiful but useless‟ (Medem, 2003).  Besides personal opinions, the peace 
assertion made by the Basque peace movement organizations does not enjoy 
serious support. This is because of the strong political component of the 
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Basque peace action. The Basque peace movement is not seen as a monolithic 
entity, but a multifaceted body, which each face determined by political ideology 
(Funes, 1998a). Lofland and part of the discourse of the Basque peace 
movement organizations suggest a solution to this dilemma, as follows: Lofland 
asserts that, to be excluded, there must be a societal mainstream a „set of 
institutions and their authoritative decision-makers who provide plausible 
rationales for exercising powers and authority in such matters‟. As repeated in 
the political discourse of all the Basque political parties, conflict resolution is a 
matter of political elites only. On the other hand, the Basque peace movements 
Organizations defend the participation of the Basque Civil Society in that 
process. Also important is that the Basque peace movement organizations have 
been tied to particular ideological sides in the Basque Country. Lokarri have 
been tied to the nationalist left and Gesto Por la Paz with the Spanish political 
parties. This caused a feeling of distrust within Basque society, but the two 
Basque peace movement organizations are not as far apart as it appears, as 
some accords, like the Maroño Accord, between Gesto por la Paz, Elkarri, and 
Bakea Orain (now defunct) demonstrate that their main guidelines might not be 
ideological but originate in their arguments for a peaceful settlement to the 
conflict. 
 Depending on the author, the main social movement theories can be 
divided in to several groups. Mario Diani (1992) divided them into four main 
approaches, the Collective Behaviour approach, part of the so-called classical 
approaches; The Resource Mobilization approach, including Political Process 
theory, which, whilst „technically‟ part of the rational choice school associated 
with Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT) also provides one of the most 
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important concepts in social movement theory - Political Opportunity Structure; 
and the New Social Movement approach (Diani, 1992). Jesus Casquette (1998) 
shares the division defended by Diani, dividing the social movement theories 
into three categories: Classical approaches, Resource Mobilization Theory and 
New Social Movements (Casquette, 1998). Cohen and Arato (1992) also divide 
social movement theories in two categories, distinguishing between the main 
perspectives in collective action, as they called them, the Resource Mobilization 
Theory and the New Social Movement approach (Cohen & Arato, 1992). I adopt 
that division and explain briefly the nature of the two approaches, giving first a 
glimpse in to the classical approaches.  
The Classical Approaches 
 The classical approaches appeared at the beginning of the twentieth 
century as a way of providing an answer to the different levels of social 
phenomena. The classical approaches can be differentiated in to different 
branches: collective behaviour, the mass society approach, and the relative 
privation approach, although some authors put these three branches under the 
collective behaviour label (Chesters & Welsh, 2011: 46). Each of these three 
branches have differences in their conceptualization of social movements, but 
all three answer to the same causal sequence to explain the emergence of 
social movements. This causal sequence, which appears in all the classical 
approaches, starts with the definition of tensions that are present in a society in 
crisis; these tensions disturb the psychological balance of individuals; finally, 
when individuals that were previously isolated start to interact and create a 
group focused on action, then a social movement is created.  
 That causal sequence is the following: 
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Structural Strain Disruptive Psychological State Social Movement 
(McAdam, 1982a: 7) 
 
 The classical approaches presented here share a basic understanding 
about the origin of social movements. They differ in the nature of the first two 
stages of the sequence; in other words, in the nature of the structural strain and 
what kind of consequences this will have on the psychological state of the 
individual, but they share the final stage when collective action (normally 
dangerous) appears.  
 Before explaining the three different branches it is interesting to explain 
briefly the irrationalism approach to collective action, which had a considerable 
influence in the three classical approaches.  
Irrationalism 
Irrationalism was the basis for most of the social theories until the 1960s. 
It was a response to collective action at the end of the nineteenth century, 
which was provided by a group of European intellectuals including Le Bon 
(1841-1931), Tarde (1843-1904) and Sighele (1868-1913). For these authors, 
collective action was a discontinuous form of social phenomena caused by 
proximity between individuals. The social phenomena, characterized in this time 
for its irrationality and use of violence was the behaviour of masses of people 
together. This is why this theory was called mass psychology theory. This idea 
was built around six points (Casquette, 1998: 43; Moscovici, 1985: 90-91): 
 A mass is a body of individuals who shares the same mental unity. They 
are not the aggregated individuals who share a common space. 
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 The individual acts consciously. The mass acts unconsciously. This is 
because consciousness is an individual trait and unconsciousness a 
collective trait. 
 Regardless of their extremist behaviour, the masses are conservative by 
nature. At the end, they always re-establish the relations of power they 
overthrew. 
 Regardless of their intelligence or cultural level, all the masses need to 
be dominated by a strong leader. These leaders with their charisma 
move the masses to follow whatever ideal they impose. These 
individuals are the engines of history.  
 Propaganda is the main way of communication by the masses. It is 
based on collective beliefs and uses the power of suggestion. That is 
why the main elements in propaganda are imaginary emotions, allegory 
and the direct imperative. 
 Every policy aimed at governing the masses is a policy of imagination. It 
is based in a strong ideal (revolution, homeland) that has to be assumed 
by everyone.  
The political significance of these ideas was clear. The masses could not 
have real interests or needs. If it is taken in to account that the most powerful 
movement in that time was the workers‟ movement, it is possible to say that 
irrationalism was a counter attack to the growing workers‟ movement.  
Irrationalism waned in the 1930s, but three main approaches took their 
ideals from the irrationalist approach, the collective behaviour approach, the 
mass society approach and the relative privation approach. 
The collective behaviour approach 
  30 
 This approach appeared in North America during the 1950s and it 
focused on understanding the emergence and significance of social movements 
as agents of social change. The collective behaviour approach studied forms of 
behaviour associated with the crowd and the mob as social responses to the 
prevailing social structure. The collective behaviour approach can be divided in 
two different variations, one based in the study of the psychosocial dimensions 
of collective action and the other based on the structural implications of the 
same. This first variation, led by the Chicago School, implies that conventional 
behaviour is based and guided by culture and the established social order; 
therefore, collective behaviour appears where that social order cannot provide 
established guidelines. The psychosocial approach, then, is based on the 
assumption that the individual is always a member of a social group. The 
structural variation, on the other hand, focused on the categorization of the 
different structural tensions that threaten and disturb the correct social 
behaviour.   
The Chicago School approach to collective action 
 The famous Sociology School of Chicago developed the psychosocial 
variant. Its main authors are Park & Burgess (1921), Blumer (1946; 1957), 
Turner & Killian (1957), and Lang & Lang (1961).  
 These authors defend the idea that conventional behaviour is guided by 
the prevailing society. Collective behaviour, hence, appears when society stops 
to give defined guidance for action and the impulses and desires of the 
individuals cannot be satisfied by that society. Its origin comes from some sort 
of institutional or cultural crisis that promote the appearance of non-
conventional ways to address these crises. These tensions make the individual 
  31 
take uncoordinated ways of action with no purpose. When these dynamics 
become circular, then they became contagious they become social unrest 
(Blumer, 1946: 171-172).  
 The difference between institutionalized behaviour and collective 
behaviour made the School of Chicago scholars to develop a specific set of 
conceptual tools to study collective behaviour. This collective behaviour was 
understood as the individual‟s behaviour under the influence of a common and 
collective impulse that was the result of social interaction (Park & Burgess, 
1921: 865).  
 Under this idea, the Chicago School, social movements are one kind of 
collective behaviour: a collective action in great scale, wide, with continuity over 
time, that has as objective to alter social order in a significant way (Lang & 
Lang, 1961: 490-491). Other kind of collective behaviour are things like mobs, 
riots, revolutionary movements, fashion, and mass communication, among 
others (Blumer, 1957: 128). This is the same logic that allowed the School of 
Chicago to put all these different things under the same label: all of them are 
unstructured situations where social organization and the systems of meaning 
do not give solid guidance for social action. It is in these situations when 
collective behaviour emerges that tries to create new foundations for a new kind 
of society (Park & Burgess, 1921: 924-925).  
 
Smelser and the functional approach 
 The difference between the functional approach and the psychosocial 
approach can be seen in the different perceptions about the role of the tensions 
that lead to social action. Under this approach, these tensions are structural 
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forces that disrupt the normal functions of society. The main author if this 
approach is N.J. Smelser (1962). Smelser share some points with the School of 
Chicago: To understand collective action it is important to assume that is 
outside the established institutions. Collective behaviour is not institutionalized. 
Regarding the degree of institutionalizations it loses its distinctive trait (Smelser, 
1962: 21). Smelser shares the view of the irresponsible nature of collective 
behaviour. It is defined as action of the impatient (Smelser, 1962: 88). Finally, 
Smelser, similar to the Chicago School puts different kinds of collective action 
under the same analytic approach. He does not consider the idea of developing 
different approaches to explain social movements or riots, for example.  
 The main differences between Smelser and the School of Chicago starts 
with the statement that collective behaviour has a sociological, and not 
psychological, explanation (Smelser, 1962: 24). The main difference comes 
from Smelser‟s structural approach that explains the different tensions in 
collective behaviour as having structural explanations. For that task, Smelser 
developed six different conditions to explain these structural tensions (Della 
Porta & Diani, 2006: 7; Crossley, 2002: 43):  
 Structural conduciveness. This concept engulfs the particularities of a 
society that make collective behaviour episodes happen.  
 Structural strain or protest inherent cause. Smelser never specifies the 
origin of these tensions, but mentions issues like industrialization, 
urbanization, and unemployment, in other words, social change.  
 The existence in the population of a generalized belief identified with the 
origin of the structural tensions. This generalized belief gives the different 
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actors a shared definition of reality that allows individuals to act 
collectively.  
 The generalized belief may be present before the collective action 
episodes. Therefore, what is needed is what Smelser calls precipitating 
factors, something that make the collective action start.  
 The mobilization for action of the different participants. The structural 
strain and the generalized belief act as the main driving forces. 
 Finally, Smelser argues that is needed a failure in the social control 
mechanisms by the authorities that facilitates the start of the collective 
action episode.  
These six factors come together under the term “value added theory” that 
means that they need to combine in different ways for an episode of collective 
behaviour to happen. As they are being combined, the collective behaviour 
episode starts to be more specific, preventing alternative phenomena (Smelser, 
1962: 26). 
The mass society approach 
 The main author is William Kornhauser (1959). He defined participation 
in collective action in political events as the result of the disconnection between 
individuals and traditional social and political values. He focuses on the study of 
alternative collective action methods and how they are preferred over traditional 
institutional ways. In what he calls mass society, great numbers of individuals 
make political action outside the regimented procedures set up by society 
(Kornhauser, 1959: 219). He finds democratic societies more prone to fall into 
mass society politics because in these societies the individual is constantly 
encouraged to engage in political action. For Kornhauser, one specific trait of 
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the mass society is the high level of social atomization, that is, the existence of 
a conglomerate of individuals connected only by their relation with a shared 
authority, commonly the State. The individuals are not related through any 
independent group (Kornhauser, 1959: 30). The main consequence of that 
analysis is the assumption that the mass is irrational and cannot be contained. 
Its objectives are remote and extreme; its members come from the most 
pampered and atomized sectors of the population (Casquette, 1998: 54).  
The relative deprivation approach 
 This approach focuses on the relation between social conditions, the 
perception of these conditions, and the final behaviour that comes from that 
perception. Ted Gurr (1970) argues that the individual feels discontent every 
time they perceive a big difference between what they give and what they 
perceive they deserve: discontent is not the difference between what they give 
and what they get, but the difference between what they want and what they 
think they are able to get (Gurr, 1970: 359). That discontent, following the 
causal process of the classical approaches, creates frustration and relative 
deprivation feelings that are compensated by the participation in collective 
protest. The origin of these relative deprivation perceptions lies in the 
accelerated social changes that create a difference between the products and 
life conditions that the individuals belief they deserve and the products and life 
condition they can achieve and maintain (Gurr, 1970: 319). This approach does 
not describe a difference between individuals that are part of the collective 
action and individuals that are not part of it. The only difference is the intensity 
of participation, derived from the degree of relative deprivation perception.  
The classical approaches and framing 
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 Although it is clear that the classical approaches are inadequate to 
describe the framing processes central for this research, it would be unfair to 
reject them totally. The main authors of frame theory have been influenced in 
lesser degree by the classical approaches. One of the most clear examples is 
the refined relative deprivation approach taken by William Gamson with its 
concept of a “frame of injustice” (Gamson et al., 1982), a tool to organize the 
perception of injustice that leads to mobilization.  
Of all the authors form the School of Chicago it is possible to affirm that 
Herbert Blumer is most influential over contemporary framing ideas. Without 
trying to give Blumer the credit for the following ideas, and without trying to be 
exhaustive, I will list some examples of hints advanced by him that are present 
in contemporary framing research: 
 Erving Goffman developed the concept of “keying”, that redefines 
activities, events, and biographies to be seen by participants as 
something else (Goffman, 1974: 43-44). This is defined later by Snow, 
Rochford, Worden, and Benford as “frame transformation” (Snow et al., 
1986: 473). Blumer described these elements previously, identifying what 
he calls “cultural drifts”, the need to achieve cultural values change by 
social movements (Blumer, 1946: 200). 
 The emphasis that framing authors give to collective identity, as the 
assumption that identity constructions, whether intended or not, are 
inherent in all social movement framing activities (Hunt et al., 1994: 185) 
has its background in what Blumer calls “esprit de corps” understood as 
the way that people have to conform to a group and to identify 
themselves in a shared effort (Blumer, 1946: 205-206).  
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 The construction of a response to an issue, or motivational framing 
(Snow & Benford, 2000: 617) finds a precedence in the assertion made 
by Blumer that “an organized movement with a clear direction cannot be 
explained only in terms of disposition or motivation. The movement has 
to be constructed (Blumer, 1957: 147)” 
These are only a few examples of the complex relation between the 
classical approaches and the framing perspective. As said at the beginning of 
this section, the classical approaches are inadequate as themselves to explain 
a framing process, but they gave the first steps to develop new paradigms for 
the studies of social movements.   
Resource Mobilization theory 
Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT) embodies one of the main trends in 
sociological reasoning. It is a North American approach to Collective Action, 
and focuses more on the how of social movement mobilization. RMT is 
interested in the ways collective phenomena are organized, and how they 
develop, rather than why they appear. RMT emerged in the 1960s in the USA, 
in response to two factors: first was the inability of the classic approaches to 
account for the emergence of the new social movements of that time, and 
second, the need for a new way to analyze them. RMT emphasizes the 
differentiation of resources of a given collective phenomena, the level of 
organization and the political opportunities of a given movement (Casquette, 
1998: 67). The first authors who used the RMT term in reference to social 
movements were McCarthy and Zald (Zald & McCarthy, 1987a).  
 The core idea of this approach is the analysis of the organizational 
factors rather than the individuals. Instead of asking why individuals take part in 
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collective action, RMT presumes this type of social phenomena is a routine 
expression of politics and instead examines the efficacy of the organizations 
that form a social movement to use the resources within their reach to achieve 
the objectives the social movement defends. This is why RMT can be described 
as a functional approach (Casquette, 1998: 63). Following Casquette (1998) it 
is possible to define the traits of RMT as follows: 
 The actions of the social movements are rational responses. In these 
responses, the costs and the benefits of the different ways of action are 
taken into account. 
 The objectives of social movements are conditioned by the conflict of 
interests between institutionalized relations of power. 
 The injustices created by these relations of power cannot be 
overestimated to define the creation of social movements. However, this 
creation depends on resource availability, the organization, and the 
opportunity frame for collective action.  
 Resources like money, activists‟ dedication and knowledge allow social 
movements sufficient degree of organization to start the struggle for their 
objectives. 
  Formally structured and centralized organizations are typical of the 
modern social movements. They are more efficient at mobilizing 
resources than informal and decentralized organizations. 
 These social movements work in a relatively stable opportunity structures 
that allow or hamper their mobilization efforts. They influence their 
strategies and condition their probabilities of success.  
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 The success is acknowledged by the recognition of the organization as a 
valid political actor or by the capabilities for securing material benefits.  
The main flaw of this approach is the lack of recognition of reasons why 
a social movement emerge. This approach disdains the importance, as stated in 
the third point of the list above, of the power relations that are dominant in a 
given society. This is one of the main ideas defended by one of the authors of 
the New Social Movement approach, Alain Touraine (1981; 1985) who saw 
social movements as a response to the injustices created by the main conflict in 
any given society (Touraine, 1981: 77; Touraine, 1985: 772). The actions of the 
Basque peace movement organizations are totally conditioned by their origin, 
as these origins define their network of allies and their possibilities of action 
(Funes, 1998a). This is fully explained in chapters 4 and 7.   
 Another aspect of RMT is the lack of importance that this approach gives 
to irrationality. RMT measures success or failure of a SMO by its capacity to 
become a valid political actor or its success in mobilizing resources. 
  RMT is really useful in analyzing the capabilities of any given 
organization at the time of social mobilization. Finally, RMT developed one of 
the most useful concepts in social movement analysis: the Political Opportunity 
Structure (POS).  
  The POS is defined as the series of political opportunities or challenges, 
the strategies and means, as well as the resources that shape the action of any 
social movement (Pérez Ledesma, 1994: 95; Tarrow, 1998: 19). The social 
movements shape the POS and the POS shapes the social movements. The 
social movements engage the POS in a sort of dialectical relation that shapes 
the collective action and the ways that action has to survive. This explains why 
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in the Basque Country, the main way of action chosen in the 1980s and early 
1990s is direct action, but the ways of action chosen in the late 1990s and 
2000s are more related to the development of political alliances (De la Peña & 
Ibarra, 2004), (Ibarra, 2005a). Charles Tilly developed this idea under the name 
of Political Process. This, according to Casquette (1998) and Cohen and Arato 
(1992), is one of the variants of RMT. This approach defends the importance of 
the political frame to shape collective action. Any political development has 
direct effects on the resources and, therefore, on the possibilities of success of 
any social movement. The main difference between RMT and the Political 
Process approach is that RMT identifies the success of any given movement in 
the recognition of a SMO as a valid political actor or in the capability to mobilize 
resources, the Political Process approach identifies success as the capability of 
any social movement to influence and change any public policy. This means 
that all the repertoires of action of a social movement will be shaped by the 
political scenario this social movement is shaping. However, the POS again 
misses something important: the nature of the organization itself. Finally, the 
RMT and its variants do not take into account one methodological difficulty: the 
highly complicated task of measuring success. The measure of the importance 
of the actions of a social movement in changing a policy or changing a certain 
discourse of an actor is, at least, extremely complex (Ibarra, 2005a: 299-308; 
Giugni, 1999: xiii-xxxiii). Finally, as noted by Ibarra (2005a), „the results of 
collective action are not always the goals of a social movement‟ (Ibarra, 2005a: 
300).  
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New Social Movements theory 
The theoretical basis for understanding the nature of the Basque peace 
movement organizations and their role in the Basque Civil Society is given by 
New Social Movements (NSM) theory. Following Alain Touraine‟s (1981) 
definition of social movement, „The social movement is the organized collective 
behaviour of a class actor struggling against his class adversary for the social 
control of historicity in a concrete community‟ (Touraine, 1981: 77). This 
definition does not seem plausible in a society like the Basque Country. 
Although the Basque society has a high degree of traditionalism, the forms of 
collective action are more close to the struggles of modernity (workers‟ 
movement) and post-modernity, like the new social movements or solidarity 
movements (Funes, 1998a: 15).  However, it is a good starting point to 
understand the philosophy of the New Social Movements approach. One of the 
most important concepts is the concept of struggle. Touraine (1981) identifies 
this struggle with the class struggle, but the whole approach is based on some 
kind of conflict that shapes collective action. Another important concept in this 
definition is historicity, the „overall system of meaning that sets dominant rules 
in a given society‟ (Touraine, 1981: 81). This is a particular historical context 
where both the social movements and their adversaries “play” the game of 
conflict. The struggle and the moment define collective action.  
Using this definition in the Basque Country, the peace process started in 
2006 could be described as a new historical context. In this context, Elkarri 
changed its nature and became Lokarri, “Citizen Network for the Agreement 
and the Consultation”, and Gesto por la Paz was immersed in a serious debate 
about the approach towards the new situation. As they were the two main 
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organizations of the Basque peace movement, it is possible to say that the 
Basque peace movement was also in a new context. Using the guidelines of a 
definition of social movement given by another of the authors of the New Social 
Movements approach, Alberto Melucci (1989), the Basque peace movement 
organizations researched are part of a social movement that is a specific class 
of collective phenomena, with three specific and clear dimensions: they involve 
solidarity, they are engaged in conflict, and, to a certain degree, they break the 
limits of compatibility of the system (Melucci, 1989: 29). To corroborate this, 
both Lokarri and Gesto por la Paz come from conflicting networks, and both 
were constructed with the idea of standing against the way mobilization was 
framed. This mobilization was characterized by the use of violent methods to 
demand Basque national rights (Casquette, 2003). Since the beginning the 
Basque peace movement organizations enjoyed considerable support and were 
the escape valve of an important social sector who did not believe in violence, 
either nationalist or state-sanctioned (Funes, 1998a: 35). Funes (1998a) also 
defines the highly ideological component that appears in the Basque peace 
movement organizations. This ideological component is why the New Social 
Movements approach is best suited to understanding the actions of the Basque 
peace movement organizations.  
One of the main problems is how organizations without any conflicting 
pattern can fit in a social movement, which, according to Melucci, is in conflict. 
One solution could be classifying this kind of organizations (Peace research 
institutes in the case of the Basque Country) as creators of identity and ideology 
for the Basque peace movement. In that way, they can be active contributors to 
that struggle. This trait applicable at Gernika Gogoratuz, Baketik, and Bakeola 
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tries to differentiate these organizations from Lokarri or Gesto por la Paz, which 
are more social mobilization oriented. It is important to say that the different 
categorizations that appear through the thesis are not, by any means, clear-cut 
differentiation between organizations, only a methodological tool that is useful 
to understand the framing efforts of the Basque peace movement.  
Another problem is the focus of the NMS on the ideological patterns, 
ignoring the resources or the organizational dimension. The NMS is a really 
powerful tool to understand the creation and the goals of a social movement, 
but as I explain later, the way the movement is organized and the tools these 
organizations use is best explained using another tool: the organizational 
approach. 
Social movement organizations 
In this section I outline some of the most relevant analysis about social 
movement organizations. I divide this section according to the main social 
movement theories. First, I explain the approach to organizations taken by the 
classical theories. For that I use the work of Casquette (Casquette, 1998: 69). 
After that I explain the organizational approach based in Resource Movement 
Theory. For that I am going to use the works of Zald and McCarthy, two of the 
“fathers” of the organizational theory (Zald & McCarthy, 1987a), (Zald & Ash, 
1966), (Zald & McCarthy, 1987b). Finally, I develop the organizational analysis 
behind New Social Movements theory. For that task I base my explanation on 
the works of Touraine (1981) and Melucci (1988; (1996).   
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The classical approaches 
The classical approaches failed to analyze social movement 
organizations. Basically, the ties between the organization and the movements 
were non-existent, at least, discontinuous. For the classical approaches, the 
only organizations leading to political change were pressure groups and political 
parties. This is because the basic understanding of social movements is tied 
with their non-structured ways of action. Social movements for the classical 
approaches are a deviation from the “normal” way of life of society (Casquette, 
1998: 69). 
Resource Mobilization Theory 
The RMT developed the organizational approach, where the focus is the 
organizational development of any given social movement. The most notable 
authors of this approach are Mayer N. Zald and John McCarthy. This approach 
tries to explain the organizations and the highly complex dimension that is 
behind the activity of the social movements. In the introduction to Zald and 
McCarthy‟s work Social Movements in an Organizational Society, William 
Gamson outlines the main focus of Zald and McCarthy‟s work (Gamson, 1987: 
2): 
 They focus the attention on interaction between SMOs and a variety of 
other organizations (other SMOs in the same movement, 
countermovement organizations and authorities). 
 They focus on the organizational infrastructure of these SMOs.  
In analyzing Zald and McCarthy‟s work, the main piece of work that 
approaches the organizational dimension of the social movements is the article 
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entitled Resource Mobilization Theory and Social Movements: A Partial Theory 
(1987a). One important contribution from these authors is the deconstruction of 
the concept of social movement. They divide social movements into five 
different parts: the social movement itself, countermovements, SMOs, Social 
Movements Industry (SMI) and Social Movements Sector (SMS).  
For Zald and McCarthy, a social movement is „a set of beliefs in a 
population representing preferences for changing some elements of the social 
structure or reward distribution, or both, of a society‟ (Zald & McCarthy, 1987a: 
20); a countermovement is „a set of opinions and beliefs in a population 
opposed to a social movement‟ (Zald & McCarthy, 1987a: 20).  
Probably, the most successful term developed by Zald and McCarthy is 
the concept of SMO. The definition that Zald and McCarthy gave is „a complex, 
or formal, organization that identifies its goals with the preferences of a social 
movement or a countermovement and attempts to implement those goals‟ (Zald 
& McCarthy, 1987a: 20). Following this definition „All SMOs that have as their 
goal the attainment of the broader preferences of a social movement constitute 
a Social Movement Industry (SMI)‟ (Zald & McCarthy, 1987a: 20). This is the 
organizational analogue of a social movement. Finally, the Social Movement 
Sector (SMS) „consists of all SMIs in a society no matter to which social 
movements they are attached‟ (Zald & McCarthy, 1987a: 20). The reference 
about the SMOs is central for this approach, as Zald and Ash (1966) stated: 
„Social movements manifest themselves, in part, through a wide range of 
organizations‟ (Zald & Ash, 1966: 327).  
Zald and McCarthy explain this analytical deconstruction with the 
following example. In a given context, there is any number of SMIs (called them 
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ecologist action, nuclear disarmament, women justice and so on). Altogether, 
they form the SMS, and the SMIs are formed by SMOs. Therefore, the Student 
Non Violent Coordinating Comitee, as Zald and McCarthy used as an example, 
was part of the “justice for black Americans” SMI (Zald & McCarthy, 1987a: 21). 
Trying to delimit these concepts is tricky, as Zald and McCarthy say it is difficult 
to put the SMOs in a certain SMI or another.  
The basic element of this analysis is the SMO. Zald and McCarthy focus 
this analysis on the capabilities of the SMOs to mobilize resources. First, they 
understand that each SMO has a number of target goals (Zald & McCarthy, 
1987a: 22).  As well, any SMO needs resources to achieve these goals and the 
way the SMO works to achieve these goals depends on the resources the SMO 
has at hand. „In any case, resources must be controlled or mobilized before 
action is possible‟ (Zald & McCarthy, 1987a: 22).   
  Zald and McCarthy divide the individuals in any SMO into adherents, 
who are sympathethic to the SMO, and non-adherents, who are not. Last, there 
are the constituents; the people who provide resources to a SMO (Zald & 
McCarthy, 1987a: 23). At the first level, the main task of a SMO is converting 
adherents into constituents and, at a second level, turning non-adherents into 
adherents (Zald & McCarthy, 1987a: 23). To conclude the explanation of the 
organizational approach, the authors define the three main characteristics of 
this approach (Zald & McCarthy, 1987b: 12-13): 
 The main focus of this approach is the SMOs study. The functions that 
these organizations have are multiple. The most important is trying to 
increase the number of activists and define strategies and tactics. 
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 The organizational approach assumes the existence of a rich society, full 
of coordinated activities by associations with limited objectives. This point 
is defined after having studied some organizations in the USA. Thus, 
Zald and McCarthy admit that is difficult to implement this idea in 
societies without a solid civil society (Casquette, 1998: 73). 
 The technologies available for the SMOs vary over time. Therefore, 
technological advances can make a huge difference to an SMO‟s ways 
of action. In extreme cases, technology can enable some SMOs to 
become highly professional. 
Another important contribution of Zald and McCarthy is the idea of 
context. The SMOs develop their activities in a particular context, and the SMOs 
should adapt to this context. The main reason for this adaptation is to secure 
the resources needed for survival. The main consequence is that the power 
relations and other internal processes of the SMOs are affected by the position 
of the individuals or other organizational actors in the regulation and control of 
resources. Thus, for Zald and McCarthy, to explain any SMO the analyst is 
required to study the context in which they move.  
This context implies the existence of competitive actors: „SMOs must 
appeal for support. Consequently, at the most general level, SMOs must 
compete not only with all other SMOs, but with voluntary organizations of other 
kinds as well as for the time, effort, loyalty and money that citizens can give or 
withhold.‟(Zald & McCarthy, 1987b: 164).  
Following this reasoning, Zald and McCarthy give us the different levels 
of interaction involved in the context. First are the SMOs that compete for the 
same resources. Zald and McCarthy state the existence of relationships of 
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collaboration between fellow SMOs in the same SMI as well of relationships of 
competition. In the case of competition, they state that these kinds of 
relationships appear when two SMOs have the same base of adherents (Zald & 
McCarthy, 1987b: 164). 
Second is the relation between two SMIs and the progression of SMOs 
between SMIs. In that case, Zald and McCarthy use the language of economics 
in identifying successful SMOs with organizations that are able to offer new 
products. This product differentiation is the way to control one segment of the 
SMI market (Zald & McCarthy, 1987b: 167).  
Finally I would like to elaborate some critiques of this approach. The first 
one is the lack of explanation about values, ideals and discourses. It lacks 
important aspects about collective action like loyalty, cultural frameworks and 
collective identity. The attention is given to the availability and managing of 
resources, although these other dimensions are addressed in later works 
(McAdam et al., 1996a). The final critique is the difficulty of differentiating under 
this approach between an SMO and a pressure group, especially when 
countermovements play an important role in the context. A relevant explanation 
of this critique appears in the work of Casquette (Casquette, 1998: 78). The 
main problem arises when Zald and McCarthy try to define the use and nature 
of the resources used by SMOs and pressure groups, giving more importance 
to the member commitment than to the money in the case of SMOs, giving them 
more horizontal structures. On the other hand, money and a hierarchical 
structure are more important in the analysis of pressure groups. This analysis 
can be problematic when trying to explain the nature of highly structured SMOs.  
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New Social Movements theory 
In this section I explain the organizational analysis from the NSM 
perspective. For this, I use the works of Alain Touraine (1981) and Alberto 
Melucci (1988; 1996).  
Alain Touraine‟s approach is meaningless without first providing a 
glimpse of his idea of social movements. For Touraine, a social movement is 
„the organized collective behaviour of a class actor struggling against his class 
adversary for the social control of historicity in a concrete community‟ (Touraine, 
1981: 77). After that, Touraine describes the social movement as an intention, a 
double relation between the adversary and the cultural stakes. These relations 
are described as a combination between three principles: identity, opposition 
and totality. These principles guide the action of the social movements 
(Touraine, 1981: 81). The principle of identity refers to how a social movement 
defines itself. The cultural stakes at play between the social movement and the 
adversary form the principle of totality. The principle of opposition explains the 
organization of any social movement. Touraine states that a social movement 
organizes itself at the point of identifying its adversary (Touraine, 1981: 83).   
 After this statement, Touraine does little to explain the nature and the 
work of SMOs (Touraine does not use this term). It is possible, however, to 
locate a NSM approach with the concept of an organization‟s nature in Alberto 
Melucci‟s work.  
 First, a few words about terms are in order. Melucci never uses the term 
SMO, instead of that he uses the term organization. This is because Melucci 
gives more importance to the processes of organization than to the 
organizational entity. With this in mind, Melucci begins his explanation about 
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organizations saying that „[a] social movement can survive over a period of time 
inasmuch as it is able to resist its own centrifugal forces and withstand the 
actions of its adversaries. This become possible only if it can develop a 
relatively stable organization and leadership‟ (Melucci, 1996: 313).  
Melucci reviews the RMT approach, acknowledging the importance of 
resources, the inevitable bureaucratization of an organization, and the change 
of objectives that comes with that process.  However, Melucci begins to deviate 
from the RMT perspective: „On the other hand, however, a social movement is a 
profoundly different kind of reality compared to the large corporations producing 
goods or services that have generally served as the original models for 
organizational theory‟ (Melucci, 1996: 314). For Melucci a social movement is 
firmly committed to building conflicting collective identities, so cannot be 
identified as a system of exchanges (Melucci, 1988: 332). This causes the 
movement to be organized in specific ways, depending on the context and the 
conflict between the movement and the adversaries.  
Melucci builds his approach upon these ideas. Regarding the nature of 
organizations, Melucci states „an organization imposes on a multiplicity of 
groups and interests (the basis of the movement) the limits of a Unitarian 
structure, gives it a central direction and establishes an agenda of shared 
objectives. But in order to be able to do so, it must also provides a series of 
incentives designed to build and secure the consensus and loyalty of its 
membership‟ (Melucci, 1996: 315). In that statement it is possible to see 
convergences between Melucci‟s ideas and the organizational approach given 
by Zald and McCarthy.  
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Melucci differentiates between internal and external procedures in an 
organization. In the internal system of allocation of resources, Melucci identifies 
three different procedures: the system of roles and the division of labour; the 
mechanism and criteria for the distribution of costs and benefits; and the 
structure of incentives. He also identifies a system of specialized roles designed 
to follow the objectives of the organization. This specialization depends on the 
nature of the organization itself. This system distributes the resources through 
the different levels of the organization and ensures a balance that makes the 
organization successful (Melucci, 1996: 315).  
In the organization internal system, Melucci identifies a power system. 
This power system is formed by three different dimensions: the structure of 
distribution of power; the processes for the aggregation of demands and the 
formation of decisions; and the mechanisms that guarantee the succession of 
the leadership functions (Melucci, 1996: 316).  
Following this, Melucci identifies the external dimension or the 
relationships with the environment. The context where the resources are 
gathered is important to the organization, as they must gather these resources 
from the society of which they are part. These resources can be material or, as 
Melucci states, hidden, for example support or consensus (Melucci, 1996: 316).  
After this introduction, Melucci describes the different processes of the 
organization, dividing them between internal and external. Melucci identifies 
three main internal processes: the formation of norms, the recruitment and 
succession of leadership, and the conflicts and factions.  
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Formation of norms 
According to Melucci, norms are the point at which operational needs 
come together with needs of integration and control (Melucci, 1996: 318-323). 
Every movement has its norms that are institutionalized and legitimized inside 
the organization. The degree of institutionalization depends on the importance 
and complexity of the organization. It happens the same with the flexibility and 
rigidity of these norms. As a rule, Melucci identifies four different areas of 
normative regulation inside an organization (Melucci, 1996: 323).  
Firstly, the exchange between members and the organization must be 
regulated. Here is where the internal incentives come into play, as well as the 
structure of rewards and sanctions. Secondly is the regulation of relations 
among the different components of the organization. The tasks and 
responsibilities inside an organization must be defined. Thirdly, the norms must 
include a definition of the relationship that the organization maintains with the 
social group it represents. Fourthly, these norms must specify the objectives 
and means of collective action.  
Having said that, Melucci states that the regulation process is not rigid. 
These norms are always under conflict and challenge by the members of the 
movement and can change overtime.  
The recruitment and succession of leadership 
This process guarantees the continuation of the organization, either 
through continuity or change. Melucci (1996: 319) states that the selection of 
leadership is made through three different channels: 
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 The social groups that make up the constituency of the movement make 
the selection, and thus the selection processes bypass the organization, 
although, this is rare.  
 The selection happens through delegation at the intermediate levels of 
the organization. This depends on how centralized the organization is. 
 The last mechanism is centralized selection, when the leaders 
themselves decide who will be the next leader by appointment.  
These models of selection reflect different organizational logics. These 
procedures can change from one organization to another, but every change has 
two characteristics: it reflects a certain balance in the power relations and is an 
important element of social mobilization.  
Conflicts and factions 
Tensions and conflicts are a consequence of the inherent complexity of 
every organization. The differences in the understanding of every aspect of a 
movement can be small or, as Melucci states, provoke schisms (Melucci, 1996: 
320). However, conflicts appear under a series of specific conditions and areas. 
First are the conflicts about the quantity and fairness of the incentives. Second, 
the quantity and quality of internal communications can obstruct the 
aggregation of demands. Third, the totality of resources determines the capacity 
of an organization to answer demands, and finally, conflict can depend on the 
capacity of an organization to redraw its ideological framework. The more 
capable an organization is of adapting its ideological framework to the different 
demands, the less likely it is to engage in internal conflict (Melucci, 1996: 321).  
 After explaining the internal processes of an organization, Melucci 
analyzes the relationship between the organization and its environment. For 
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Melucci there are three main variables to understand this relationship (Melucci, 
1996: 325): 
 The requisites of affiliation required by the organization. Melucci explains 
this saying that the more elastic the requisites the wider the support, but 
this comes with an increased probability of facing internal conflict. 
 The attitudes of social groups that are not part of the social movement‟s 
constituency. The “spectator groups” as Melucci calls them, can give the 
organization indirect resources or moral support. However, they can also 
hamper the organization‟s recruitment. 
 The response of the opponents, or, in particular, the reaction of the 
political powers and the apparatuses of the state. Melucci says that the 
behaviour of the adversary is key to understand the success or failure of 
an organization. This behaviour can also modify the structure of the 
organization.  
The organizations not only have to deal with society as a whole, but with 
other organizations that are part of the social movement, particularly if they 
claim that they represent the whole social movement. As Melucci states „these 
organizations define the objectives of the movement and the means for 
collective action differently, and compete against each other for support by 
potential adherents. The competition may have a radicalizing influence on 
objectives and tactics. The dissatisfied support base of one organization may 
be successfully mobilized by another which proposes more radical objectives or 
tactics‟ (Melucci, 1996: 325-326).  
It does not mean that the relationships between organizations are always 
of competition; Melucci states that these relationships can be of cooperation, 
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alliance and even fusion. Cooperation appears when different organizations 
decide to take different roles in pursuit of the same goal. When this becomes 
regular an alliance occurs and they intensify cooperation. Finally, if they 
become one entity, fusion happens. Of course, for alliances and fusions the 
debate about costs and benefits is central (Melucci, 1996: 326). 
 After defining the internal and external processes and systems of the 
organizations, Melucci makes an analysis of forms of organizations. Instead of 
making a typology, Melucci prefers to provide analytical tools through which the 
organizations can be analyzed (Melucci, 1996: 327).  
First, Melucci states that organizations can be analyzed by their 
objectives. It is possible to distinguish between expressive and instrumental 
goals. The former are aimed to fulfil the satisfaction of the social and 
psychological needs of the members. The latter are the attainment of specific 
goods. Melucci states that this distinction is problematic in the analysis of 
contemporary forms of action. Second, Melucci divides the organizations 
between inclusive and exclusive. The former implies elastic and flexible ways of 
selecting members and the latter selects members in stricter and more rigid 
ways.  
Another analytical tool is focused on the incentives the organization 
offers to its members. They can be material incentives, solidarity incentives and 
value incentives. The first are economic goods or resources, the second are 
derived from the participation itself and the third are about the whole objective 
of the organization (Melucci, 1996: 327). 
The relations with the environment, particularly with other organizations, 
constitute another analytical approach. In that case, organizations can be 
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analyzed in terms of isolation or integration. This dimension, internally, refers to 
the heterogeneity or homogeneity of an organization.  
Finally is the power issue. In this case it is possible to differentiate 
between authoritarian and participatory organizations. When taking into account 
leadership it is possible to differentiate between orientations toward mobilization 
or towards articulation.  
 These analytical dimensions can be combined to get an articulate frame 
analyzing social movements. Finally, Melucci states that this catalogue is far 
from exhaustive (Melucci, 1996: 327).     
Frame analysis theory 
This part is devoted to expose the different theoretical issues regarding 
frame analysis. I begin with a brief introduction of the foundations of frame 
analysis and the different branches of knowledge devoted to that. After that I 
give a longer explanation of the theoretical concepts of frame analysis 
regarding social movement studies.  
Following that path, I start with the work of Erwing Goffman (1974), 
regarding its impact in the application of frame analysis to social movements. 
After that I consider the different aspects of frame analysis in social movement 
theory, discussing particular authors like Snow and Benford (1986, 1988, 1992, 
2000) and Gamson (1992a, 1992b, 1995, 1996).  
A sociological approach to frame analysis. A brief review of Erwing 
Goffman’s work Frame Analysis.  
Erwing Goffman‟s work is prolific and dense, taking up the concept of 
framing developed by the anthropologist Gregory Bateson in his work A Theory 
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of Play and Fantasy (1972). Bateson proved the fact that to understand a 
communicative act, a reference to a metamessage of what is happening is 
required (Rivas, 1998: 182). Following this rationale, Goffman builds his dense 
work, Frame Analysis, upon the following question: “What is happening here?” 
(Goffman, 1974: 8). To identify one event from others and to give it some sense 
we have to use some interpretive frames. Goffman calls them primary frames, 
because they do not relate to any other previous interpretation. The primary 
frames concept is the main definition of frame used by Goffman. Frame denotes 
„schemata of interpretation‟ that enable individuals „to locate, perceive, identify, 
and label‟ occurrences within their life space and the world at large (Goffman, 
1974: 21). Goffman makes a distinction between two kinds of primary frames: 
natural and social. The natural primary frames make it possible to distinguish 
and isolate events considered “not in order, not oriented, unanimated, not 
guided, purely physical”. The social primary frames make it possible to 
distinguish events that have “the will, the end, the controlled effort of an 
intelligence, a living agency, mainly the human being” (Goffman, 1974: 22). 
Briefly, the human being perceives different events using primary frames and 
the different kinds of primary frames provide a way to describe such events. 
Using Goffman‟s words, the sun rising is a natural event, moving the curtain to 
block the sun, a social one (Goffman, 1974: 25).  
Following Bateson, Goffman formulates a central concept for the analysis 
of different frameworks, the key. The key is the assembly of different 
conventions by which one event, given sense by one primary frame, transforms 
itself into another event, using the original as a model, but with a sensible 
difference for the participants. Keying is a process of transcription. The keying 
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plays a central role to determine what is really happening (Goffman, 1974: 45). 
Goffman has two different objectives: to isolate the basic frames in human 
society to give sense to the process of experience and to analyze the different 
vulnerabilities that affect these reference frames (Goffman, 1974: 10). Goffman 
implies the idea that the different frames are not stable structures. This idea is 
revisited later by different authors applying frame analysis to social movements 
(Snow & Benford, 2000: 628).  
The primary frames of a given social group are central components of its 
culture. In the interpretation of such frames appear things like schematics 
categories, their relations and finally, an undetermined group of forces and 
agents. However, the question of a frame of cultural frameworks (the system of 
beliefs or ideologies the frame operates within) remains outside of Goffman‟s 
analysis. This is addressed later by the different analysts of the political 
discourse and social movements (Rivas, 1998: 185).  
Frame analysis in social movements theory 
Probably, the first to apply frame analysis to social movement was 
William Gamson. In 1982 he and others introduced the “frame of injustice” 
concept (Gamson et al., 1982). They based their analysis on Goffman‟s work, 
defining frameworks as mental orientations that organize perceptions and 
interpretations. This is a cognitive approach that was eventually abandoned by 
Gamson himself, focusing on the collective processes and organization 
processes related to mobilization (Gamson, 1988). The other group of 
researchers devoted to frame analysis regarding social movements are Snow, 
Benford, Hunt, and Rochford. Other significant authors regarding frame analysis 
and social movements are Gerhards (1995), Gerhards and Rucht (1992), 
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Donati (1992), and Johnston (1995). I am going to revisit these authors as I 
describe the different aspects of frame analysis and social movements. For that 
I follow the categorization given by Snow and Benford (2000).  
Collective action frames 
The main difference between Goffman‟s approach and the social 
movement application of frame analysis is its collective nature. Social 
movements become signifying agents actively engaged in the production and 
maintenance of meaning for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or 
observers (Snow & Benford, 1988). In other words, social movements become 
creators and administrators of collective action frames. They are collective 
because they are aimed at a group of people and action-oriented because they 
are aimed at mobilizing these people. Framing, under this approach, denotes 
an active, processual phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the 
level of reality construction. It is active in the sense that something is being 
done, and processual in the sense of a dynamic, evolving process (Snow & 
Benford, 2000: 614).   
Going beyond Goffman‟s theory, collective action frames perform the 
interpretive function noted above, by simplifying and condensing aspects of the 
world, but in ways that are “intended to mobilize potential adherents and 
constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists” 
(Snow & Benford, 1988: 198). Collective action frames are action-oriented sets 
of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns 
of a social movement organization (SMO) (Snow & Benford, 1992; Snow & 
Benford, 2000: 614). Collective action frames are the outcome of negotiating 
shared meaning (Gamson, 1992b: 111). Collective action frames are 
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constituted by two characteristic features: core-framing tasks (Snow & Benford, 
1988; Snow & Benford, 2000: 617) and the interactive, discursive processes 
that attend these core-framing tasks and thus are generative of collective action 
frames (Gamson, 1992b; Snow & Benford, 1992).  
Core framing tasks 
Snow and Benford identify three different tasks or processes. These are 
“diagnostic framing”, “prognostic framing” and “motivational framing” (Snow & 
Benford, 1988; Snow & Benford, 2000: 617).  
Diagnostic Framing 
To date, most of the analysis regarding “diagnostic framing” is related to 
the injustice frame defended by Gamson et al. (1982). The first task of a given 
SMO is to define the victims and culprits of any given situation. Since social 
movements seek to remedy a problem, it is paramount to define the source(s) 
of causality, blame or/and culpable agents (Snow & Benford, 2000: 616). 
However, different SMOs can define different attributes for a given situation. 
Regarding the Basque peace movement organizations, Gesto por la Paz 
assigns more blame upon different nationalist political sectors, in contrast with 
Lokarri, which needs to be in tune with the different political groups. Lokarri 
needs to maintain a calm relationship with the different political parties due its 
political project. The same can be said about the role of the victims of violence 
(Anton, 2007: 68), but in this case Gesto por la Paz is the organization that 
nurtures the victims of violence demands for recognition.  
Another interesting attribution process is what is called “boundary 
framing” (Hunt et al., 1994: 194) and “adversarial framing” (Gamson, 1995). 
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These processes tend to delimit boundaries between “good” and “evil”, thus 
building protagonists and antagonists.  
Prognostic Framing 
Prognostic framing involves the articulation of a proposed solution to the 
problem and the strategies for carrying out the plan (Snow & Benford, 2000: 
616). This prognosis seems to be restrained by two main factors: the diagnosis 
and what is called “counterframing” (Benford, 1987: 75). Counterframing can 
put movement activists into a defensive stance, which can lead to a clearer 
prognosis. Coming back to the case study prognostic framing establishes one of 
the most importance differences between Basque peace movement 
organizations. Lokarri uses a more “institutional” approach because it tries to 
enforce a political agenda, while Gesto por la Paz relies on a more 
“contentious” approach to achieve social mobilization. This difference is fully 
explored in chapter 7.  
Motivational Framing 
Motivational framing provides a rationale to engage in collective action. 
That implies the construction of a proper discourse and vocabulary for that task.  
This task entails the development of the “agency” component of collective 
action frames. The agency component refers to what Gamson describes as the 
“consciousness that [it] is possible to alter conditions or policies through 
collective action” (Gamson, 1995: 90).  
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Variable features of collective action frames 
Different studies on collective action frames found four main features that 
affect the analysis. These are the identification problem, flexibility, variation in 
interpretive scope, and resonance (Snow & Benford, 2000: 618).  
Problem identification and direction/locus attribution 
Under the same frame it is possible to find different ways of 
identifying problems. This enables the elaboration of different lists of collective 
action frames. The most interesting results come from comparative studies. For 
instance, Gerhards and Rucht found differences between the problems 
identified by the same frame in different time periods: “ the larger the range of 
problems covered by a frame, the larger the range of social groups that can be 
addressed with the frame and the greater the mobilization capacity of the frame” 
(Gerhards & Rucht, 1992: 580).  
Flexibility and rigidity, inclusivity and exclusivity 
Collective action frames can vary in terms of exclusivity and flexibility. 
Hypothetically, the more flexible and inclusive a frame, the more prone it is to 
become a master frame (Snow & Benford, 2000: 618).  
Variation in interpretive scope and influence 
Normally, a collective action frame is limited to the interests of certain 
groups or organizations. However, collective action frames can vary in their 
scope and become a constraint of other social movement‟s actions. These 
frames are considered master frames (Snow & Benford, 1992: 138). Master 
frames constitute a way to constrain any number of movement organizations. 
Master frames can be affected by four different variables: attributional function, 
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linguistic codes, mobilizing potency and narrative fidelity. Using these four 
dimensions it is possible to classify different master frames in terms of flexibility, 
openness and resilience (Snow & Benford, 1992: 138-141).  
Resonance 
The concept of resonance was developed by Snow and Benford 
(1988). This concept is relevant to assess the effectiveness of mobilization 
potency of such frames, and addresses the question of why some frames are 
more effective than others; why they “resonate” (Snow & Benford, 1988). 
Resonance can be measured using two different variables: credibility of the 
proffered frame and its relative salience. Credibility depends on discourse 
consistency and empirical credibility, which means a certifiable credibility of the 
frame articulators. A fit between the perception of world events and the actions 
of the SMOs make any given frame more credible (Gamson, 1992a). Framing is 
made more credible, with broader appeal, when the claimed evidence is more 
culturally believable with a greater amount of slices of such evidence (Snow & 
Benford, 2000: 620).  
The other feature about resonance is its salience to targets of 
mobilization. Beliefs, values and ideas associated with the movements are 
central to understanding frame salience. The more central or salient the beliefs, 
ideas and values of the movement to the targets of mobilization, the greater the 
probability of their mobilization (Snow & Benford, 2000: 621).  
Master frames 
One collective action frame concept that is important to this research is 
the master frame concept. A master frame is a collective action frame that 
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emerges from a specific movement to become several movements‟ paradigm 
for action. Master frames have the same functions as collective action frames, 
but on a larger scale. They provide the punctuations, articulations and 
attributions for a specific phenomenon. In other words, a master frame is a 
hugely successful collective action frame (Snow & Benford, 1992: 138). Master 
frames work in the same fashion as collective action frames, but in a larger 
scale. They work as meta-frames. They normally colour other movements‟ 
collective action frames with only three substantial differences. First, master 
frames normally take the lead role to assign blame in a particular issue or 
problem. Second, master frames can be very flexible in the articulation mode or 
incredibly rigid, which normally depends on the mobilizing potential of the 
master frame. Therefore, in places where the master frame is highly credible 
and it is perceived as legitimate, it tends to be more rigid. Finally, the more rigid 
the master frame is, the more cultural elements from its surrounding are needed 
to give the frame fidelity. Master frames need a high degree of resonance to 
operate, as they need to permeate sectors for which the master frame was not 
designed. The factors that affect this process are varied: the protest cycle, the 
credibility and the clarity with which the frame is able to allocate blame. In this 
research this concept is important because, as explained in the introductory 
chapter, the Basque Peace Frame has some, but not all, of the characteristics 
to be considered a master frame that relies on a clear enemy and a clear and 
rigid way of action to be credible. In this case, the enemies are ETA and the 
Spanish State and the way of action is rejection of violence, respect for the 
victims of political violence, and social and political reconciliation.   
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Framing processes and dynamics 
I discuss now the different framing processes and the literature on these 
framing processes (Snow et al., 1986; Snow & Benford, 2000). I begin with the 
development, generation and elaboration of such processes and I finish by 
discussing how frames are diffused across movements, cultures and time.  
Frames not only appear to be constructed, developed and elaborated 
upon the core-framing tasks explained before, but also by the way of three sets 
of overlapping processes that can be conceptualized as discursive, strategic 
and contested (Snow & Benford, 2000: 623). 
Discursive processes 
As can be deduced from the name, these processes concern discourse, 
talk, conversation and speeches. Here it is possible to define two different 
processes: frame articulation and frame amplification (different from the 
strategic process of framing amplification, explained later in this chapter). 
Frame articulation involves the connection and alignment of events and 
experiences so that they hang together in a relatively unified and compelling 
fashion (Snow & Benford, 2000: 623). Frame amplification involves the 
highlighting of specific issues, events or beliefs to make the frame more credible 
and effective. 
Strategic processes 
Strategic processes are those that are deliberative, utilitarian and goal 
directed. These processes have been conceptualized as “frame alignment 
processes” in the work of Snow et al. (1986), from which it is possible to define 
  65 
four different strategic processes: frame bridging, frame amplification, frame 
extension, and frame transformation.  
Frame bridging refers to the linkage of two or more ideologically 
congruent, but structurally unconnected, frames regarding a particular issue or 
problem (Snow et al., 1986: 467). One important idea is the linkage between a 
given social movement industry and what McCarthy calls “unmobilized 
sentiment pools” (McCarthy, 1986). These pools are aggregates of individuals 
who share common grievances, but who lack organizational base. This process 
appears in the case study, in the form of mechanisms created to mobilize 
concerned people about peace in the Basque Country. Lokarri seems to have 
switched its main frame alignment process from frame transformation to frame 
bridging using new technologies to unite individuals concerned about peace 
(Anton, 2009).  
Frame amplification refers to the clarification and invigoration of an 
interpretive frame that impacts on a particular issue, problem or set of events 
(Snow et al., 1986: 469). This process involves a two-dimensional approach, 
the value amplification and the belief amplification. The former refers to the 
identification, idealization, and elevation of one or more values presumed basic 
to prospective constituents, but without collective action. The latter involves the 
amplification of stereotypes or a set of beliefs about antagonists, situations and 
future events.  
Frame extension refers to the intentions of a social movement of 
portraying its activities as congruent with the beliefs of the potential adherents, 
a process particularly common in the peace movement. Normally this 
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mechanism appears studying groups close to the social movement, but not part 
of it. (Snow et al., 1986: 472).  
Frame transformation refers to the mechanisms adopted by an SMO to 
change the current frame and put in place a frame closer to its ideals. When a 
frame does not resonate enough or mobilization decreases, the movement tries 
to plant and create new values, new rules. New values have to be nurtured, old 
meanings or understandings jettisoned, and erroneous beliefs or “misframings” 
reframed (Goffman, 1974: 308). Going back to Goffman, that is precisely what 
he means as keying. This is the action of redefining activities or events to make 
them seem as “something else” (Goffman, 1974: 45). Snow et al. define two 
different transformation processes: transformations of domain specific frames 
and global interpretive frames (Snow et al., 1986: 474). The former relates to 
substantial, but fairly self-contained, changes in a dominant frame. The latter 
involves a more general change, normally aimed to create a master frame.  
Contested processes 
Contested processes emerge from challenges between movements or 
antagonists. The main contests are created between movement opponents, 
bystanders, and the media: frame disputes within movements; and the dialectic 
between frames and events (Snow & Benford, 2000: 625). Normally, these 
contests occur in a multi-dimensional and complex environment. The most 
studied of contests are the challenges created by the media. However, it is 
important to note the counterframing processes, or processes created to 
delegitimize a social movement, normally pursued by social movement‟s 
opponents.  
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 Finally I explain how these frames diffuse. Framing activity is more prone 
to diffusion when one of the parts, the transmitter or the adopter, takes an 
active role in the process. The two main frame diffusion processes are strategic 
selection or adaptation and strategic fitting or accommodation.  
 Strategic Selection is done when there is intentional cross-cultural 
borrowing. Strategic fitting involves cross-cultural promotion. In other words, the 
former involves adoption of frames, while the later involves the opposite 
process (Jennes, 1995; Jennes & Broad, 1994; Snow & Benford, 2000: 627).  
Contextual constraints and facilitation 
Framing is a dynamic process that changes over time. However, this 
process is not isolated from other structural or cultural issues, and is modulated, 
created and developed from them. Here I focus on two processes that impact 
directly upon frames: Political Opportunity Structure and cultural constraints and 
opportunities. 
Political Opportunity Structure 
The POS is defined as the „consistent – but not necessarily formal or 
permanent – dimensions of the political environment that provide incentives for 
collective action by affecting people‟s expectations for success or failure‟ 
(Tarrow, 1998: 76-77). It is possible to assert that changes in the institutional 
arena will affect the different framing processes of a social movement. For 
some frames, changes in material conditions lead to changes in frame 
resonance, which in turn lead to reframing.  
Cultural opportunities and constraints 
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Culture constitutes a major factor affecting different framing 
processes. The more relevant cultural material includes the extant stock of 
meanings, beliefs, ideologies, practices, values, myths, narratives, and the like. 
This is what Swindler calls the “tool kit” (Swindler, 1986). These are the 
foundations for new cultural meanings and new cultural framing processes. 
Movements become both consumers of existing cultural meanings and 
producers of new meanings. Collective action is thus the stage in which new 
meanings are produced, as well as full of old meanings (Tarrow, 1992: 189). In 
this research I look at the Basque Peace Social Movement, not only as a hub 
for public and collective action, but also as a creator of culture itself. Inside this 
category are the peace organizations described in chapters 5 and 8, which do 
not have as their main objective social mobilization, but are creators of cultural 
values for the peace movement.  
The cultural effects of framing processes are a significant point of 
focus for this research; hence I devote a full part of this theoretical chapter to 
this.  
The impact of social movements 
Considering that social movements emerge to effect change, to achieve 
something, the lack of studies addressing social movements‟ impacts is quite 
paradoxical. Social movements emerge to compel political elites to take 
decisions on their behalf, to change, or ultimately have a lot of weight in public 
policy (Ibarra, 2005a: 299).  Some authors note this difficulty: 
 „Part of the problem is that while it is possible to correlate 
outcomes with movement efforts, it is not easy to identify particular 
movement actions as the cause for a specific outcome. To the voices of 
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movement activists we must add the impact of public opinion, interest 
groups, parties, and executives as potential causes for outcomes of 
interest to movements‟ (Tarrow, 1998: 162).  
With impacts, apart from that methodological question, it is important to 
take into account the following issues: first, there is a terminology problem. 
Whilst accepting different terms, like consequences, impacts or results, it is 
important not to associate any of these terms with success or failure 
(Casquette, 1998: 203). The reason for this is that social movements often 
achieve results that are not initially intended (Ibarra, 2005a: 300; Giugni, 1999: 
xxi). Second, most of the studies made are focused on public policy outcomes, 
mostly based on the idea defended by Tarrow that social movements are 
defined as „collective challenges, based on common purposes and social 
solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, opponents, and authorities‟ 
(Tarrow, 1998: 4).  
However, social movements are not only aimed at achieving something 
in the public policy arena; they seek impacts at a number of different levels. It is 
possible to classify the different impact in two levels, external and internal, each 
with their own categories: 
 
Impact Scenarios 
External Impacts Internal Impacts 
 Political Institutions 
Demands Inclusion 
Processual 
Substantial  
Structural 
 Movement 
Systemic Structure 
Support 
 Political Actors 
Agenda 
Structures 
Symbolic Dimension 
Action and Organization 
 Organization 
Collective Identity 
Size 
                          Organization Structure 
 Society  Members 
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Cultural Change 
Political Change 
Material Change 
Winnings 
Biography 
Source: (Ajangiz, 2002: 40) 
In the table above, cultural change is identified as one of the external 
impacts of social movements on society. This categorization is made for 
analytical purposes; in practice it is quite difficult to separate clearly external 
impacts from internal impacts, as social movements create effects in all the 
areas they work.  
Internal impacts have received less attention than external impacts in the 
literature. Social movements are created to transform their environment, but this 
is not as clear as one may think. External and internal impacts overlap, 
particularly when cultural and symbolic changes are involved (Casquette, 1998: 
221). Following the table above, the systemic structure refers to the way social 
movement‟s actions modify their alliance networks. Here it is possible to identify 
the way the social movement changes its strategy and its relations with 
opponents and antagonists. Support involves social movement‟s capacity to 
recruit members and leaders. Probably the most important dimensions of 
internal impacts are collective identity and organization structure. The 
construction, maintenance and transformation of individual and collective 
identities is one of the most notable impacts of social movements (Casquette, 
1998: 222). Using Melucci‟s words: „what the individuals demand collectively is 
the right to realise their own identity; the possibility to use their personal 
creativity, their affective lives, and their biological and interpersonal existence‟ 
(Melucci, 1980: 218). These dimensions can be affected by a movement‟s 
actions in qualitative and quantitative dimensions. The actions that create 
opponents and an identity crisis can take the movement to a fracture, and 
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reduce membership. This directly affects the organization structure. Sometimes, 
this dimension can be central for the movement, ignoring other dimensions of 
action. Finally, the members themselves could be affected. The selective 
incentives could grow, giving more winnings, or, more frequently, non-material 
winnings, for example, to be part of a group that rewards in terms of self-
esteem. The activist, through their participation in the social movement, 
acquires a biography in which their experience and knowledge have great value 
(Ibarra, 2005a: 304).  
External impacts are the most visible of impacts and are the dimensions 
of impacts the social movements aim for. First, it is possible to identify impacts 
that affect the political institutions. When a demand is formulated, for example, it 
can be in response to an authority decision or more proactively, because the 
movement creates it. However, the most important of impacts in this dimension 
are processual and substantial impacts. Gamson identifies two kinds of impacts 
(or “success16”) (Gamson, 1990: chpt 3). The first one refers to the moment a 
social movement is recognized as a valid speaker by its antagonists to defend a 
set of rights recognized as legitimate. This gives the social movement the 
opportunity to create new channels for participation in the decision-making 
processes, which is referred to as a processual impact (Kitschelt, 1986). 
Gamson asserts that there are four different indicators to assess the 
acceptance of social movements by the authorities:  
 The creation of processes of consultation.  
 The opening of negotiations with the antagonist indicates that they see 
the social movement as a legitimate and continuous speaker. 
                                            
16
 Gamson‟s success is the achievement of objectives clearly defended by an organization or 
social movement (Gamson called them “contentious groups”) 
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 Formal recognition of the social movement as a valid representative of a 
social base. This, however, does not necessarily mean the acceptance of 
the means and ways developed by the social movement.  
 Inclusion of members of the social movement in authority positions, 
retaining their status in the social movement.  
The second kind of “success” refers to the achievement of new 
advantages to the social movement‟s social base. That is, if the social 
movement achieves benefits determined by the social movement itself. This 
type of impact is called by Kitschelt a substantial impact (Kitschelt, 1986). 
Gamson combines the two dimensions, acceptance and advantage, and 
identifies four possible outcomes: 
  ACCEPTANCE 
  Total None 
NEW 
ADVANTAGES 
A Lot Total Response Prevacuum 
None Cooptation Collapse 
Source: (Gamson, 1990: 20) 
The total response and collapse categories are, respectively, total 
success or total failure for the social movement. The two other categories, 
cooptation and prevacuum are mixed. Cooptation admits acceptance, but 
without any new advantages and prevacuum involves new advantages without 
acceptance.  
Structural change or structural impacts „indicates a transformation of the 
political opportunity structures as a consequence of a social movement‟s 
activity‟ (Kitschelt, 1986: 67). These are much more important impacts. The 
movement changed the decision-making process, the structure at least. These 
changes can go much further to achieve, at their best, a change of political 
regime. This is highly unlikely, except, maybe, the processes of change that 
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happened in the eastern bloc countries. However, it is possible to define 
indicators for these changes as the inclusion of new political parties that are 
highly receptive to the social movement‟s demands. This is not the same as a 
social movement or organization that becomes a political party. Social 
movements not only want to have an impact on the political institutions or 
authorities, they seek to impact on the political actors. These kinds of impacts 
are called sensitizing impacts (Giugni, 1995). They can vary between social and 
political impacts. The symbolic dimension, for example, can be applied to the 
social dimension as well. These impacts work in different aspects: first, they 
occur when transforming the political and media agendas, modifying their 
priorities, forcing the inclusion of social movement‟s demands on those 
agendas. Thus, they shift the discourse through media; second, the alignment 
with different political actors forces the change of the political structures. The 
most important of structural changes is the appearance of new political actors 
(for example, green parties in Germany in the 1980s); third, they change 
political actors‟ priorities, changing their symbolic dimension and their 
frameworks. They have to adapt their discourse to the new cultural frames that 
appear from the social movement‟s actions and discourse; finally, and as a 
consequence of all the impacts explained under this point, the social 
movements transform the action and organization of other political actors 
(Ibarra, 2005a: 306).  
Social movements may achieve changes in society. Three dimensions in 
particular are affected by social movements‟ actions: culture, political culture 
and material change. A social movement can change the political culture of a 
society. People can adopt new attitudes and, for example, ask for more 
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participation if the social movement endorses a culture of political participation. 
Regarding material change, almost any type of change is possible, from the 
redistribution of salaries to new infrastructures. These changes are enacted in 
public policies that might appear as a result of the social movements‟ actions. 
Finally, the social movement can change the culture. It can transform public 
opinion and create new social frameworks. This process becomes endless; the 
movements change their discourses to fit in with the new frames that change 
their discourses…. At the end, they achieve change in behaviour and values.  
Cultural impacts  
Cultural impacts relates to the way social movements change values, 
knowledge and norms of a given society (Casquette, 1998: 217). Melucci (1989; 
1993) explores the field of cultural change and identifies three consequences 
derived from social movements: first, social movements enforce institutional 
change through political reforms and the redefinition of organization practices; 
second, they are a source of elite recruitment; third, they feed the process of 
cultural innovation. This is the production of models of behaviour and social 
relationships that enter into everyday life and the market, modifying the 
functioning of the social order by means of changes in language, sexual 
customs, affective relationships, dress and eating habits (Melucci, 1993: 249). 
However, all these impacts are minor, while Melucci states that the most 
important impact is derived from the challenge to the dominant codes over 
which social relationships are built (Melucci, 1993: 248). Melucci identifies three 
different kinds of symbolic challenges (Melucci, 1989: 75-76; Melucci, 1993: 
249-250). First, the prophecy: that is the act of announcing, based on 
experiences affecting the individual‟s life, that alternative frameworks of sense 
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are possible and that the operational logic of power apparatuses is not the only 
possible rationality (Melucci, 1993: 249). Second, the paradox: the reversal of 
the dominant codes by means of their exaggeration, which in turn reveals their 
irrationality and the measure of silence and violence they contain (Melucci, 
1993: 250). Third, the representation, in which the collective actors‟ capacity to 
isolate form from content permits, by means of a play of mirrors, their 
retransmission to the system of its own contradictions (Melucci, 1993: 250). The 
effects created by these three forms of symbolic challenge are not structural, 
but symbolic. They consist mainly in rendering power visible. These are the 
systemic effects (Melucci, 1989: 76-77). The role of collective action is to create 
public spaces to show the most hidden aspects of power. Once power has been 
discovered, it is possible to negotiate over it.  
One of the most important cultural impacts is the creation of master 
frames of protest (Snow et al., 1986; Snow & Benford, 1992), which are 
ideological narratives that legitimate protest and are shared by different social 
movements, as explained earlier in this chapter. This is linked to another 
important cultural impact, that is, the creation of new collective identities 
(McAdam, 1995: 50). Other impacts pointed out by McAdam include the 
creation of innovative forms of action or the creation of cultural items. The strike 
is, perhaps, the best example of the former. The strike is a form of action that 
supersedes the boundaries of the working class movement and has been 
identified with protest and contentious politics. The new ways of clothing, 
fashion, language or symbols are examples of the latter. McAdam points out the 
capacity of social movements to affect the work of mainstream cultural 
institutions such as the church. Actually, the example of the Liberation Theology 
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in Latin America is a fascinating example of new cultural uses of the Catholic 
church fuelled by social movements (McAdam, 1995: 52). Finally it is important 
to note what Eyerman and Jamison call cognitive praxis (Eyerman & Jamison, 
1991). This is the creation of new knowledge or the reinterpretation of existing 
knowledge in specific socio historic contexts. One example of this is the 
vulgarization/popularization of scientific knowledge by the environmentalist 
movement, making accessible information about greenhouse effects, acid rain, 
and more.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have discussed the theoretical basis of my research. 
Firstly, I defined peace movement and applied it to the Basque scenario. It is 
possible to say that a peace movement exists in the Basque Country with its 
own character. Alongside the organizations that struggle for a peaceful 
settlement of the conflict exist a number of peace research centres that, without 
having a strictly social nature, are providing inputs into the Basque peace 
movement. Secondly, I described and analyzed the different approaches that 
exist to explain collective action. I gave a brief explanation of the classical 
approaches to social movement theory, followed by a deeper analysis of the 
two main social movement theories, Resource Mobilization Theory and New 
Social Movements, in order to elaborate their strengths and weaknesses.  
Thirdly, I analyzed the different approaches to social movement 
organizations. I classified these approaches within the main theories of social 
movements. After explaining briefly the classical approach, I focused on the 
organizational approach in Resource Mobilization Theory, using the texts of 
Zald and McCarthy, before looking at the work of Alberto Melucci to give an 
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explanation of the organizations in a social movement from the New Social 
Movements perspective. Fourthly, I discussed the different approaches of frame 
analysis, providing a definition of what a frame is and how social movements 
deal with it. Finally, I discussed the different issues regarding social movement 
impacts, emphasizing the cultural dimension.  
From the theoretical discussion provided in this chapter, I conclude that 
when analyzing the Basque peace movement organizations it is useful to use 
two perspectives. One perspective is dedicated to the structural analysis of the 
organizations and their role in the Basque peace movement itself. For that the 
New Social Movement approach is more useful, taking into account its strong 
emphasis on ideological factors. The Basque peace movement organizations 
face a conflict between themselves and the political actors in the Basque 
Country. The second perspective is dedicated to the organizational 
development and inner working of the Basque peace movement organizations. 
To achieve this we need both the ideological approach elaborated by Melucci, 
and the organizational approach of Zald and McCarthy. It is possible to assert 
that the Basque peace movement organizations share a common frame that 
tries to modify other cultural frameworks of the conflict. The theoretical concepts 
presented in this chapter assist in answering the research questions presented 
in the introduction: Is there a Basque Peace Master Frame? How has the 
Basque Peace Frame evolved? How has the Basque Peace Frame impacted 
on other Basque Civil Society Organizations related to the conflict? The RMT 
and the New Social Movement approaches are revisited in the next chapter, 
focusing on the methodological implications inherent to them.  
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CHAPTER 3 - METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
I began my research with a clear research direction, and my research 
questions demonstrate the focus and range of my endeavour. However, the 
development of my research methodology was necessarily an iterative process, 
as my research took me into largely unchartered territory. I did not and could 
not determine concretely the methods and tools I would need for this research 
from the outset, and my choice and adaptation of methodology for this research 
would prove itself only in the final analysis. The engaging starting point about 
social research is, like nineteenth century exploration, that we do not know the 
path ahead or what lies between us, and our destination. We, as social 
scientists, begin with an approach and tools that have proved useful in similar 
research, adapting our methodology according to the research environment and 
specific challenges encountered as the research progresses, and in the process 
develop new methods and tools (Law, 2007). My methodology maintained its 
essence throughout, but was significantly re-shaped by the research 
experience. In the following section, I outline the choice of existing methods and 
tools available to me for this research, as utilised by the social movement 
theories, Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT) and New Social Movements 
(NSM). For that I will take the concepts explained in the previous chapter and I 
will focus on the methodological assumptions inherent to the RMT and the New 
Social Movement approaches. I explain my decision to employ frame analysis, 
followed by a description of my research journey, how I approached the field, 
the problems I encountered and how I approached the different organizations. I 
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explain my situation in the field, and discuss issues of access and withdrawal. 
Finally, I consider the ethical issues connected with my research, including the 
common issues of anonymity and informed consent, but also more subtle 
issues, such as the subjectivity of my position as a researcher, my role as 
Basque, male and academic.  
Different approaches to the study of social movements  
The following section is devoted to revisit and describe briefly the 
methodological assumptions used in the different social movement theory 
approaches. I highlight the underlying methodological factors shared by certain 
approaches to the study of social movements, though this is not to say that 
every approach shares the same methodological assumptions. For example, 
within RMT there exist different ways to tackle particular issues, notably the 
political process approach, which stresses the importance of the environment in 
explaining social movement organizations through the creation of the concept of 
Political Opportunity Structure  (POS). This is a concept whose existence and 
change, according to political process authors, can be measured (Gamson & 
Meyer, 1996: 277), and the political process approach provides means of 
looking at resources in mobilization theory as an external issue, whose nature is 
defined by the perceptions of the organizations researched (Tarrow, 1998: 76). 
Here lies a difference between the political process approach and other RMT 
approaches that see resources as something internal to, and rationally 
managed by, the organization. Nevertheless, the greatest difference in 
methodological assumptions is between theories. I outline the different 
characteristics of the methodological approaches adopted or developed by 
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different social movement theories and I connect them with the critical approach 
I used in this research.  
Resource Mobilization Theory. A rational choice needs a rational 
methodology 
It is important to note that when we talk about the RMT, in fact, we are 
talking about a family of concepts, propositions and research projects about 
social movements. While there is no consensus between authors in defining this 
approach (Casquette, 1998: 62), it is possible to outline the common points 
between orientations, mainly concerning methodology of research.  
Alberto Melucci identified perfectly the epistemological project of RMT 
when he said that it looks at the “how” and NSM looks at the “why” (Melucci, 
1980). With the “how”, Melucci meant the description of mobilization processes 
and the gathering of resources for action, which implies a functional approach 
to the study of social movements. RMT appeared as a response to irrationalist 
models of social action (Jenkins, 1983: 528; Alvarez-Junco, 1995: 104). The 
level of mobilization that occurred in the 1960s in the USA made some theorists 
(Leites & Wolf, 1970; Lipsky, 1968; Oberschall, 1973; Tilly, 1978; Zald & 
McCarthy, 1987a; Zald & McCarthy, 1987b) think about the rationality or 
irrationality of the individual and concluded that the rational management of 
resources is the most important factor when explaining collective action 
(Casquette, 1998: 62). However, as I explain in the previous chapter, RMT is 
not a monolithic approach. There are different orientations within RMT 
(Casquette, 1998: 69), but they share one approach, which is their emphasis on 
the importance of understanding social action through the strategic thinking of 
the individual and the calculation of costs and benefits before the beginning of a 
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course of action (Gamson et al., 1982; Gamson, 1990; McAdam, 1982b; 
Tarrow, 1998; Jenkins & Klandermans, 1995). While RMT theory uses the 
individual as the central actor who takes decisions, NSM uses the organization 
as a central actor in decision-making. I call the former an individual rationality 
model and the latter a collective rationality model.  
The individual rationality model employs the “individualist methodology”, 
which is the doctrine that affirms that all social phenomena are explicable using 
the properties, objectives and beliefs of individuals (Elster, 1982: 543). It is 
important to note some assumptions associated with this approach that are 
included in the different RMT methodological approaches, like the 
organizational approach (Zald & McCarthy, 1987b) or the political process 
approach (Kriesi, 1989; Kriesi et al., 1995; Tarrow, 1998; Tilly, 1978).  
 The RMT theory of social movements was widely influenced by Mancur 
Olson‟s (1965) theory of rational choice. It became the basis for understanding 
the individual rationality model and some of the basic points under the RMT 
methodological approach. Olson stated that, before being part of a collective 
action, the individual checks the costs and benefits of that decision in a purely 
instrumental way. The Olsonian ontological assumption is that the human being 
is selfish and looks to maximize the benefits of a given choice and trying to 
minimize the costs at the same time.  Indeed,  „unless the number of individuals 
in a group is quite small, or unless there is a coercion or some other special 
device to make individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-interested 
individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests‟ (Olson, 1965: 
2). This assumption is relevant in complex entities, such as State institutions, or 
interest groups, and highlights one of the problems derived, that is, the 
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existence of the free rider. For Olson, the individual, when in a group, will try to 
benefit from the efforts of others and enjoy the outcomes independently of their 
support for the organization (Olson, 1965: 16). This is the explanation given to 
understand individuals that do not take part in the achievement of goals, but 
enjoy their success. These are collective goods that cannot be negated. A 
problem derived from the free rider concept is that it is unable to explain why 
some individuals are very active in certain organizations. Olson attempts to 
resolve this by introducing the selective incentives concept. These are in 
addition to, but different from, public goods; they are perks that are only enjoyed 
by the committed individuals (Olson, 1965: 51).  
What is the impact of Olson‟s theories on the study of social 
movements? Olson broke with the preconception that collective goods and 
individual goods are in harmony. This was one of the ontological assumptions 
that earlier social movement theories entertained (Gurr, 1970: 359). After 
Olson‟s contribution, social theorists started to treat the relationship between 
public goods and individual goods as problematic. Social theorists assumed a 
natural inaction on the part of the individual when collective goods were at 
stake. Based on this, RMT (Zald & McCarthy, 1987a) developed a multifactor 
model of resource allocation, organization and political opportunities. Indeed, as 
a result of Olson‟s principles, resources became central to the description of 
social movements, leaving aside concepts like ideology, beliefs and privation 
situations. Few individuals assume the costs of collective action by themselves. 
An explanation of collective behaviour demands detailed attention to incentive 
selection, the mechanisms of cost reduction, and the professional benefits of 
collective action. (Zald & McCarthy, 1987a: 18). Another author key to 
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understanding RMT, Oberschall (1973) states that to build a theory of 
mobilization and opposition, of groups in conflict, of social movements and 
masses, of protest behaviour and of collective action, requires considerable 
modification of Olson‟s theories (Oberschall, 1973: 118).  
The RMT approach then, relies on a rationale that is based on the 
individual. It is the individual who makes the decisions and those decisions 
explain the different dynamics within collective action. However, this model 
alone is not sufficient to understand the different realities that appear in any 
given social movement. Collective action is a complex phenomenon, and there 
are plenty of examples that do not support this ontological assumption of 
selfishness. Other authors (Cohen, 1985; Kitschelt, 1991; Turner, 1991; Tarrow, 
1998) acknowledged this complexity and, using different approaches, moved 
from an individualistic rationale to a collective rationale, forming the political 
process approach. This change of approach was derived from three main 
critiques of the individualistic model. First, the rational action models ignore 
factors such as altruism, present widely in collective action. Second, a huge 
number of social movement organizations look for public benefits without giving 
any material personal incentive to their members, and third, the rational action 
model ignores the effect of the group or the collective, focusing solely on the 
individual, without any bonds to others. This has important methodological 
implications. Within RMT, the unit of analysis must be the individual. This 
individual is in an almost static field of interactions and only acts using an 
instrumental rationality. The role of emotions, discourses and symbols are 
rejected or ignored. This approach seems to be limited, as applying these 
methodological assumptions cannot explain why people act in unselfish ways. 
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Another point is the inability to explain widely successful collective action 
movements, like the ecological movement. These groups base their ideals in 
public benefits that cannot be divided. On the other hand, contemporary 
movements offer social incentives, like prestige, solidarity and so on. They are 
what Melucci calls solidarity incentives (Melucci, 1996: 327). Finally, the 
individual rationale assumes the different preferences that could be adopted by 
the individual are a static set of options that do not change with time. Instead, 
time is an external variable that contributes to our understanding of collective 
action. This suggests an epistemological approach that considers preferences 
as a central part of the research imperative and because these preferences 
change during the course of that action, they become an internal part of the 
process (Melucci, 1996; Casquette, 1998: 172). To be part of the group and be 
part of a particular social context entails a social construction of motives and of 
identities. The „rationality‟ of an action must be understood in the context of a 
complex interplay between the social values and preferences of the individual.  
As stated earlier, RMT uses, primarily an individual rationale approach to 
the research of social movements. However, following the political process 
critique, other authors (Rule, 1989; McAdam et al., 1996b; Tarrow, 1998) 
moved from an individual approach to a collective rationality approach. This 
approach assumes that individuals participate in a conscious way in those 
episodes of collective action that entail a high positive ratio between costs and 
benefits, but not for the individuals alone, but as a part of a collective (Rule, 
1989: 147). McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (1996) propose that the individual 
rationale ignores the degree to which the individuals are ontologically immersed 
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in different kinds of structures and social practices (McAdam et al., 1996b: 26). 
  
I explain the political process approach through reference to the work of 
Charles Tilly and then offer an explanation of the New Social Movement 
approach to methodology. Tilly moves the unit of analysis from the individual to 
the group. The group tries to achieve collective goods for its members. Tilly 
calls these groups “contenders”, that is, “any group that, during a specific period 
of time, turns all resources at its disposal to trying to influence the authorities” 
(Tilly, 1978: 52). These are the main characteristics of the political process 
approach: 
 Collective action has costs. 
 All contender groups analyze those costs. 
 Collective action has benefits, in the form of collective goods. 
 The contender groups compare expected costs with expected benefits.  
 Both costs and benefits are uncertain because a) the contender groups 
have imperfect information about the situation of the political system; b) 
all the contender sides are involved in a strategic interaction. 
(Tilly, 1978: 99) 
On one side, this model can be considered an extension of the 
individualistic rationality model. While these models attribute the individual with 
the power to take decisions, the collective model relies on the idea of the group. 
This model is used by Alain Touraine, François Dubet, and Michel Wieviorka 
(1983) in their study of the Polish trade union movement Solidarnosc. In their 
analysis of the decision-making process of Solidarnosc, Touraine, Dubet, and 
Wieviorka considered that it was self-limited. They made rational decisions 
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between cost and benefit based on government actions (Touraine et al., 1983: 
cap. 3). The model of the political process defended by Tilly (1978) and used by 
Touraine, Dubet, and Wieviorka is based on a collective rationale, which is a 
bridge of understanding between the RMT and the NSM (Casquette, 1998: 
175). In particular, the political process approach and the NSM share a model of 
collective rationale. 
New Social Movements, the interpretation of the group 
The NSM approach shares its rationality about social movements 
research with RMT in its assumption that collective action is the outcome of the 
behaviour of rational actors. The decisions made are based upon a schemata of 
costs and benefits. However, the NSM approach addresses the inadequacies of 
the RMT approach. NSM theory changes the epistemological orientation of 
movement analysis, basing it on the collective instead of the individual, focusing 
on the reason why social movements appear and develop, rather than looking 
at how they conduct themselves. This is, perhaps, the most fundamental 
difference between the two approaches. A second, and important, difference is 
that while RMT asserts that its conceptual and analytical tools are applicable to 
all social movements in any given society (Casquette, 1998: 99), the NSM 
approach has narrowed its focus to the social movements that appear after the 
second world war, and particularly from the 1960s onwards (Casquette, 1998: 
100; Della Porta & Rucht, 1995: 6). This is a fundamental difference to RMT, as 
the NSM approach is, by definition, non universalistic. RMT is based upon a 
positivistic approach to social movement phenomena, which is rooted in the 
positivistic approaches that dominated social sciences journals during the 
1960s and 1970s (Neuman, 2003: 71). However, NSM theory uses a more 
  87 
interpretive approach. Rather than focusing on tangible collective (or selective) 
goods, the focus is on, what are called, “cultural goods” and NSM theory 
advocates tend to focus on the production and limits of cultural and symbolic 
trends in society (Johnston & Klandermans, 1995; Johnston, 2009; Johnston et 
al., 1994: 7). These cultural goods are mainly produced by a clash of identities.  
The NSM approach interprets this as a direct consequence of the 
modernity process. Stepping a little bit further from the Marxian sentence that 
“modernity is constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance 
of all social relations, everlasting uncertainty and agitation….” (Marx & Engels, 
1969: 52), Giddens identifies the nature of rapid change and highlights the 
importance of symbols in this new society. Tradition is measured in symbolic 
ways, becoming incredibly important (Giddens, 1990: 37-8). It is in this new 
environment NSM appeared, questioning boundaries and fighting, not for 
tangible benefits, but to create new identities, and to win symbolic fights. The 
importance of this for the methodological discussion is particularly significant, 
largely due to the very nature of the outcomes that NSM movements look for. 
The concept of identity here is complex and depends upon a wide interpretation 
of the environment and, in the case of social movements, on the process 
through which this environment, coupled with personal positioning in a group, 
leads to the establishment of collective identity. It is sufficient to note that the 
debate about collective identity is ongoing and far from settled (Polletta & 
Jasper, 2001). Tilly (1984) highlights the interpretive stance of the NSM 
approach: „the actions are subjective, the outcomes, fluid. Social movements 
are products of the changes in their social environment. The recognition of the 
historical significance of collective action forms, is the beginning of wisdom‟ 
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(Tilly, 1984: 305). The NSM approach focuses on the creation and interpretation 
of norms and meanings (Melucci, 1996: 317). Therefore, NSM stresses the 
importance of understanding the common ground within a social movement, 
that is, the processes that individuals recognize as common and cause them to 
act together (Melucci, 1996: 64). These different processes merge in what 
Melucci (1996) calls collective identity (Melucci, 1996: 67) 
The study of collective identity is a relevant part of this research (Melucci, 1988; 
Pizzorno, 1978; Friedman & McAdam, 1992; Hunt & Benford, 2007; Polletta & 
Jasper, 2001). Collective identity is constituted through the individual‟s 
cognitive, moral, and emotional connection with a broader community, category, 
practice, or institution. It is a perception of a shared status or relation, which can 
be imagined rather than experienced directly, and it is distinct from personal 
identities, although it may form part of a personal identity (Polletta & Jasper, 
2001: 285). It is a continuum of shared cognitive frameworks regarding 
orientations (Melucci, 1989: 35) that is developed from the different tensions 
and negotiations between actors (Melucci, 1996: 70). Its role in this research is 
related to the meaning of communication channels between different 
organizations. As is explained in chapters 6, 7, and 8, an understanding of the 
sharing of collective identity traits is one of the ways in which we can make 
sense of the way the Basque Peace Frame diffuses. It gives a common ground 
to understanding and provides incentives for the acceptance of new ideas about 
a struggle or conflict (Friedman & McAdam, 1992: 162). Collective identity 
processes are dynamic and ever changing constructs, therefore, it is important 
to understand how these constructs work in an environment as the Basque 
Country. Collective identity involves a process of construction of reality or action 
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system (Melucci, 1996: 70) that gives the possibility to include or exclude other 
collectives. It is agreed that these construction systems are never settled, as 
Melucci states when the term identity is explained (Melucci, 1996: 85) and the 
Basque Country is not an exception.  However, the role of political collective 
identities is more determined. Political collective identities are a recognized way 
of perceiving the other in the Basque Country. The Basque national identity is 
been constructed continuously for centuries and is well established as a 
defining political feature (Castells, 1998: 30). The national identity, therefore, 
works as an exclusive construction, thanks to the different processes of 
radicalization explained in chapter 6 (Perez-Agote, 2008: 135). This trend is 
changing as noted by various authors (Ibarra, 2005b; Perez-Agote, 1998) that 
detected trends of inclusion in the Basque national identity. This is relevant for 
this research explaining the identity position of the nationalist left as this 
collective still relies in old ways of reproduction of identities. This fact makes the 
nationalist left less prone to defining themselves with any other political position 
but nationalist.   
The NSM approach uses a different epistemology. It tries to understand 
why, in a post-industrial society and in a particular environment (mainly western 
Europe), a particular kind of collective action occurs. They focus on movements 
like peace, ecology and antimilitarist movements, women‟s movements, 
solidarity with the third world, civil and human rights defence and the urban 
alternative movements (Casquette, 1998: 175; Della Porta & Rucht, 1995: 6). 
The focus of the analysis is on social movements‟ attempts to construct new 
social identities in response to the dissolution of older identity structures 
(Casquette, 1998: 103), such as family, religion and class. To achieve this, the 
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NSM approach explores other dimensions. It does not focus on structures of 
resources, but on cultural conflicts and the winning of “cultural appropriations” 
(McAdam, 1995: 37). The field is not a field of contesting resources, but a field 
of contesting cultural and identity models. These models are in continuous 
struggle and continuously changing. The knowledge no longer resides with the 
individual, or the group, but in the subjective perception that the group has 
about its meanings and actions. Ontologically speaking, actors are not 
individuals, but parts of complex groups that are in perpetual conflict. The 
different organizations are a construct of different conflicting processes 
(Melucci, 1996: 20). These groups need conflict to survive. This conflict is 
mainly symbolic and cultural, with an everlasting process of collective identity 
transformation (Melucci, 1988: 332; Melucci, 1989: 25-30; Melucci, 1996: 70).  
It is important to emphasise that the focus of this research is the different 
cultural impacts of the Basque peace movement organizations through the 
identification and analysis of the Basque Peace Frame (see chapter 6). 
However, the different collective identity processes that exist in Basque society 
condition these cultural impacts. These collective identity processes are key to 
understanding the nature of the Basque Peace Frame and the mechanisms at 
play that allow its diffusion.  Finally, and this is key to understanding the 
methodology used in this research, the main goal of NSM from its constant 
collective identity transformation, is the need to politicise everyday life. 
Therefore, the goal of social movements will not be structural changes in the 
system, but changes in the system of values, which is precisely what I am 
researching here. 
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 The unit of research, then, is the interacting group. The group is the 
beginning and the end; the agent in charge of making society believe the 
cultural changes they defend are real, not fictional. The NSM approach 
demonstrates how difficult it is to understand how a social phenomenon 
appears, if one‟s analysis is based solely on an epistemological position that 
sees only the rational individual. An important part of the NSM approach is the 
interpretation that the group makes of its environment and how the group tries 
to communicate and transfer that interpretation to other groups in society, 
effectively engaging in different frame alignment processes (Snow et al., 1986; 
Snow & Benford, 2000: 624; Tarrow, 1992: 188). This is not to say that the 
phenomenon is new, but the methodological approach is. There have been 
different models to approach these dilemmas, but I would like to revisit in detail 
the model proposed by the French Sociologist Alain Touraine and the Italian 
cultural theorist and cognitive psychologist Alberto Melucci presented in the 
previous chapter and focus on their methodological implications. 
Alain Touraine uses a collective approach to the study of social 
movements. The fundamentals of his ideas are articulated in his book The 
Voice & The Eye (1981). First, Touraine bases his ontology in the idea of a 
“sociology of action”. In his words “a society is a system capable of producing, 
of generating its own normative guidelines instead of having them passed down 
via an order or a movement that transcends history – no matter whether one 
calls it God, Spirit or History” (Touraine, 1981: 14). Touraine perceives a society 
with hierarchical systems of actions. These are social relations between actors 
with conflicting interests who share certain cultural orientations (Touraine, 1981: 
25). Touraine‟s approach conceives of society as formed of two components: 
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historicity and class relations. Historicity is firmly based on class relations. 
Touraine describes all social relations as relations of power that emanate from 
the main intrinsic conflict, the class struggle (Touraine, 1981: 33). This implies 
that the analysis of society, as a system of action, is an analysis of change and 
therefore, the analysis of relations between the State and social movements 
(Touraine, 1981: 53). Here he introduces the idea of historicity, which implies 
knowledge, and the capacity to develop functioning models of social 
interactions. For Touraine, social movements are agents of action, an organized 
collective behaviour of a class actor struggling against a class adversary for the 
social control of historicity in a concrete community (Touraine, 1981: 77). 
Finally, action is seen as the behaviour of an actor guided by cultural 
orientations and set within social relations defined by an unequal connection 
with the social control of these orientations (Touraine, 1981: 61). It is possible to 
assume, then, that a social movement is a cultural actor driven by an unequal 
system of power relations and its main goal is to reframe that system closer to 
its ideals.  
Touraine explains in detail both his conception of society and social 
phenomena and how to study it. He calls his method social intervention. This 
method aims to study collective action, approaching the action as directly as 
possible, constructing interactions with different social partners. It implies that 
the researcher cannot be a distant observer and rejects any sense of positivist 
objectivity (Touraine, 1981: 27). Touraine defined four main principles of 
research practice (Touraine, 1981: 142-45). First, the researcher has to enter 
into relationship with the social movement itself. Second, it is important to go 
beyond language and focus on the militant role of the group researched, and 
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third, the researcher must engage with the group and its opposition. The 
researcher has to identify the principle of identity and the principle of opposition, 
and becomes the interlocutor between the militant group and its opposition. 
Finally, this process of intervention culminates in a process of self-analysis 
inside the social movement. This is the moment to analyze the social 
movement‟s actions, with which the researcher should have become entirely 
familiar. Evidently, the relationship between the movement and the researcher 
is close and leads, in the end, to the possibility of episodes of change.  
Another interesting methodological approach, and one developed by one 
of Touraine‟s students, is Alberto Melucci‟s (1989; 1996) approach to the study 
of social movements. As with Touraine‟s approach, Melucci begins with an 
explanation of society as a whole. He sees social movements as products of the 
transition between industrial society and “complex” society or the information 
age. This emergent society is characterized by the decline of material 
productivity and its substitution with production organised through social 
relations and signs (Melucci, 1989: 45). Society becomes paradoxical as it 
provides all the means for individualization, but becomes the target of a 
regulation process that looks for uniformity, “control can no longer restrict itself 
to the external regulation of the production/appropriation of resources; it must 
also intervene in the internal processes of the formation of attitudes” (Melucci, 
1996: 92). This is a key point as these processes find opposition in the form of 
social movements. For Melucci, social movements are the mobilization of a 
collective actor defined by specific solidarity, engaged in a conflict with an 
adversary for the appropriation and control of resources and whose action 
entails a breach of the limits of compatibility of the system within which the 
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action takes place (Melucci, 1989: 27-8; Melucci, 1996: 29-30). These conflicts 
arise in those areas where the control apparatus tries to regulate individual and 
collective identities until the individuals reclaim their right to be themselves and 
self-define their subjectivity and field of action. That makes social movements 
creators of cultural codes. As we can see, the role of social movements as 
creators and multipliers of cultural trends is not different from Touraine‟s 
approach.  
From this point, Melucci builds a vision of social movement research 
using a constructivist standpoint. First, he rejects the idea of social movement 
reification and proposes a new epistemic version that sees social movements 
as the result of analysis. The important question is how and why social 
aggregates arrive at a collective definition of their joint action (Melucci, 1996: 
384). Following this statement, Melucci proposes several points for the 
researcher. First, the researcher should assume that the actors can make 
sense of themselves without the help of any researcher; second, the researcher 
should take into account the impact of the researcher‟s action, in itself, a 
process to be observed and analyzed; finally, the researcher must assume that 
his or her intervention will create an artificial environment in the movement 
(Melucci, 1996: 385). To overcome this, Melucci suggests the idea of a 
reflective process about the actor-researcher relationship to achieve recognition 
of the communication processes between the two. Both parts demand cognitive 
resources: the researcher‟s interest in gathering information and the actor‟s 
interest in increasing its capacity for action (Melucci, 1996: 392). Melucci tries to 
find a methodology that detects the action system of any given actor and how 
the different parts come together and are translated into mobilization. The 
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methodology needs an analysis of the tensions between actors and processes 
and needs to focus the analysis on the different collective identity processes 
that occur within any collective actor. 
Conclusions 
I have given some insight into the different methodological approaches that 
appear in the different trends for social movement study. For that task I revisited 
the RMET and the New Social Movement approaches and I discussed the main 
methodological assumptions inherent to these approaches. The discussion has 
moved from individualistic and rational approaches to a collective and 
interpretive approach defended by various NSM authors. From these authors I 
find the contribution made by Alain Touraine (1981) and Alberto Melucci (1988; 
1989; 1996) particularly useful. These authors provide a bridge from an 
interpretive approach to a critical one, which is particularly relevant for the next 
section, where I explain the approach taken in this research. 
Methodological approach to the study of the Basque Peace  
Movement 
In this section, I explain the methodological approach used in my 
research and the different steps I took to collect the data.  At the beginning of 
this research, the decision to undertake a case study of Basque peace 
movement organizations was made by following my passions. The Basque 
conflict has been constantly present in my life and I felt the need to make some 
contribution to understanding the line I instinctively defend – non-violent action 
against the conflict. I have been part of marches and gatherings protesting 
against violence, mainly political violence, and I always felt civil society lacked 
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recognition. The idea of doing research based on the Basque peace movement 
organizations come directly from the philosophical question that drives this 
thesis: What is the role and importance of civil society in a conflict resolution 
scenario? 
In devising this research, the initial idea was to describe the conflict 
resolution proposal that comes from the Basque peace movement 
organizations. Reality showed that the Basque peace movement organizations 
have a heterogeneous approach to conflict resolution. Lokarri tries to enforce a 
political settlement, based on peaceful dialogue (see chapter 4) and the 
purpose of Gesto por la Paz is to influence society to promote the principles of 
rejection of violence and respect for Human Rights. However, both 
organizations managed to create a paradigm of peace action that permeates 
Basque society. As basic social theory shows us, social organizations are 
mostly the symptom of an unmet need growing in any given society (Melucci, 
1996: 1). Following this reasoning, how did the Basque peace movement 
organizations manage to achieve this? That question haunted, and continues to 
haunt me. The scope of this thesis cannot address such a broad area, and 
consequently my working objectives are much more modest. I try to understand 
and describe the mechanisms used by the main Basque peace movement 
organizations, Lokarri and Gesto por la Paz, to make their message permeate 
other social organizations related to the conflict. For this purpose, I decided to 
focus on the framing efforts of the Basque peace movement organizations. The 
objective of this thesis is to answer the questions presented in the introduction: 
Is there a Peace Master Frame? How has the Basque Peace Frame evolved? 
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How has the Basque Peace Frame impacted on other Basque Civil Society 
Organizations related to the conflict? 
The use of frame theory in the study of the Basque peace movement 
 In the previous section, I described the different methodological 
approaches that exist in the two main branches of social movement theory, 
RMT and NSM theories. In this section, I describe the approach I chose as most 
appropriate for this research, in understanding the mechanisms the Basque 
peace movement organizations use, or processes they pass through, to 
communicate their messages and ideas to other social organizations. To 
establish this, I decided to use a frame analytical approach. This approach 
gives me the analytical tools to identify the way the Basque peace movement 
organizations perceive the conflict and the solutions they propose. More 
importantly, defining the Basque Peace Frame provides me with an indicator 
that helps to understand the impact of the Basque peace movement on society. 
The main theoretical concepts are present in the theory chapter of this thesis 
(chapter 2). Here, I present the relevant methodological concepts. The idea of 
perception is important here. I describe how the Basque peace movement 
organizations perceive the conflict and I explain how this perception is 
influencing other social actors. The philosophical question forces us to take a 
stance and criticize the status quo present in Basque politics. Traditionally, 
these politics have been characterized for contentious actions reclaiming 
Basque nationalist rights (Casquette, 2003; Perez-Agote, 2008). The Basque 
peace movement offers a new way of doing politics: using the public space in a 
non-contentious way (Funes, 1998a; Funes, 1998b). The epistemological 
assumptions present in this research are not only the description of the cultural 
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mechanism present in the social relations of the Basque peace movement 
organizations studied that enable their conceptualization of social action, but 
also how those mechanisms vary in space, time and social scenario; and more 
importantly, how those mechanisms could improve the social and political 
situation.  
 Frames are created by cultural perceptions based on personal ideas of 
reality and mainly, based on the different collective identity processes that the 
persons of these groups and the groups themselves pass through (Bateson, 
1972; Goffman, 1974; Snow & Benford, 2000). During the course of this 
research I found myself defining a rich and complex ontology where the 
different groups and individuals interact with each other. These interactions act 
on the collective identity processes that are the base for the frame described. 
This stance requires a critical realist position that advocates an in depth vision 
of the social relations present within the Basque peace movement organizations 
and between them. With this assertion, I lean towards Melucci‟s (1996) ideas of 
situational knowledge and the need for breaking the observer-actor barriers 
present in other methodological approaches (Melucci, 1996: 396). This is also 
the main characteristic of what Stones (1996) called a „past-modern sociology‟ 
(Stones, 1996: 82). Frames, on the other hand, are interpretive tools, an 
artificial idea to codify patterns of behaviour by groups that share cognitive 
mechanisms (Johnston & Oliver, 2005: 189). These processes are different 
within an organization and outside it. Within, one has to negotiate between the 
different discursive ideas whilst to the outside, one has to create a firm 
message that overcomes other discourses (Rivas, 1998: 207). My 
  99 
understanding therefore suggests the need for an analysis of interior and 
exterior processes. 
Applying this approach 
 For the purpose of answering the research questions presented in the 
introduction, I devised a set of methods and ideas based broadly on the case 
study approach defended by Lofland (1996) and the participant ethnography 
approach (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2009: 230). Although with its limitations, the 
ethnographic approach seemed more plausible for the ontological assumptions 
of this research. To map the different aspects of perceptions and discourse I 
used a participatory approach based on participant observation exercises and 
semi-structured interviews with members of the Basque peace movement 
organizations and members of other Basque Civil Society Organizations. These 
methods were helped with audio recordings of meetings, photographic evidence 
of events and the study of documents produced by the organizations or based 
on them. For the technical data please refer to appendix 1. 
 The approach to fieldwork presented a number of problems derived from 
the nature of the research. The main issues are presented by Robert Burgess 
(1984) as location, time, events and people (Burgess, 1984: 52). The research 
took me all over the Basque Country, so I based myself in the western part of 
Bizkaia. The reason for that was the relatively easy connection to other parts of 
the Basque Country. The time period of the fieldwork (interviews) was from May 
2007 to February 2008. Finally, I decided to focus on the events hosted by the 
Basque peace movement organizations trying to find examples of collaboration 
between them and other Basque Civil Society Organizations. When I arrived to 
the Basque Country, peace activity was frenetic. The ETA bombing of Madrid 
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airport in December 2006 created a high level of peace activity trying to 
overcome distrust and maintain the process of the former negotiations in place 
during the ceasefire. However, the Basque peace movement organizations 
Lokarri and Gesto por la Paz, being two similar organizations, they are prone to 
maintain fierce differences that prevent them from working together, despite the 
fact that most of their members know each other and maintain good personal 
relations. At the beginning of fieldwork I was puzzled by this fact. This pointed 
me towards the idea that being a participant was the most advisable approach, 
enabling me to see the nature of the relationship between Lokarri and Gesto 
por la Paz first hand. For this I chose an ethnographic approach, becoming a 
member of a peace organization, in this case, Lokarri. The second ethnographic 
approach was the study of the influence of the Basque peace movement 
organizations on other Basque Civil Society Organizations. I tried to maintain as 
diverse and equitable approach as possible towards other Basque Civil Society 
Organizations. However, as the research advanced, I found that some 
organizations were very difficult to access, but working closely with particular 
individuals in these organizations solved that problem. 
 My personal background helped me a great deal to obtain information 
from the Basque peace movement organizations. I had knowledge of the area, 
the language and personal friendships with some members of the Basque 
peace movement organizations. These factors were invaluable during my 
research, but also created challenges for me. These issues, noted by 
Hammersley and Atkinson (2009), appeared during all the phases of fieldwork. I 
address these issues under the following subtitles: Methods, Access, Ethics, 
Risk and Subjectivity.  
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Methods 
The main data collection methods involved in this research are 
interviews, direct observation, focus groups and content analysis.  
Semi structured interviews 
The in depth interview is a professional interview with the aim of 
obtaining information about the life of, a concrete process, or theme about a 
person. Through this data collection method it is possible to know what is 
important or significant for the interviewee, trying to understand how he or she 
sees, classifies or understands the world or the process the researcher wants to 
study. In the words of Olabuenaga and Ispizua (1989), the interviews are 
„reiterative encounters, face to face, between the interviewer and the 
informants, aimed towards the understanding of the informants‟ perspectives 
about their lives, experiences and situations, where the researcher is not only a 
mere data collecting machine, but the main tool of the research, besides 
protocols or interview guides‟ (Olabuenaga & Ispizua, 1989: 126). 
In this research, the main interview type was the focused interview. It 
was focused on the sense of belonging and the perceptions of the interviewee 
about his or her position in the organization and the organization‟s position in 
the social environment; how they see, feel, and interpret the actions of the 
particular organization. 
Interviews are a very good data collection method when anonymity is 
crucial. It is easier for the interviewee to talk about sensitive matters during a 
confidential conversation. An interview allows the researcher to obtain very rich 
information about a particular issue and is a great tool for explorative research. 
Furthermore, the role of the interviewer is very important as they control the 
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interview and the informant. The behaviour of the interviewer determines what 
is important and what is not important. Finally, the influence of the interviewer 
can affect the validity of the results, as the way the interviewer participates in 
the interview directly affects the theme that is being analyzed.  
For this research 18 interviews were conducted that have a duration from 
45 minutes, which was the shortest, to 4 hours, the longest17. In the process I 
found myself dealing with the matter of subjectivity, how my role as a 
researcher, friend, male or Basque influenced the responses. I explain this 
issue later in more detail during the subjectivity section.  
Direct observation 
The direct observation method consists of observing in a controlled, 
systematic way the behaviour of a certain group of people, without any kind of 
manipulation. This method is not based on the perspectives of individuals, but 
on their behaviour. The observation was made in a natural environment, without 
any control over it or the stimulus the observed received. This method is very 
useful in studying the actions of social movements and their decision-making 
processes. The kinds of direct observation used in this research were 
participant observation and controlled observation. The first refers to the 
method where the observer participates in the daily lives of a certain group of 
people, during a relatively extended period of time, looking at what is 
happening, listening or asking questions. The second refers to the observation 
of concrete actions as an outsider.  
                                            
17
 For the interview technical data, questionnaire and informed consent protocol, see 
appendices 1 to 3.  
  103 
In the case of this research, the observation was applied mainly to 
assemblies, marches or the decision making process within the Basque peace 
movement organizations, the aim being to uncover what is happening in the 
middle of a group, and trying to connect the actions of this group to the effects 
on other groups.  
Content analysis 
Content analysis is a method that analyzes social reality through the 
observation of documents that are created in these social realities. It is a 
method that combines observation and the analysis of documentation.  
Content analysis is a useful method of understanding the intentions of 
the Basque peace movement organizations. Both Lokarri and Gesto por la Paz 
produce plenty of documentary resources, mainly press releases and campaign 
documents. These resources reflect the attitude of the Basque peace 
movement organizations in determined periods of time, as well as the answers 
to other inputs from other social actors. More importantly, these resources form 
the main discourse of the Basque peace movement organizations.  
The main sources of documents were the organizations‟ websites. There 
they published most of the press releases and documents describing new 
initiatives. The case of Lokarri was particularly important because the 
organization gave lots of importance to the role of its website (Anton, 2009). 
The website was not only a source of documents, but also a forum of discussion 
between members. Apart from that, both Lokarri and Gesto por la Paz publish a 
hardcopy magazine, Haritu in the case of Lokarri and Bake Hitzak in the case of 
Gesto por la Paz. I had access to both magazines and the information in them 
was included in the fieldwork data.  
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Access 
 Access was one of the trickiest issues regarding my fieldwork. The fact 
that I had personal knowledge and previous contacts with members of the 
Basque peace movement organizations helped me to gain access to 
information, but in some ways prevented me from perceiving other important 
dimensions (see subjectivity section). The negotiation procedure described by 
Hammersley and Atkinson (2009: 40) was easier for me. Through various 
contacts and after deliberating the different options, I opted to negotiate access 
with a series of gatekeepers in both Lokarri and Gesto por la Paz. In the case of 
Lokarri, this was the main director and in the case of Gesto por la Paz, this was 
one member of the coordination commission, the governing body (see chapter 
4). This process was different in the rest of the Basque Civil Society 
Organizations I researched. With them I adopted an ad hoc procedure 
depending on the closeness, personal contacts and sense of opportunity.  
 The gatekeeper method was chosen using personal knowledge of the 
Basque peace movement organizations. Basque culture and associations rely 
on a series of social rituals that entail recognition by the group into which you 
would like to be accepted. Basque social life is very intense with an 
underdeveloped tradition of public display, so in these organizations the sense 
of membership was something private that needed formal permission (Perez-
Agote, 2008: 132). Trying to maintain extensive contact with members of the 
Basque peace movement organizations without the permission of the directing 
bodies would have been counter productive, perhaps causing more problems in 
terms of access to documentation and internal meetings. The gatekeeper 
approach was successful as I received extensive help from the Basque peace 
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movement organizations. I had to participate in a formal meeting with each 
gatekeeper. They used these meetings to assess my honesty and line of 
approach. I presented a copy of my research project and tried to answer as 
many questions as possible in a straightforward way. In the words of the Gesto 
por la Paz gatekeeper “I see that you are honest and know what is going on 
here. It will not be any problem to help you” (Fn. 10/04/2007). Here it is possible 
to see one of the nuances I encountered during my fieldwork. My condition as a 
Basque smoothed the way into the Basque peace movement organizations. 
The gatekeepers gave me the details of several people inside the organizations 
that could be interviewed. I tried to find out if the gatekeepers (as members of 
the organizations‟ directing bodies) tried to discover the outcomes of the 
interviews, but there was no evidence of this happening. More importantly, the 
contacts they provided proved to be helpful as they provided me with new 
contacts or pointed me towards issues that otherwise I would have found 
difficult to discover. For example, the Lokarri interviewee 11, pointed me to the 
nuances of leadership inside Lokarri (see chapter 7).  
 With the data provided, I contacted the possible interviewees. I 
proceeded as follows: I tried to arrange a prior interview meeting where I gave 
them a copy of the research project, explained the nature of the interview and 
explained all the issues around the research. I explained then their status as 
interviewees and I made myself open to questions. It was explained that they 
had the right to withdraw from the research at any moment, with no reason 
required. If that meeting was successful, we arranged another date to make the 
interview. We tried to arrange a quiet and private place to do it. The outcome of 
this process was successful, with no person withdrawing from the process. This 
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process helped me to build a “reputation” of honesty inside the peace 
organizations. Subsequently, access to internal documents or publications was 
easy and it gave me several ways to access different types of meetings.  
 The approach to meetings was a bit different. Before undertaking this 
research I had attended some of them, so I was not a stranger. That worked in 
two ways. In one, I was seen as “one of them”, in the other they assumed some 
of my positions on several key issues. This is one of the issues that I describe in 
the subjectivity section.  
 The rest of the Basque Civil Society Organizations were approached in a 
slightly different manner. Organizations with strong institutional support, like the 
EGK or Gernika Gogoratuz, only required an appointment and a preliminary 
meeting. In the case of the EGK I discovered that the contact person was a 
former university colleague. Other kinds of organizations were more 
problematic. Victims of terrorism organizations were very suspicious of any 
research intention. Some of them, like Covite (Basque Victims of Terrorism 
Organization), gave me a late response apologizing for the inconvenience, but 
rejecting their participation in the research. Others, like the Foro de Ermua, a 
political pressure organization created in 1998, did not respond at all to calls, 
emails or fax. The only organization that defended victims of terrorism that 
accepted my offer to participate in the research was Basta Ya. The fact that the 
contact person was a philosophy professor who was sympathetic to the 
research nuances made the approach easier. It is important to note that I got 
limited access to the victims of terrorism organizations‟ information and 
permission for interviews; the general response towards this research was not 
encouraging. The main factor for the problems I experienced here is the 
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ideological component of these organizations. The members are people that 
have been through processes of persecution with little institutional or public 
support. Moreover, they see the academic world more as a problem than a 
solution, as the researchers are not eager to take positions of absolute rights of 
absolute wrongs. 
 A similar problem appeared when I tried to approach organizations that 
were ideologically close to ETA. One of the organizations missing in this 
research is Askatasuna. This organization advocates the liberation of all ETA 
prisoners as they consider them political prisoners. Askatasuna is one of the 
radical organizations in the nationalist left political spectrum. Several contact 
attempts were made, but the organization was declared illegal before the 
fieldwork commenced. Members of sympathetic groups, like the TAT or Etxerat, 
tried to help me to make contact, but, as one member of the TAT told me “It is 
going to be very difficult, with the illegalization and things like that… they were 
in their own world before, but now… It is going to be very, very difficult” (Fn. 
02/07/2007). Regarding the organizations contacted successfully, TAT was 
contacted directly as they have a public profile. Etxerat was more difficult. They 
never responded to emails or phone calls, so I tried to contact them directly 
when they were protesting as they were in a lock-down. As one of the members 
told me, “seeing my face” made it much easier to help me out (Fn. 23/12/2007). 
Again, the problem here was these organizations were largely closed to the 
outside world, even with the organizations close to them. My position as Basque 
with a discourse not very opposed to their ideals smoothed the way as I stated 
before. Close relationships are very important in the Basque social world and 
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seeing a face is much more helpful than hours of phone calls or hundreds of 
emails.  
These problems with access prevented me from collecting data from the 
Basque Civil Society Organizations that are less sympathetic with the Basque 
peace movement. This could mean the absence in my research of a significant 
part of the Basque Civil Society Organizations. However, I had the opportunity 
to interview people from similar organizations. These interviews (Basta Ya in 
the case of victims of terrorism, and TAT and Etxerat in the case of the 
nationalist left) provided me with the insight needed. The fact that the Basque 
Peace Frame is present in these organizations, as explained in chapter 8, gives 
me the grounds to assert that the Basque Peace Frame is a master frame. I 
cannot say that the Basque Peace Frame permeates all the Basque Civil 
Society Organizations, but it is present in most of the social ideological 
spectrum.  
Ethics 
In this section, I describe the ethical issues that appeared during the 
fieldwork period, and how I dealt with them. Since the beginning of the fieldwork 
period there were three issues that appeared as the main ethical questions I 
had to deal with. They were informed consent and truth telling, privacy, and 
anonymity.  
Informed consent and truth telling 
Informed consent means that those researched have the right to know 
about why the research is being done, how, the status of that research, and, 
after the information is collected, to have the opportunity to comment on it. 
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Some authors believe that this is not good for the overall balance of the 
research (Reynolds, 1979: 95), however I believe this instilled confidence and 
openness in my interviewees. During the fieldwork period it was apparent for 
the members of the organizations researched that I was researching them. 
There was a clear distinction of roles between the researcher and the 
researched (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2009: 10). Some of them did not 
understand my position clearly in informal situations, which I explore in the 
section about subjectivity. During my participant observation sessions, I found 
that the most important moments to gain an idea of the social relations inside 
an organization were the ones after the formal meeting. Having a beer with the 
group provided me with more data than the meetings themselves. The fact that 
most of the organizations‟ members drew a line that differentiated between the 
activist and the person made them believe that I did the same. This particular 
point arose during one of the last Lokarri meetings that I attended before 
finishing the fieldwork. After the meeting we went for a drink in a bar near the 
organization‟s offices. In this bar we found members of Gesto por la Paz18. 
During a relaxed conversation I suggested the idea of both organizations doing 
something together. This idea was received humorously and dismissed. I raised 
some questions about that issue and the responses were negative, but relaxed. 
The problem there was that I was not perceived as a researcher, but as “one of 
the team” (Fn. 10/09/2007).  
During the interviews, the interviewee was presented with a form (see 
appendix 3) that described the role of the interviewee and the nature of the 
                                            
18
 This represents the most visible feature of the significance of identity in Basque society. 
Lokarri and Gesto por la Paz have their offices in the same building, on different floors. Despite 
this, they still have great problems in terms of working together.  
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interview.  During that process it was clear that my role was as a researcher 
and no doubts appeared. The existence of the signed agreement gave the 
interviewees reassurance that they, in an extreme situation, could use that 
paper as a legal tool (Sieber, 1992: 33). Another problem that appeared was 
the groups being researched demanding information from me about the 
research, and specifically my sources of funding (Frankfort-Nachmias & 
Nachmias, 1996: 87), (Robson, 2002: 74). This issue appeared strongly at the 
beginning, but disappeared as the fieldwork went on. The fact that I had a 
Basque Government scholarship did not make any difference in dealing with the 
organizations. All these issues were directly connected to one issue that was 
key to dealing with a Basque social organization: truth-telling. I would like to 
make a distinction between truth-telling and omission, although some authors 
put it in the same box (Burgess, 1984: 201). During my fieldwork I was 
questioned several times about my political beliefs and cultural position. In the 
preliminary meetings I avoided the questions, but finally I decided to be as 
honest as possible. This strategy gave me good results. Without being 
confrontational, honesty drew me closer to people, even in difficult situations. 
For example, confronted with a question about my opinion of the political status 
of a relative of a member of Etxerat, I answered that the status as a prisoner 
was not political (he was in jail for committing a crime), but the conditions he 
was suffering were political (see section devoted for Etxerat, chapters 5 and 8). 
This drew me closer to that person and gave me access to invaluable 
information that I would not have otherwise have had (Fn. 05/02/2008). Again, 
this was due to my knowledge of Basque culture, where expressing honesty is a 
valued trait in a person. 
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Privacy 
As in any research conducted in areas of conflict, privacy was a major 
issue in this research. Within the privacy dimension, one of the most important 
aspects is the sensitivity of information (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 1996: 
87). In Basque society, privacy is an important thing and disseminating facts 
disclosed privately is a serious matter. This issue connects directly with the 
issue of dissemination of information (Burgess, 1984: 203; Hammersley & 
Atkinson, 2009: 212). This issue was tackled in the form presented to the 
interviewees. In the form, it was stated that the data collected would only be 
used for this research and in academic articles. Regarding other sources of 
data, I tried to maintain verbal agreements with members of the different 
organizations. The participants in this research were the owners of the data 
collected, and the idea of ownership appeared during the fieldwork period 
(Hammersley & Atkinson, 2009: 213). That gave rise to the question of 
devolution of the results. Some of the participants, mainly the directing bodies 
of the two Basque peace movement organizations, stressed the idea of 
devolution of knowledge. It was agreed that a report relating the main findings 
of this research was to be sent and presented to the organizations for feedback. 
However, beyond the idea of devolution, the main aspect of privacy, and the 
most important for the participants, was the assurance of anonymity and the 
degrees of confidentiality.  
Anonymity and confidentiality 
During the fieldwork period, these two issues were very important. First 
of all, privacy arose as a deal breaker. In several conversations, not agreeing to 
these conditions of anonymity and confidentiality with the participants could 
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jeopardise the entire research (Sieber, 1992: 53). The breaching of anonymity 
or confidentiality could seriously endanger the researcher and the participants 
(Jamieson, 2000: 64; Hammersley & Atkinson, 2009: 214). In this issue, the 
storage of information is vital. One method is to have several data archives 
(Robson, 2002: 360) with encrypted security. Another method is to make 
summaries, split from the main data, or to hold the data, but omit important 
categories, like names, places, and telephone numbers (Frankfort-Nachmias & 
Nachmias, 1996: 90). The approach that I chose was to keep the data about the 
interviews in different files. I stored the audio recordings with the interviewer 
responses separately from the transcriptions, and omitted the names and 
personal data and only identifying the interviewees with an interview number 
and a few facts: gender, education level, age, and day of interview. In my field 
notes, no mention of names or physical appearances was made, with the idea 
of preserving the identity of the participants. However, particular individuals are 
easier to recognize on recordings. The directing body of the organization that 
hosted the meeting is an example. In most of the cases, that issue was raised in 
a private conversation and the people affected assumed that was the case. 
After all, they were prominent public figures. In other cases the persons affected 
stressed the importance of maintaining the identifying data at a minimum, but 
recognized the fact that in the final thesis that would be very difficult to achieve. 
During fieldwork, the building of trust and confidence were very important. One 
of the most difficult moments was the attempt of some members of Gesto por la 
Paz to find out the identity of some of the interviewees. I decided not to disclose 
any details. The episode happened in a relaxed environment and with no harm 
intended, but, as some of the interviewees pointed out to me after that, it could 
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have meant that some of them would withdraw from the research, hampering 
the outcome significantly (Fn. 14/07/2007). 
Field relations or subjectivity 
Finally, I would like to describe what Hammersley and Atkinson call 
“Field Relations” (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2009: 63) and I call subjectivity. As it 
is noted during the whole text, the cultural, physical and personal impacts were 
extremely important for the outcomes of my fieldwork period. It gave me 
advantages and problems. My position when I arrived was as a Basque male 
with higher education that had personal contacts inside the participant 
organizations. That gave me preferential insight into the nuances of the 
research. The perceptions I had from the participants were mostly positive. In 
most cases the interviewees and I shared common acquaintances that helped 
the relationship, and in most of the cases, the participants tried to find 
connections outside the research between themselves and myself. For 
example, the interviewee from the EGK decided to be part of the research after 
knowing that I attended some modules during my university degree that he had 
also attended (Fn. 21/05/2007). In one case, the interviewee was from my 
hometown, „So, you‟re the grandson of X. Of course I know your family!‟ (Fn. 
14/07/2007). In other cases, a cultural connection was sufficient. The 
identification of my accent as Basque relaxed the atmosphere on more than 
one occasion. One fact that I encountered was the natural distrust of the 
participants to divulge their stories if you were not identified as Basque. For 
example, regarding a report written by two US authors about the conflict a year 
before my fieldwork period, some members of Lokarri dismissed it, using the 
fact that they were unable to understand the complexities of the conflict. They 
  114 
assumed that I did. These perceptions about me brought several advantages. I 
was not looked upon with the typical mistrust that foreign researchers have to 
deal with and I had better access to information, but it brought me some 
disadvantages as well. The most important were the assumptions that the 
participants made about me. They assumed I already knew some of the 
answers because they thought I had the same ideas as them. During one 
interview with a member of Lokarri, I found myself hearing the answer „you 
know‟ (Fn. 14/06/2007). To solve that issue I tried to engage in a controversial 
topic, which helped in most of the cases. In other cases, I tried to be honest and 
I told some of the participants that I did not know or simply not to assume that I 
had the same ideas as them. This is a dimension full of nuances that is 
explored more fully in the data analysis (see chapters 7 and 8).  
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CHAPTER 4 - THE NATURE OF THE BASQUE PEACE 
MOVEMENT  
Which are the organizations that form the Basque peace movement? 
How many of them exist? How do they work? In this chapter I shed some light 
on these questions. First I describe the two main Basque peace movement 
organizations that are central in this research. These are Gesto por la Paz and 
Lokarri. Gesto por la Paz was created in 1986 to answer the growing unrest in 
Basque society about the political responses to the conflict. In that period where 
democracy was consolidated in Spain the conflict trends were quite similar to 
those that dominated during the Franco dictatorship. The nationalist left parties 
and organizations that were relying on what is called the spiral of silence 
fiercely defended the image of the armed struggle (Funes, 1998a: 55). The 
change of the Political Opportunity Structure in the early 1980s alongside the 
consolidation of a nationalist political option in power created the conditions for 
the appearance of a peace movement. That does not imply that the peace 
ideas were not there before, rather that they were a submerged network 
(Melucci, 1989: 60) with limited access to the public protest space. This 
limitation disappeared with the arrival of democracy. The peace submerged 
network rejected the role of violence to achieve political outcomes that have 
been intrinsically associated during the Dictatorship years (Perez-Agote, 2008: 
140). This process is revisited when the Basque Peace Frame is explained in 
chapter 6. The moment and political atmosphere at the arrival of democracy 
created the perfect combination for peace values to emerge. As is described 
later in this chapter, the use of the public space by Gesto por la Paz was a huge 
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success that allowed other forms of social protest to flourish. A direct 
consequence of that was the creation of Elkarri, a peace organization that in 
2006 became known as Lokarri. Elkarri was created from a network developed 
to respond to local environmental issues. The solidarity involved in that network 
combined with a moment when the democratic values were consolidated and 
the Basque peace movement, directed by Gesto por la Paz, was at its peak, to 
evolve a new way of breaking the spiral of silence. Elkarri brought a new 
dimension to peace mobilization, giving not only a response against violence 
but proposing a specific political conflict resolution scenario based on the idea 
of dialogue between parties. Since the beginning, the two organizations had a 
bumpy relationship. The idea of proposing political scenarios was against the 
Gesto por la Paz ethos and for Elkarri, Gesto por la Paz lacked a purpose. 
However, the two organizations tried to reach common ground, acknowledging 
their similar purpose. Soon, it became clear that each organization would be in 
charge of one aspect of the social movement, with Gesto por la Paz dominating 
the social protest and Elkarri adopting a more pressure group type behaviour. 
This “division of labour” helps to explain the success of the Basque Peace 
Frame as the Basque peace movement organizations devoted resources to 
promote their particular issues. The evolution of the Basque peace movement 
organizations was affected as well, in particular, the collective identity 
processes. These collective identity processes are the outcome of these two 
specialisations. This fact is explained in chapters 6 and 7.   
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Gesto por la Paz. Basque Country Peace Groups Coordinator19  
Gesto por la Paz is the Basque example of a more „traditional‟ peace 
organization. As I explain later, Lokarri is an organization with a more 
„institutional‟ approach, resembling more a pressure group than a social 
organization (De la Peña & Ibarra, 2004: 85). Along with Lokarri, Gesto por la 
Paz is one of the most important Basque peace movement organizations, with a 
rich and long history and several outstanding contributions for peace 
mobilizations.  
History 
Gesto por la Paz was created in 1986 as a coordinator of several local 
peace groups in the Basque Country. These groups started to unite as a result 
of killings associated with the political violence. Gesto por la Paz’s primary 
intention is to protest against the political violence and to motivate the Basque 
society to mobilize against that violence (Funes, 1998a: 39). Gesto por la Paz 
also promotes the idea that Basque Society has to do something about the 
political violence. Yes, the society is the main sufferer, but it is also the 
supporter of the political violence and the creator of a solution (Funes, 1998b: 
496). The creation of Gesto por la Paz was a breakthrough in the history of 
political mobilization in the Basque Country. The Basque Country is a place 
where mobilization in pursuit of political objectives is accepted by society. 
However, mainly, these mobilizations were of a contentious nature, that is, large 
marches with aggressive mottos and a display of symbols that recall a violent 
struggle. More importantly, these demonstrations were monopolized by the 
                                            
19
 The full name in Spanish and Basque is Coordinadora Gesto por la Paz de Euskal Herria/ 
Euskal Herriko Bakearen Aldeko Koordinakundea. 
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nationalist left sectors of Basque society, leading, in most cases, to episodes of 
urban violence (Casquette, 2005: 108). Gesto por la Paz brought a new way of 
mobilization, the silent mobilization. The main driving force behind the local 
peace groups is the Gesto, the Gesture, a 15 minute silent stand to protest 
against every killing the day after it happens. This evoked an incredible 
response, mainly based in youth parochial groups, but it immediately garnered 
wider support in Basque society. This new way of mobilization took over the 
public space from the violent marches and was a point of inflexion in the history 
of social mobilization in the Basque Country (Tejerina, 2001: 53). The Gesto is 
well explained by Gesto por la Paz: 
„The silence is the pacifist way of expression, and the way of our organization. 
Silence is not passive, nor compliant with violence. It can mean only the 
defence of democratic values20‟.  
The Gestos became part of the landscape in the Basque Country, most 
of the time with the help of the mass media (Funes, 1998a: 41). The Gesto is 
very important in understanding the impact of Gesto por la Paz in Basque 
society. It is further explained later in this chapter.  
The history of Gesto por la Paz is one of highs and lows. Starting from 
the local groups, its social support grew gradually. The most important event in 
its growth was the signature of the Pacto de Ajuria Enea (The Ajuria Enea Pact) 
by most of the Basque political parties, without the nationalist left parties. The 
agreement, signed in 1988, relied on the confidence in the elected political 
institutions; the support for the recently signed Estatuto de Gernika (Statute of 
Gernika, a charter of competences of the autonomous community of the 
                                            
20
 Gesto por la Paz rules for mobilization: http://www.gesto.org/movilizacion.htm (24/11/2009) 
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Basque Country21), and; the total rejection of political violence22. Under this 
agreement, Gesto por la Paz enjoyed support from the Basque political 
institutions and some of the most prominent Basque politicians took part in 
some Gestos. It was in this period when the protest against kidnappings23 in the 
late 1990s took place, and this is when Gesto por la Paz reached its peak. The 
period of the kidnappings was critical for the organization. The Gesto was an 
impressive way to demonstrate the rejection of those acts. The symbolic power 
of the Gesto gave a sense of support, and support was what Basque society 
lacked to protest against violence (Funes, 1998a: 39). It was also the moment 
of the creation of the Lazo Azul or Blue Ribbon in one Gesto por la Paz 
workshop. It is not, in fact, a ribbon; it is a piece of blue cloth making the shape 
of an “A”, meaning Askatasuna or Freedom. The Lazo Azul was a symbol for 
demanding the freedom of the people kidnapped. After the first kidnapping, 
Gesto por la Paz suffered a counter attack from the social sectors of the 
nationalist left. They argued that for every Gesto, there would be one 
demonstration asking for the liberation of ETA prisoners in the same place and 
at the same time of the Gestos (Funes, 1998a: 141). In some places, everything 
went peacefully, while others experienced violence. In most places, the police 
had to form a line between both demonstrations. Finally, in 1997, after giving a 
deadline, ETA kidnapped and killed a local politician of the Popular Party called 
                                            
21
 Quick note about Spanish legislation: the central law is the Spanish Constitution, from which 
the entire law body emerges, below it is the different Statutes o charters of competences of the 
different autonomous communities.  
22
 The document can be consulted in http://www.filosofia.org/his/h1988ae.htm (24/11/2009) 
23
 The kidnappings was a tactic used by ETA to raise money. The usual tactic was to kidnap a 
prominent member of the Basque bourgeoisie and ask for a huge ransom. Between 1993 and 
1996 Julio Iglesias Zamora, Jose Maria Aldaya and Cosme Delclaux were kidnapped. The big 
change came when, in 1996, a prison civil servant, Jose Antonio Ortega Lara was kidnapped. 
He was not a prominent business man and ETA made no claims of ransom. It was the longest 
kidnapping in the history of ETA. 
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Miguel Angel Blanco, of the Spanish right wing party. The social response was 
overwhelming. The Popular Party used the situation to take over the social 
response and became the major protagonist, pushing aside Gesto por la Paz. 
Since then, Gesto por la Paz has lost some prominence to political parties 
(Funes, 1998a: 188). In 2000, the Pacto por las libertades y contra el terrorismo 
(Pact for liberties and against terrorism) was signed in Madrid, supporting the 
police actions and giving no recognition to the national claims in the Basque 
Country. New social organizations supporting this position were created, like 
Foro de Ermua (Forum of Ermua) and Basta Ya (Enough), mostly by people 
who had belonged to Gesto por la Paz in the past. Basta Ya is described in the 
following chapter as it is one of the organizations that represents the social 
position that rejects any Basque nationalist claim and defends the victims of 
terrorism rights.  
Since that moment, Gesto por la Paz, without abandoning the Gestos, 
focused on other initiatives. These are the recognition of victims of violence, the 
creation of spaces for peace education, the rejection of every kind of violence 
(not only violence attributed to ETA), the situation of the prisoners convicted for 
terrorism crimes, calling for mutual understanding between political parties, and 
supporting of the idea of separation of conflicts. The ceasefire declared by ETA 
during 2006 created a moment of reflection for Gesto por la Paz. One side of 
the organization advocated for the dissolution of Gesto por la Paz if ETA 
rejected violence (Anton, 2007: 64). Finally, this did not happen, making the 
organization refocus on their main goals. This process is addressed in chapter 
7.  
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 After the ceasefire, Gesto por la Paz started to focus on its traditional 
ethos, trying to mobilize people and change people‟s perceptions around some 
particular issues of the conflict. Its latest initiative is to stress the importance of 
delegitimizing violence24. 
 Still, Gesto por la Paz maintains an important presence in Basque social 
life. Once a year, the organization calls for a march for peace in January, 
celebrating the international day for non-violence. This march is widely 
supported and has a great mobilization capacity.   
Nature of Gesto por la Paz 
Since the beginning, Gesto por la Paz has defined itself as a pacifist 
organization with direct reference to the ideals and philosophy of Mahatma 
Gandhi25. Gesto por la Paz was created around particular characteristics 
stressing its popular and plural nature and its pacifist ethos. The organization 
also stresses the importance of advocating for global peace, but its focus is on 
the political violence originated in the Basque Country26. This makes Gesto por 
la Paz a peace organization that focuses on one specific conflict (Carter, 1992: 
15; Overy, 1982: 2), and is different from other kinds of peace movements, for 
example peace movements that seek demilitarisation, that are very strong in the 
Basque Country (Ajangiz, 2002; Barcena et al., 1998; Gordillo, 2007).  
Gesto por la Paz is a direct product of the identity creation processes 
that were in place during the Franco dictatorship. During that time, the political 
                                            
24
 They published a document about it: 
http://www.gesto.org/prensapdf/DESLEGITIMACION%2008-06-17%20def.pdf (24/11/2009). 
See Bake Hitzak magazine, 61 and 70.   
25
 Definition of Gesto por la Paz: http://www.gesto.org/definicion.htm (24/11/2009) 
26
 Gesto por la Paz declaration of principles: http://www.gesto.org/principios.htm (24/11/2009) 
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identities against the regime‟s centralist vision had to rely on private means of 
propagation. The reproduction of the nationalist identity became a contentious 
issue that was associated with the use of violence as a political tool. The peace 
identity was a rejection of that, but during the Dictatorship, it did not have 
access to the public space. Family and friends became central. Social meetings 
and casual association were the main means through which those political 
identities grew, resulting in the creation of highly active and solid social bonds. 
This was termed the „collective clandestine‟ (Perez-Agote, 2008: 103). That 
mechanism helped in the creation of ETA, for example. The nationalist identity 
created during the Dictatorship was challenged during the transition to 
democracy, especially the perception of the use of violence to achieve political 
means. Two main trends appeared, one legitimizing the new political scenario, 
which rejected violence; and the other delegitimizing it, and accepting violent 
action. The trend rejecting violence provided the main source of Gesto por la 
Paz members (Funes, 1998a: 38). Two groups played a central role in the 
creation of Gesto por la Paz: followers of Euskadiko Ezkerra27 and groups of 
young catholic people.  
Gesto por la Paz developed an pacifist identity. Most of its membership 
comes from cooperation and volunteering environments, highly committed to 
different charitable initiatives and with high political involvement. Within the 
organization, there is a strong sense of belonging. This sense of belonging is 
strengthened by the participation in different rituals, like the Gesto, or the 
                                            
27
 Euskadiko Ezkerra (EE „Basque Left‟ in Basque) was a political party created from a ETA split 
in the late 70s. In that moment ETA found itself with the dilemma of whether to keep using 
violence or not. The people that decided to use legal methods of action formed EE. Later on 
they fusioned EE with the Basque Socialist Party (Basque branch of the Socialist Workers 
Spanish Party or PSOE, now governing Spain) to form the Partido Socialista de Euskadi – 
Euskadiko Ezkerra (PSE-EE „Basque Socialist Party – Basque Left). 
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wearing of the Lazo Azul (Blue Ribbon). The importance of the Gesto became 
paramount at the end of the 1990s when the Gestos where contested with 
expressions of aggression from supporters of the nationalist left, and the love-
hate relationship was as its high. A clear division between „them‟ and „us‟ was 
drawn (Melucci, 1996: 83). In this respect, it is pertinent to say that the three 
mechanisms described by Blumer (1957) apply in that division. First, the 
formation of an adversary or a „them‟ is described fully; second, the idea of 
comradeship is built on the idea of endurance and penitence. I use the word 
penitence consciously, having said that the catholic organizations had a 
substantial role in the formation of the local peace groups and creation of Gesto 
por la Paz. Finally, the particularity of the performance, the ownership of the 
Gesto, and the Lazo Azul is key in understanding that nature of Gesto por la 
Paz (Blumer, 1957: 206-208; Casquette, 2006: 43-44). 
This mix of people gave the organization its main ideals and explains the 
broad array of issues that it addresses. From their basic points of right to life 
and rejection of all kinds of violence, they engaged in other important issues, 
like the problem that exists following the policy of isolation of the nationalist left 
and their concern around the different denouncements of torture every year. 
However, the main point of creating the identity and image of Gesto por la Paz 
comes from the particular use of symbolic communication, particularly the 
creation of the Gesto.  I describe more fully the Gesto and other initiatives later 
in this chapter.  
Organizational model 
The backbone of Gesto por la Paz is the unity of its diverse groups. 
Currently, there are more than 85 groups in the Basque Country coordinated by 
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Gesto por la Paz. One important thing to say before going on, is that these 
groups are not the only local peace groups operating in the Basque Country. 
Other groups exist that did not decide to be coordinated by Gesto por la Paz. 
These other groups are local independent groups or groups that were 
organized under other peace organizations like Bakea Orain or Denon Artean28.  
Gesto por la Paz groups are based locally in towns or villages and in the 
neighbourhoods of the big cities. They are groups of volunteers who perform 
the most important act of Gesto por la Paz, the Gesto. These groups are 
defined by the organization as „concerned and sensitized people‟29, who, after 
participating in the Gestos, identified with and came to support Gesto por la 
Paz’s work. The local groups are important because they created Gesto por la 
Paz a local groups coordinating organization. They control and lead activities in 
their immediate area, and coordinate with other groups between the different 
bodies that form the organization. These bodies are: 
 The Ordinary General Assembly: It meets once a year. At the meetings, 
the work of the groups is evaluated and the roles of the Coordinator and 
the working commissions are discussed. It is where new proposals are 
presented and the new guidelines are decided. This is the most 
important decision-making body of Gesto por la Paz.  
 The Coordinator30: Gesto por la Paz meets at different levels. The 
Coordinator (a body that coordinates activities within the organization) 
                                            
28
 Bakea Orain was an organization that split from Gesto por la Paz due political differences 
with the main principles of the organization. They were active during the 1990s, but dissapeared 
finally in 1998. Denon Artean, on the other hand, is a group that works directly with victims of 
terrorism in San Sebastian. At the beginning, they worked closely with Gesto por la Paz, but 
now the organization is involved in the Basque victims of terrorism association, Covite.  
29
 Gesto por la Paz organizational model: http://www.gesto.org/organigrama.htm (24/11/2009) 
30
 In Spanish: La Coordinadora.  
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meetings are frequent meetings to discuss organizational issues. 
Members of the Permanent Commission usually attend these meetings. 
The main difference between the Coordinator meetings and the General 
Assembly is that the Coordinator offers support and quick decisions 
about the ongoing initiatives. The Coordinator also works as a meeting 
point between initiatives designed to be carried out by Gesto por la Paz 
in general, or by the local groups.  
 The Permanent Commission: This is the executive body of the 
organization. It consists of twelve members of the organization who are 
elected annually by the General Assembly. The Permanent Commission 
is in charge of applying all the decisions taken in the General Assembly 
or the Coordinator. This means closely following the implementation of 
the initiatives that are ongoing. The Permanent Commission is the public 
relations body, in charge of the message to the media, to the public, and 
to the local groups. The twelve members of the Permanent Commission 
are volunteers and, usually, are the public face of Gesto por la Paz31.  
 Debate Forums: These are ad hoc forums to debate particular issues in 
the organization. These are the channels that Gesto por la Paz members 
have to express their opinions around different issues. The Debate 
Forums have been created around numerous issues like Human Rights, 
Concept of Pacifism, Peace Education, and Political Pluralism, just to 
give some examples. 
                                            
31
 All members of Gesto por la Paz are unpaid volunteers, except for one paid administrator.  
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 Work Commissions: The Work Commissions are the practical field where 
the different initiatives are defined and implemented. Two kinds of Work 
Commission exist, temporary and permanent.  
1. Temporary: This deals with one temporary issue. The most 
important of the temporary Work Commissions is the one created 
and dissolved around the 30th of January every year to organize 
the annual march for peace. The temporary Work Commissions 
were very important between 1995 and 1997 to deal with the 
intensive work in demanding freedom for the victims of 
kidnappings. Other important temporary Work Commissions are 
the ones created to coordinate different activities in universities 
and other educational centres.  
2. Permanent: There are currently six different permanent Work 
Commissions; some more relevant than others: 
a. Solidarity with victims of violence. It deals with the 
recognition and solidarity with victims of terrorism and 
therefore designs and creates the different initiatives 
devoted to that goal. Currently, this is the most important 
Work Commission.  
b. Commission against violence of persecution. Gives 
recognition to the victims of political extortion and 
harassment.  
c. Human Rights and prisoners. This commission deals with 
issues related to beatings, torture, assassinations and 
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everything that undermines the right to life and moral 
integrity.   
d. Peace Education. This commission deals with the Peace 
Education plan. This plan is based on two main pillars: the 
search for a positive peace and the creative perspective of 
conflict. The objectives are to create pedagogic material 
and to spread these ideas to the public.  
e. Relations with other organizations. It decides the different 
strategies to communicate with like-minded groups. The 
main goal is to share ideas and engage in constructive 
debate. 
f. Bake Hitzak (Peace Words). This Commission deals with 
everything related to the creation and publication of Bake 
Hitzak, the organization‟s magazine.  
 Finally, it is worth dedicating some space to explain how Gesto por la 
Paz is funded. Gesto por la Paz secures funding from four main sources: public 
funding, awards, funding campaigns, and donors. The main source of funding is 
the public funding that accounts for almost 50% of the organization‟s funding32. 
Donors provide almost the 25%, with the rest coming from awards and 
campaigns. Only when the funding situation is critical does the organization 
initiate funding campaigns, like a lottery. In recent years, due to the political 
situation and the ever-decreasing support from public institutions, the funding 
                                            
32
 Gesto por la Paz finances and budgeting: http://www.gesto.org/financiacion.htm (24/11/2009) 
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has been diminishing, which has led to a significant reduction in the action of 
the organization and some structural changes33.   
Repertoire of action 
Symbolic communication is a key factor in understanding the social 
action in the Basque Country (Funes, 1998a: 39). As I show in this section, the 
use of symbols is one of the most successful points in Gesto por la Paz’s 
history. The highly valued use of symbols in the Basque society and the coming 
of democracy made symbols very important in understanding the peace 
mobilization there (Benedicto & Moran, 1995: 261). The communication 
adopted by Gesto por la Paz is very expressive and highly emotional. Within 
this idea of communication and action are two initiatives that are very important 
for their great success and their enormous impact on peace mobilization in the 
Basque Country. Without these two initiatives, it is impossible to understand 
peace mobilization there. These are the Gesto (Gesture) and the Lazo Azul 
(Blue Ribbon).  
The Gesto 
The most characteristic trait, from which the name Gesto por la Paz is 
taken, is the Gesto. The Gesto consists of a silent gathering in a prominent part 
of a town, city, village or neighbourhood34. This gathering takes place the day 
                                            
33
 The most significant is the change of headquarters. Before 2006, the headquarters was a 
large flat in Bilbao city centre owned by the Bilbao Bishopric. In 2006, the Bishop decided not to 
let the flat to Gesto por la Paz. As a result, the organization sought a small office not far away. 
After a year, the organization relocated to a larger studio in the same building. Coincidently, this 
is the same building where Lokarri has its headquarters. Gesto por la Paz is located on the third 
floor, and Lokarri on the first floor. However, their proximity to one another did not improve 
communication between the two organizations.   
34
 Gestos normally take place in a main square or park, public space, in front of the city hall or 
any other public building. More unusually, they take place where a violent act happened or 
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after a politically motivated killing and lasts for about 15 minutes, after which 
people disperse. Between 1995 and 1997, the Gestos were also used to 
demand the release of the people kidnapped and took place every day a person 
remained kidnapped by ETA. As I explained before, the Gesto is highly 
symbolic. The people gather silently and display a poster denouncing the killing 
and the violence. That is to „do the Gesto‟, making it a kind of rite of passage. 
The significance behind the Gesto is deeply rooted in the way violence is 
perceived and lived in the Basque Country. The way of calling for the Gesto 
(noone calls the Gesto; people know the time and place to meet when there is a 
killing) is creating a routine, which counters the way violence is perceived to be 
part of Basque daily life. The idea is to create a peace image in contrast to the 
violent image (Funes, 1998a: 41). The way of making it routine answered two of 
Gesto por la Paz’s problems: scarcity of resources, and impact. Making the 
Gesto routine and easy to access provided a very cheap way of protesting, and, 
against a model of large marches, Gesto por la Paz proposed a model of small, 
but numerous gatherings to maximise impact. In the beginning, the Gesto was 
used mainly to denounce the violent killings carried out by ETA. With the 
appearance of the GAL35, the Gestos started to be used to denounce all 
politically motivated killings, not only the killings by ETA. This created some 
tensions inside the organization, but finally the decision was made to protest 
against all killings. Gesto por la Paz always tried to stress this point, arguing 
                                                                                                                                
home of victims‟ relatives. The number of groups and places for the Gestos can be consulted 
here: http://www.gesto.org/gestos.htm (24/11/2009) 
35
 GAL or Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberacion (Antiterrotist Freedom Groups) were groups of 
mercenaries hired by the Spanish government in a covert operation to fight ETA. This was the 
most important case of state sponsored terrorism in Spain. In 1996, several key figures of the 
socialist government during the 1980s were tried and sent to prison. For more information about 
this episode refer to LETAMENDIA, F. (1994) Historia Del Nacionalismo Vasco Y De E.T.A, Vol. 
3, San Sebastian: R&B Ediciones, or WOODWORTH, P. (2001) Dirty War, Clean Hands: Eta, 
the Gal and Spanish Democracy, Cork: Cork University Press. 
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that not protesting against all killings meant accepting the logic of violence36. In 
2004, they published several articles stressing this point, linking the rejection of 
violence to other fields, like the rejection of the death penalty or the decision to 
support only non violent means of conflict resolution (Calleja, 2004).    
The impact of the Gesto is very important in explaining the nature of 
peace mobilizations in the Basque Country. The Gesto was the first initiative to 
reclaim the public protest from the traditional sectors, notably the nationalist left. 
Most importantly, the Gesto broke the cultural routine of remaining silent against 
a violent act. Paradoxically, silent action broke the traditional idea of not 
speaking publicly about the political violence. With the appearance of the 
Gesto, the social mass that rejected violence and were not politically aligned 
with the nationalist parties found their means to „reclaim the streets‟ (Funes, 
1998a: 42). During the time of the kidnappings, the Gesto showed its most 
heroic image. To confront the success of the Gesto, the nationalist left decided 
to make counter Gestos. However, those Gestos were not similar in nature. 
Against the silent gathering, the counter Gestos used noise and heavily 
offensive slogans. As in Gesto por la Paz, the symbolic dimensions of 
communication were very important for the nationalist left.  As I said earlier, 
Gesto por la Paz took over the spaces that, traditionally, the nationalist left had 
monopolized. This, coupled with the fact that the peaceful protest altered the 
social mechanisms for how the conflict is perceived, provoked a change in the 
strategies37. Two lines of action affected Gesto por la Paz members. On one 
side, the aggression against people wearing the Lazo Azul increased. On the 
                                            
36
 Manifest aginst violent death: http://www.gesto.org/pdf/contramuerte.pdf (24/11/2009) 
37
 In 1994, Herri Batasuna (People United) the nationalist left party signed the Oldartzen chart, 
with the acquiescence of ETA. In that chart one of the guidelines was to “socialize the suffering” 
and to “be united in the struggle in all fronts”.  
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other, they started the Contra-Gestos (counter gestures). The aim was to instil 
fear in the members of the Basque peace movement (Funes, 1998a: 141).  
During the subsequent years, tension was the norm in the Gestos. On most 
occasions, the police had to be placed in the middle of the two groups to avoid 
aggression, mostly from the nationalist left. The nationalist left movement did 
not expect the following consequences: first, the social conflict was no longer 
Basques against the Spanish state. The image was a conflict between 
Basques. This was entirely opposite to ETA strategy, which conceptualized 
reality as an oppressed people against and oppressor state in ETA‟s action-
repression-action strategy (Ibarra, 1987: 127)38. Second and most importantly, 
that situation made Gesto por la Paz heroes in the social perception of the 
conflict. They were normal people against the image of violence, making them a 
reference in social action.   
The Lazo Azul  
The Lazo Azul or Blue Ribbon is an important visual symbol created by 
Gesto por la Paz. Any person, institution, organization that wear the Lazo Azul 
are automatically part of Gesto por la Paz’s message. The Lazo Azul is entirely 
identified with Gesto por la Paz discourse: tolerance, freedom for the 
kidnapped, the search for peace, the rejection of violent killings (Funes, 1998a: 
40). The Lazo Azul appeared in 1993, from the ideas of four different local 
peace groups, to protest against the kidnapping of Julio Iglesias Zamora39. 
                                            
38
 In the first days, the objective was to achieve military victory. This evolved into the aim for 
political negotiation. More information in IBARRA, P. (1987) La Evolucion Estrategica De Eta, 
San Sebastian: Kriselu, and LETAMENDIA, F. (1994) Historia Del Nacionalismo Vasco Y De 
E.T.A, Vol. 3, San Sebastian: R&B Ediciones. 
39
 Julio Iglesias Zamora was a Basque businessman kidnapped by ETA on the 6th of July, 
1993. He was released after 117 days and the payment of a ransom.  
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When the Lazo Azul was launched, it was a symbol offered to the people to 
wear it to denounce the damage that ETA was doing to civil rights in the 
Basque Country, most importantly, life and freedom. The Lazo Azul actually is 
not a ribbon; it is piece of cloth that shapes the letter A of Askatu (Freedom). 
The Lazo Azul was used again in subsequent kidnappings until 1997, its 
use finishing with the kidnapping and killing of Miguel Angel Blanco, and the  
dominance of political parties in the public space. During the kidnappings, 
between 1995 and 1997, the Lazo Azul was one of the most identifiable images 
of the rejection of violence. Its simplicity and visual impact made it one of the 
most used symbols. After 1997, the symbol was taken by new social groups, 
like Basta Ya o Foro de Ermua to represent their opposition to the violence of 
ETA and their opposition to any Basque national project. Gesto por la Paz 
rejects the use of the Lazo Azul beyond the rejection of violence: 
„[..] We would like to ask the people for a minimum of common sense, who, 
rather than fighting against the serious problem of terrorism, focus their fight against 
against their political adversaries. The political discrepancies are legitimate, but the 
experience told us that the use of antiterrorist policies as political weapons against 
parties has been disastrous for the whole society40‟.    
The impact of the Gesto and the Lazo Azul is impressive. However, the 
action of Gesto por la Paz includes more that these two symbols. Other lines of 
action are the campaign to make people more aware of particular problems 
related to the conflict, and to change the perceptions of several aspects around 
it. These campaigns are Peace Education, Violence of Prosecution, and 
awareness towards victims of violence. However, the most important campaign 
                                            
40
 Reclaiming the use of the Blue Ribbon: http://gesto.org/prensapdf/07-03-
07%20NP%20Lazo%20azul.pdf (24/11/2009) 
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is the Separation of Conflicts. I devote some words to that campaign, as it is 
one of the most important pillars in Gesto por la Paz’s philosophy.  
The Separation of Conflicts 
Gesto por la Paz understands that the Basque Conflict can be 
understood using two different dimensions: the political and the violent. Gesto 
por la Paz believes these two dimensions can and should be treated differently. 
However, before I go into how these dimensions have to be treated, I explain 
them: 
 The political side: the Basque conflict has political roots based in the 
conflict between one nationality, the Basque, and two established nation 
states. This conflict comes from the nineteenth century, with an historical 
disagreement between Basques, and the Spanish and French about the 
rights and the territory of the Basque Country. Gesto por la Paz 
recognizes this fact and defends the idea that this conflict must be 
resolved within legitimate democratic institutions, like parliaments and 
the conversations between democratically elected governments. The 
society in this case has the right and the duty to give its opinion about 
how to resolve this conflict using all the means necessary, like 
demonstrations, acts, petitions or marches. Both these ideas, the political 
struggle and the social action, must be conducted with a total rejection of 
violence. 
 The violent side: the political violence in the Basque Country, as it is 
understood by Gesto por la Paz, is a consequence of the image of the 
conflict. It is an issue that came from the Franco dictatorship. The 
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political violence transforms the social and political environment, denying 
normal, non-violent, means of resolving conflict.  
Gesto por la Paz believes that the political conflict has to be treated 
differently from the violent conflict. While, in the political conflict, dialogue and 
concessions are the norm to reach a consensus, in the violent conflict no 
concession are to be given. Within this rationale, for example, Gesto por la Paz 
defends the idea of a legalization of the nationalist left parties, but rejects the 
idea of giving any concessions to ETA. This is one of the messages that Gesto 
por la Paz tries to convey to the whole of Basque society: confidence in the 
democratic institutions and a total rejection of violence. The main idea behind 
this is that there is no indissoluble association between the identity conflict and 
the use of terrorism and violence in the Basque Country41.  
Gesto por la Paz is trying to reach the greatest number of social agents 
possible, using a series of speeches open to everyone, as well as in every 
communication Gesto por la Paz has created. This idea has been very 
successful, being one of the main reasons for the growing delegitimization of 
violence that appeared in Basque society over the past years. These speeches 
are called on a regular basis, and attract audiences that encompass members 
of different political sensibilities, including members of the nationalist left. This is 
one indicator of the success of this initiative.       
Lokarri. Network for the accord and the consultation 
Lokarri („Bond‟ in Basque) was established in March 2006 after a long 
process. That process started in September 2005, with Elkarri‟s VIII Assembly.  
                                            
41
 http://www.gesto.org/prensapdf/07-09-25%20NP%20Charla%20y%20atentado.pdf 
(24/11/2009) and Bake Hitzak magazine, No. 58.  
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Elkarri and the VIII Assembly. The end that started a new beginning 
Elkarri42 (Dialogue, in Basque) was born in 1992, six years before the 
appearance of Gesto por la Paz. The creation and expansion of Elkarri was not 
a coincidence and one factor was the existence of Gesto por la Paz. In the 
beginning, Elkarri was not defined as a pacifist movement, but an organization 
that worked for dialogue and mediation (Funes, 1998a: 47). Its origins are in the 
social networks created during the opposition to the Leizaran highway, 
represented by the Lurraldea collective43 (Barcena et al., 1995; 1998). These 
networks were a mix of people with different backgrounds, from the nationalist 
left to those with a religious background. If Gesto por la Paz defended the idea 
of the complete separation of political conflict and violence, Elkarri took the 
opposite approach. Its main objective was to work with social and political 
agents to find a solution. It analyzed the conflict in two stages: a political 
conflict, with two clear parties, and a social conflict, derived from the first stage. 
Elkarri’s first objective was to make Basque society see the conflict, and its 
second objective was to create the tools to promote dialogue on two levels, 
political and social. For Elkarri, any previous factors to initiate dialogue were a 
problem. For example, in Elkarri’s opinion, asking ETA first to stop violence is 
giving ETA the key to start a dialogue process (Funes, 1998a: 48). 
                                            
42
 The history and description of Elkarri is brief in this document as my analysis is focused on 
Elkarri’s successor, Lokarri. For a much more detailed history of Elkarri, as well a full description 
of its organization and methods, refer to FUNES, M. J. (1998a) La Salida del Silencio. 
Movilizaciones por la paz en Euskadi 1986-1998, Madrid, Akal. And the Elkarri papers 
www.elkarri.net (20/01/11) 
43
 The Lurraldea collective was a civic platform created to organise social action against the 
construction of the Leizaran highway. The Leizaran conflict was an environmental struggle 
created to oppose the construction of a highway that connected Pamplona in Navarre with San 
Sebastian in Guipuzcoa. It took that name from an ecological protected area endangered by 
that highway. Quickly, it became a conflict between the political parties and the alternative 
movements, mostly conducted by the nationalist left. For more information see LETAMENDIA, F. 
(1994a) Historia del Nacionalismo Vasco y de E.T.A, San Sebastian, R&B Ediciones. pp. 344-
377, Appendix A.   
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Since the beginning, Elkarri made a huge effort to spread itself in the 
Basque territory and to promote its ideas. The structure and organization was 
solid, with four centres well identified and a planned worksheet divided in 
periods. Unlike Gesto por la Paz, Elkarri did not avoid political commitment. 
Instead they tried to achieve accords and agreements with different political 
parties, that led to a high specialization of their members, with a clear divide 
between the full time members (people who get paid for their work in the 
organization) and the activists, most of them volunteers. In its 14 years of 
existence, Elkarri was able to start three different „Peace Conferences‟ 
meetings between different political parties to achieve a final document towards 
the peaceful resolution of the conflict, numerous workshops in neighbourhoods 
and towns and a meaningful impact on the collective imagination. They made 
the word „dialogue‟ part of the political discourse and a social issue.  
Finally, the end of Elkarri came, as is usual in this kind of organization, 
from its own success. In 2005, after two years without killings in the Basque 
Country, and with a moderate left wing government in Spain that was willing to 
explore pacifist ways to end the conflict, Elkarri felt the need to change. In this 
atmosphere, the VIII Assembly was started. 
On the 26th of September 2005, Elkarri published the brief that detailed 
the VIII Assembly that ended in December of the same year. In that brief, five 
main questions were formulated, divided between five different documents. 
They were: the completed activities, the current situation, an evaluation of 
Elkarri’s activities since its beginning, the alternatives that Elkarri was able to 
offer, and the way to carry out all these initiatives. These points where 
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summarized in five questions: „what have we done?‟, „where are we?‟, „where 
have we come from?‟, „where are we going?‟ and „which way?‟.  
Following that reasoning, Elkarri reached the conclusion that the situation 
was very different from 1992. The violence from ETA was almost nonexistent 
and that made Elkarri think that a ceasefire was near. As Elkarri noted: 
„However, the most determinant factor is the evidence that the only viable 
alternative that ETA has is to stop violence. In fact, its only alternative is to start 
a process of nonviolence and dialogue‟. (Elkarri, 2005a: 2)  
As they noted in the document „Where we come from‟, the position of 
Elkarri was key to understand the new situation and to break what they called 
the „definitive tie44‟. Elkarri understood that the majority of the popular opinion 
was towards non violence and dialogue (Elkarri, 2005b: 4).  As a result of this 
conclusion, the opinion was reached that the organization model of Elkarri was 
redundant. The options were now to change or to disappear. Finally, it was 
decided that a new proposal for the future, based on a new organizational 
model, had to be created. That decision was taken to face the challenge of a 
new kind of society, with new ways of mobilization and with a new perception of 
the political situation. The idea of the creation of a network devoted to the 
consultation and the agreement was there. Later on, that idea was christened 
as Lokarri and its main objective was to promote negotiation between all the 
political parties before March 2006.  
That moment marked a turning point in Elkarri’s history. Not only a 
change of ways of action and objectives was decided, but a total image and 
personnel change as well. The old organization was abandoned, with new 
                                            
44
 „Empate definitivo‟ in Spanish.  
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faces, lower budget and lower cost. A new organization to work in a peaceful 
environment was created.  
The VIII Assembly process created problems for Lokarri as well. The 
Elkarri director was a very charismatic media figure. When he stepped down, 
some people saw a problem and a lack of will in the new director.  
History 
On the 12th of March 2006 Lokarri was created with a constitutive 
document designed to lead the organization through a hypothetical peace 
process. Lokarri aimed to achieve two objectives: conciliation and reconciliation, 
defined by Lokarri as social priorities. For that, Lokarri developed two 
hypothetical scenarios, one positive, with a peace process in place and the 
other negative, with a situation worsening. Two achieve the two priorities; 
Lokarri defined its own basis, its organizational model and its acting guidelines45 
these points are developed below. After the creation of Lokarri it was immersed 
in the most favourable situation. Ten days after the official start, ETA 
announced its „permanent‟ ceasefire on 23rd of March 2006.  
Lokarri took the ceasefire announcement with optimism. On the 22nd of 
March Lokarri described it as the „most awaited moment for the Basque 
society‟46. Elsewhere in that press release, Lokarri did not hide its concern 
about the situation and showed its intention to work harder than ever to 
establish and develop a process to lead to a peaceful resolution. For Lokarri, 
the “day after” was there.  
                                            
45
 Lokarri foundational document: http://lokarri.org/index.php/es/acerca-de-
lokarri/publicaciones/documento-constitutivo-de-lokarri, page 2. (24/11/2009)  
46
 The opportunity to open a normalization and peace process: 
http://lokarri.org/index.php/es/actualidad-lokarri/prensa/la-oportunidad-de-abrir-un-proceso-de-
paz-y-normalizacion (24/11/2009) 
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During the peace process Lokarri concreted its objectives. After six 
months of peace process, Lokarri launched its evaluation and action plan for 
2006-2007 (Lokarri, 2006b). In this document, it is possible to see the 
challenges that the peace process was facing. The most important problem for 
Lokarri was the lack of movement in the negotiations. This was based on a 
series of problems. The first was the proximity of elections. Here, Lokarri’s 
diagnosis was critical of the political parties that used that momentum for 
electoral benefits. Another factor was the delay in organising the negotiating 
table for the political parties. Another important issue was the lack of a 
recognized political voice inside the nationalist left. Lokarri supports the creation 
of formulas to allow Batasuna or any other political voice from the nationalist left 
to be able to be part of the process. For that purpose Lokarri created its first 
„campaign book‟ called „Three objectives that unite us47’. These three objectives 
were classified as the accord, the consultation, and the reconciliation48. Before 
the re-appearance of violence, Lokarri was only able to develop the accord 
initiative, giving ideas of how an agreement has to be reached between the 
different political and social actors in the conflict49. During the peace process, 
Lokarri started different campaigns, like creating a mailbox to collect people‟s 
opinions about the peace process, or the creation of an academic report aimed 
at international actors and institutions (Chapman, 2006). In the last days of the 
peace process, all the efforts were aimed at not loosing the opportunity of 
peace and not letting the situation become irreversible. However, the bombing 
                                            
47
 Tres objetivos que nos unen, in Spanish.  
48
 Press release announcing the first step of the „Three objectives that unite us‟ campaign: 
http://lokarri.org/index.php/es/actualidad-lokarri/prensa/tres-objetivos-que-nos-unen-promover-
el-acuerdo (24/11/2009) 
49
 „The Agreement. Reflections and proposals to build a coexistence agreement.’: 
http://lokarri.org/files/File/PDF/El_acuerdo.pdf (24/11/2009) 
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in Madrid airport in December 2006 meant that Lokarri had to change its 
strategy. Caught between an organization that was saying that the peace 
process was still on, but had no problems with using violence, and political 
parties that were saying that everything was over, Lokarri decided to 
delegitimize ETA as a political actor. All these efforts were in vain, as on the 5th 
of June 2007, ETA declared the ceasefire over.  
 After the ceasefire, Lokarri focused for the first time on bringing the 
situation to another political agreement, with little success. The objective was to 
try and solve the conflict using non-violent means, trying to avoid past 
situations. The main objective here was to confirm that the society was mature 
enough to face a political settlement. As Lokarri said in its first press release 
after the end of the ceasefire, the most important danger of the political and 
social situation is a return to the past, giving the government the excuse to use 
any means to end violence. Lokarri made clear its support for the use of Human 
Rights and civil rights in the pursuit of peace. In that press release, Lokarri 
announced its main initiative for the time post ceasefire: the popular 
consultation50. This campaign was intended to be the second step in the „Three 
objectives that unite us‟ campaign and was presented shortly before the end of 
the ceasefire51. Lokarri announced in its campaign book for the end of 2007: 
„To offer to the whole society the initiative to call off a popular consultation as a 
concrete, viable and solid alternative to unblock the situation and to walk 
towards a peace process‟ (Lokarri, 2007b). 
                                            
50
 „The response to ETA is more democracy‟ press release: 
http://lokarri.org/index.php/es/actualidad-lokarri/prensa/la-respuesta-a-eta-es-mas-democracia 
(24/11/2009) 
51
 For a Political Consultation:http://www.lokarri.org/files/File/PDF/consulta.pdf (24/11/2009) 
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During 2008, Lokarri worked to consolidate the consultation and gave its 
opinion about the conflict situation. It published a handbook about the 
participation and the reasons for a consultation.  There, the organization made 
a point about the main ideals of Lokarri to encourage people to participate in the 
conflict resolution, and to put some pressure on the political parties.  In that 
regard, Lokarri tried to focus on action through the internet (Anton, 2009).  
Nature of Lokarri 
Lokarri defines its nature through four basic principles: the defence of the 
non-violence approach; life and Human Rights as ethical absolutes; the option 
of dialogue without exclusions; and the respect for the popular will. These 
principles are not very different from the ones that Gesto por la Paz defends. 
Through these basic principles, Lokarri developed its four main goals: 
 The vindication and promotion of a plural accord and a popular 
consultation. For Lokarri, this is the central axis for the promotion of 
conciliation.  
 The contribution to help build a reconciliation process.   
 Promote and facilitate the people‟s participation in the peace process. 
 To „defend the conquered‟. That is to promote all the factors not lose a 
non-violence and dialogue scenario.  
To reach these goals, Lokarri developed a series of functions or 
strategies: to analyze and to make proposals; to inform and to opine; to 
vindicate and denounce; and to take the initiative and to mobilize. All these 
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strategies were created to achieve the objectives described above, following the 
basic principles that are described at the beginning of the section52. 
The identity tied with Lokarri is very similar to the identity that Elkarri 
created. As with Elkarri, Lokarri is difficult to identify as a pacifist organization in 
the same sense as Gesto por la Paz. Lokarri identifies itself with the defence of 
human dignity, but its goals are more aimed towards facilitating or forcing the 
negotiation and to create new conditions of perception about the conflict. If we 
take its nature and its actions together, it is clear that Lokarri is a peace 
organization. The difference between Gesto por la Paz and Lokarri is evident, 
but this does not happen without a reason. As I argued before, Elkarri did not 
appear totally apart from Gesto por la Paz. Gesto por la Paz was created from 
the social frustration and the social need to provide an answer to violence, but 
this answer, very symbolic, was a blunt answer. Elkarri tried to bring some 
structure to the action, to give some results. The experience of the Lurraldea 
platform gave the impression that a change in public policy was possible. 
Lurraldea was an environmental issue, but with the meddling of ETA during the 
protest, it became a political issue. That meant the use of institutional means of 
action. Between some scholars, for example, the difference between a social 
movement and a pressure group in Elkarri never was very clear. Some even 
characterized it as an interest group coming from a social movement (De la 
Peña & Ibarra, 2004: 85). This kind of philosophy of action was inherited in 
Lokarri. The existence of Gesto por la Paz is not apart from this decision. As 
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 Foundational Document: http://lokarri.org/index.php/es/acerca-de-
lokarri/publicaciones/documento-constitutivo-de-lokarri, page 3 (24/11/2009) 
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some members of Lokarri opine, Lokarri do the things Gesto por la Paz does 
not do and vice versa.  
Lokarri’s membership is widely dispersed and varied. At first glance, it is 
common to make the mistake of thinking that Lokarri is a nationalist 
organization. However, within the organization, it is possible to find people from 
different political persuations. Most of the people are nationalist in the sense 
that one of the main points the organization defends is the right for the Basque 
people to decide what to do with the conflict. However, the most important 
feeling within the organization is the rejection of violence: ETA should stop its 
strategy and should negotiate. That is a central motivation of Lokarri members. 
Another point that comes from Lokarri‟s actions is that they are much more 
critical towards policies applied to solve the conflict. The action of sending 
political messages makes Lokarri a good organization to criticize the political 
process. Press releases or reports about the banning of political parties or the 
action of the police are everyday actions for the organization.  
The members of Lokarri define themselves as convinced, committed and 
good willed people. They have their rites of acceptance, as in Gesto por la Paz. 
If in Gesto por la Paz, to do the Gesto was the rite of passage, in Lokarri it is to 
take part in a petitioning campaign. This comes from the times of Elkarri when 
gaining signatures for petition was the most important visible part of Elkarri’s 
action.   
Organizational model 
Lokarri’s organizational model is defined as „new‟, with the idea of 
adjusting to the contemporary social situation. This organizational model is 
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based on two parties: the participants, and the decision-making bodies or the 
board of directors53: 
 Participants:  This level is divided into three categories: 
1. The friends (Lagunak54). These are the people who are nominally 
part of Lokarri, but do not give any particular commitment 
2. The collaborators (Erkideak). These are people who want to take 
an active part in any of Lokarri’s initiatives.  
3. The members of the forums55 (Foroak). These are meeting points 
created by Lokarri to discuss different objectives at any level, 
geographical or thematic. The members who decide to create a 
forum coordinate directly with the Coordination Comission.  
These three groups encompass the total membership of Lokarri 
(Bazkideak). All members pay a monthly fee and receive Lokarri’s magazine, 
Haritu. They are invited to the tri-monthly provincial assembly and to the 
biannual meeting, as well as to all the public acts that Lokarri organizes.  
 Decision making and organizational bodies: Lokarri has two main 
decision making bodies and one executive organ: 
1. General Assembly. This is the ultimate decisive organ. It is called 
every two years or when the Coordination Commission, the 
Provincial Assemblies or the members require. The General 
Assembly approves the budget and the main lines of action. Any 
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 Foundational Document: http://lokarri.org/index.php/es/acerca-de-
lokarri/publicaciones/documento-constitutivo-de-lokarri, page 5 (24/11/2009) 
54
 Lokarri is a bilingual organization; the everyday language is Basque or Spanish. For that 
reason, I will write the names in Basque when those appear in Lokarri’s documents.  
55
 These forums are both physical and electronic. Although participation is open to anyne, 
usually only Lokarri members attend or post. To access the online forums (in Spanish or 
Basque): http://lokarri.org/es/participa/en-los-foros/ (24/11/2009).  
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change in Lokarri’s basic principles has to be approved with the 
absolute majority of the General Assembly.  
2. Provincial Assemblies. Four exist, divided territorially between the 
three Basque Provinces and Navarre. They develop the guidelines 
for the General Assembly, the annual budget and the three 
monthly action plans. It is called every three months or when the 
Coordination Commission or the members decide.  
3. Coordination Commission. This is the permanent executive organ. 
It develops plans to solidify the General Assembly’s guidelines 
and proposals. These plans have to have the approval of the 
Provincial Assemblies. A reduced body six of people carry out the 
everyday management of Lokarri. This body meets every two 
weeks or as necessary.  
With this organizational model, Lokarri defined three complementary 
structures that articulate their actions. These are the Peace Process social 
watch, foreign network of support for dialogue, and the popular network for the 
accord and the consultation56. The main work is done in the Network, but 
Lokarri is trying to revitalise the other two structures.  
The Peace process social watch is a group of intellectuals, approached 
by Lokarri, with the task of creating documents describing the Basque society‟s 
perception of the conflict. To date, they have only created one document, in 
December 200757. The foreign network was the direct evolution of a network of 
groups that Elkarri had outside the Basque Country. As far as Lokarri is 
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 Foundational Document: http://lokarri.org/index.php/es/acerca-de-
lokarri/publicaciones/documento-constitutivo-de-lokarri, page 4 (24/11/2009) 
57
 The document can be consulted online: http://lokarri.org/files/File/PDF/observatorio.pdf 
(24/11/2009)  
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concerned, only two groups have regular meetings, one in Madrid and another 
one in Barcelona. These groups are mainly created by Basques working or 
living in those cities, and the amount of work engaged in by these groups is 
significantly low.  
The members are mainly volunteers. The organization has six 
employees, one being the coordinator. The coordinator and the rest of the 
employees form the Coordination Commission. At the same time, some 
positions are filled with part-time jobs.  
Lokarri has an average annual budget of 450,000 Euros, used mainly to 
pay the employees, the headquarters, the different campaigns and Lokarri’s 
own magazine Haritu. The main sources of funding for Lokarri are the monthly 
payments from the members, the different support received by the institutions, 
and the revenues from different campaigns. Of these sources, the most 
important is the monthly payments, which amounts to two thirds of the money 
received. This fact makes clear that, even with close ties with the public 
institutions, Lokarri is not economically dependant on them.  
Repertoires of action 
Lokarri uses a more institutional approach than Gesto por la Paz. The 
main aim of Lokarri is to change perceptions of the political actors towards the 
conflict. This means the use of campaigns aimed at political parties to take a 
specific approach towards the conflict. However, before getting into specifics, it 
is worth recounting the basic objectives that Lokarri adopted in their 
foundational document: 
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 To promote a plural accord and a popular consultation. This objective is 
the most important one. Lokarri feels this is the central point to achieve a 
conciliation process within the Basque society. 
 To prepare the reconciliation with the use of a uniting discourse. 
 To promote the popular participation in the peace process. 
 To defend the conquered: the non-violence and dialogue as basic 
conditions for the conciliation. 
The main difference from Gesto por la Paz in this point is that Lokarri 
specifically announces that the main receptors of its message are the political 
actors. On one side are the different political parties. Lokarri demands several 
commitments from them; the most important being to respect society‟s opinion 
regarding the conflict. Besides that, they urge parties to negotiate and put aside 
political differences and other internal demands in order to tackle the conflict. 
On the other side is ETA, from whom Lokarri demands the complete end of 
violence and the need to start a negotiation process. Therefore, the action and 
initiatives are more focused to achieve something, more than to express the 
discontent about the situation. This focus on concrete initiatives made the way 
of action much more structured and objective oriented. The word that can 
describe Lokarri’s action could be „achievement‟. Lokarri’s different campaigns 
have titles or names describing objectives and solid goals. Here are some 
examples: “To get 50,000 signatures”, “Participate in the consultation”, “The 
priority is to reach an agreement and to call a consultation”.  
This focus on the “practical” dimensions of action makes the symbolic 
component in Lokarri’s action much less important than in Gesto por la Paz. In 
fact, the campaigns are presented in a much more practical way, with a clear 
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route and objectives. This makes Lokarri much more efficient in exploiting the 
opportunities the political system presents, and gives a clear message to the 
members within the organization‟s schemata. The campaigns have a beginning, 
a middle and an end, making them significantly easier to follow and much more 
efficient in resources. As I said before, the goal is not to provide an avenue for 
protest, but to impact on the political actors. However, one crucial aspect about 
this is that it is based on a clear conception of society itself. Lokarri has its 
opinion about what society believes about the conflict. Society is protracted, 
tired of violence, and demands a space to speak about the conflict. In the end, 
Lokarri’s objective is one old ideal, also shared by Gesto por la Paz: the 
socialization of the conflict resolution58.  
Lokarri perceived a change in society. This meant a change in the 
channels of communication between the organization and the society. That is 
why Lokarri is focusing most of its action through new technologies. Lokarri’s 
website (www.lokarri.org), alongside a series of email lists, provides a central 
point to communicate their ideas and initiatives to the public and to 
communicate with the organization‟s members. This is ideal in showing the 
principles and the way of action desired by Lokarri.  
Now, I explain the different initiatives that Lokarri has spearheaded since 
its creation. Of the three initiatives that are explained, the first has the aim of 
changing cultural perceptions of the society about the conflict and the second 
has a clear, concrete political goal.  
                                            
58
 One of the most dennounced issues from peace activists and political academics in the 
Basque Country is that the political parties and ETA never had a problem to socialize the 
conflict and the violence (at the beginning this issue was key to understanding ETA‟s strategy, 
for example), but they are extremely reluctant, if not totally opposed, to socialize a conflict 
resolution process.  
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The Agreement 
The agreement is one of the three steps that Lokarri identifies to achieve 
comprehensive conflict resolution. The main idea is to reach an agreement in 
the general guidelines about the political coexistence in the Basque Country. As 
Lokarri says in its report about the agreement, the Basque history was a history 
of problems of coexistence between the Basque nationalists and the Spanish 
nationalists. This conflict shaped every level of social life and needs to be 
addressed. For that, it is important to start a process of negotiation between the 
different political parties, without any exclusions (Lokarri, 2006a). More 
importantly, Lokarri uses that report to make a statement about the role of the 
organization in a Basque peace process: 
‘Lokarri has to work to unite, without exclusions and without winners or losers 
in a resolution process. Therefore, Lokarri’s mission is to be what unites, 
specifically, to make the proposals of agreement, consultation and 
reconciliation tools of union and social and political integration59‟.  
Lokarri uses different international examples to show how political 
coexistence is possible60. At the end, the agreement is a divulging campaign 
without real action by the Lokarri members, and the success of this campaign 
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 „The Agreement. Reflections and proposals to build a coexistence agreement.’: 
http://lokarri.org/files/File/PDF/El_acuerdo.pdf (24/11/2009)  
60
 The most important are Belgium and Northern Ireland. The first one is very unfortunate. In 
2008, Belgium suffered a major political crisis between communities that showed that the 
coexistence is far from perfect. The second is the referent to Lokarri of how a violent conflict can 
be solved. However, the differences between Northern Ireland and the Basque Country ar far 
more than Lokarri can accept. The scope of the Northern Irish context is far from this paper‟s 
objective, but just to note two major differences: the segregation that exists in Northern Ireland 
does not exist in the Basque Country and neither does the Basque Country have a political 
party that defends independence and is recognized from other political forces, unlike in 
Northern Ireland. In the Basque Country, the major political parties that defend independence 
are banned.  
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is far from perfect. Lokarri decided to use the agreement document to take 
the next step; to start campaigning for the consultation.   
The Consultation 
Lokarri publicly presented the initiative for a popular consultation on the 
19th of March 2007. At that moment, the peace process was at its worst. It was 
characterised by a divided political arena, which ultimately resulted in ETA 
carrying out two killings in December 2007. In their presentation, Lokarri 
explained that the initiative would be carried out either if ETA does not 
renounce violence, or if the situation degenerates and dialogue becomes 
impossible between political parties, to find a solution. Ultimately, both two 
scenarios occurred.  
The main objectives of the initiative were to impel the calling of a popular 
consultation through a petition to the Basque and Navarre parliaments and to 
mobilize society for increased activism about peace, dialogue and agreement. 
These are the main characteristics of the initiative: 
 The call for a consultation was carried out under the right to petition, 
stated under the 29th Article of the Spanish constitution61. This right gives 
the opportunity to citizens and social organizations to make petitions to 
the institutions. The institutions have to process and answer these 
petitions.  
 Lokarri attempted to collect 50,000 signatures to support this petition.  
 The petition was presented in both parliaments on the 31st of October 
2007. Before that, Lokarri tried to find as much support as possible 
between the political parties. 
                                            
61
 http://www.constitucion.es/constitucion/castellano/titulo_1.html#1b (24/11/2009) 
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 The main tools for this initiative were leaflets asking for signatures, the 
Lokarri website and the arranging of a series of vans that crossed the 
Basque Country.  
The initiative started with the van campaign, and later focused on the 
collection of signatures by the members. Towards the end, this initiative 
encountered two problems. First, it was the intention of the Basque President to 
arrange a consultation about the political future of the Basque Country. This 
initiative tried to shape the public opinion, in order to understand the difference 
between Lokarri’s initiative and that of the President. The President‟s initiative 
was a consultation about the political future of the Basque Country, and 
Lokarri’s initiative was about what the people want in terms of conflict 
resolution. Second, the members of Lokarri had doubts about the Consultation. 
In the General Assembly on the 24th of September 2007, Lokarri members 
expressed the need for a reflection period to know if this initiative was worth the 
work done, or if other initiatives were required (Fn. 24/09/2007). Finally, the 
Basque government changed the nature of the consultation and made it a type 
of conflict perception. This, effectively, co-opted the initiative from Lokarri. The 
response from the organization was to support the Basque government 
initiative. In its last document, Lokarri urged Basque society to participate in the 
consultation62.  
                                            
62
 A proposal to inform and participate in the consultation: 
http://lokarri.org/files/File/PDF/informar-participar-consulta.pdf (24/11/2009) 
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Social Participation 
Finally, Lokarri tried to focus its attention on promoting participation using 
the Internet, and different publications. Here, I explain two different initiatives, 
the peace process blog and the peace observatory.  
 Peace process blog: In its idea of promoting participation using the 
Internet, Lokarri started a blog to condense the different opinions around 
the themes the organization defends. The main objective is to post 
different texts produced by prominent social and political figures in the 
Basque Country, and follow closely the debate these texts generate.  
 Peace Observatory: The peace observatory was created in 2006, but it 
has been left abandoned until recently. It consists in a periodical 
document elaborated by Basque intellectuals describing the social and 
political current situation related to the conflict. This document is 
presented publicly and organises the main trends for Lokarri to follow in 
the subsequent months. 
Conclusions 
In this chapter, I described the social organizations involved in this 
research. First, I described Gesto por la Paz and Lokarri, the two main Basque 
peace movement organizations. These organizations constitute the main focus 
of this research because they are the main agents that the Basque peace 
movement possesses in order to influence other organizations. In their 
descriptions, I explained their history, nature, organization, goals and repertoire 
of action. From that, two important points emerged: first, Gesto por la Paz was 
the spearhead that allowed peace mobilization to be widely known in the 
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Basque conflict context; second, using symbolic action and methods Gesto por 
la Paz created an environment that allowed Basque people to mobilize openly 
against violence. These symbolic actions were described: first, the Gesto, which 
is a silent gathering to protest against a killing or violent act. This action was 
simple in its execution and incredibly powerful in communication. The Gesto 
was so powerful that it became the most important way to commit to peace in 
the Basque Country; second, the Blue Ribbon, a piece of cloth that identifies a 
person as committed to peace ideals. The combination of those two, with 
marches and public appearances, made Gesto por la Paz a widely known 
organization. Lokarri (as Elkarri) used the mobilization scenario enforced by 
Gesto por la Paz to propose a political resolution to the conflict. The political 
proposal defended by Lokarri shapes the organization‟s mobilization model. 
Lokarri uses tactics and methods that try to convince political parties, so it 
needs an institutional approach. Lokarri is more keen than Gesto por la Paz in 
using experts to support its claims and has developed a more extensive use of 
new technologies. The final result is two organizations that complement each 
other and that created and enforced a very powerful peace frame in the Basque 
Country. Paradoxically, this issue does not make them more prone to working 
together. Part of their ethos is a powerful sense of identity independence. 
Ironically, it is this sense of independence that made the two organizations 
focus on the issues they each feel closer to and, thereby, improve their impact.  
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CHAPTER 5 - THE NATURE OF BASQUE SOCIAL 
ORGANIZATIONS 
In this chapter I describe the different social organizations approached 
during this research. The criterion for deciding which organizations were used 
was their qualitative importance in the Basque social environment, though I 
tried to cover most of the social groups present in the Basque Country. The final 
selection included youth groups, religious groups, groups against state 
violence, victims of terrorism and peace think tanks. The organizations included 
are: 
 Bakeola: A catholic peace group focused on social and educational work. 
 Baketik: A peace think tank created and directed by the former director of 
Elkarri. 
 Basta Ya: A victims of terrorism organization with political objectives that 
rejects any Basque nationalist claims. 
 EGK: An institutional platform that coordinates youth groups. 
 Etxerat: An organization that defends the rights of family members of 
prisoners associated with ETA. 
 Gernika Gogoratuz: A peace research institute with many years of 
experience in the Basque conflict. 
 TAT: An organization that provides help to victims of torture.  
 The organizations are divided into four categories for this research, 
according to the issues they address. This categorization is maintained during 
the research and it is fully explained in chapter 8. The categorization is an 
outline of the identity differences that exist between organizations. However, it 
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is important to note that this categorization does not try to deny the underlying 
complexities that exist inside the social interaction in the Basque Country. 
Members of Bakeola, Baketik, and Gernika Gogoratuz are part of some of the 
Basque peace movement organizations and have strong personal ties with 
some members of the nationalist left organizations. This web of complex 
relationships shape their collective identity processes and the collective identity 
processes of the persons in contact with, but for the purpose of this research it 
is useful to differenciate between organizations. It is important, however, to not 
forget that underlying dimension.  
 First, are the peace organizations that share identity bonds with the 
Basque peace movement organizations, but their objectives are not social 
mobilization, but peace research or charity work. These organizations create 
cultural and intellectual goods that are used later by the Basque peace 
organizations as explained in chapter 8. The organizations in this category are 
Bakeola, Baketik, and Gernika Gogoratuz.  
Second, the nationalist left organizations come from networks closer to 
ETA and share the same political goal. These organizations share a collective 
identity that does not question the use of violence as a political tool, but rather 
accepts it (Mata, 1993; Muro, 2008: 10). The organizations that belong to this 
category are TAT and Etxerat. 
It is important to explain briefly the concept of the nationalist left that 
appears in the Basque narrative about the conflict and is used to unite all 
organizations that share a common ideology with the armed group ETA. A 
common understanding of this group is that it works as a pyramid with ETA at 
the pinnacle. That was a working hypothesis entertained at the beginning of this 
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research, but was subsequently discarded. It was noted that the solidarity 
bonds between organizations with the same ideological background were 
stronger and, in this case, those bonds were critical for their survival, for two 
reasons: first, the overlapping of population, that is, people who defend 
independence were more likely to have a relative or friend in one of those 
organizations, and second, the siege effect from the aggressive policies by the 
government strengthened those bonds. However, it is not pyramidal at all. The 
differences are critical and the organizations rely on their own resources to 
survive. The problem is these resources are, in most instances the same. This 
issue is revisited in chapter 8, where the relationship between the Basque 
peace movement organizations and the nationalist left organizations is 
explained.  
The third category is the exact ideological opposite of the nationalist left. 
Basta Ya was created to defend the political status quo and the victims of 
terrorism rights. I use the term Constitutionalist Movement because they defend 
the application of the Spanish constitution, therefore rejecting any Basque 
nationalist claims. It is a network that was created in 1998 after the kidnapping 
and assassination of Miguel Angel Blanco, a councilman from Ermua, a small 
town in Bizkaia. Most of it members moved from Gesto por la Paz, as they felt 
the organization was not doing enough to end the conflict (Chapman, 2006: 14).  
Finally, I included one institutional organization, the EGK, a youth group 
coordination organization that is useful in demonstrating the need for shared 
identity traits to understand the frame diffusion. The EGK is in contact with 
almost all youth organizations in the Basque Country, providing help as a 
consultant body. Using these contacts, the EGK tried to implement peace 
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programmes inside the youth organizations with little success. The reasons for 
this are explored in depth in chapter 8, but it is important to say now that the 
EGK lacks a shared identity network with the youth groups.  
Another kind of peace organizations: Bakeola, Baketik, and 
Gernika Gogoratuz 
Bakeola 
 Bakeola is a Basque Christian organization specialized in dealing with 
different aspects of social conflict in a peaceful way. It is framed inside the 
Biscayan catholic diocese63. It was created in 2003 in response to social agents 
inside the catholic community asking for a more direct approach in dealing with 
social problems. Bakeola is not only devoted to the consequences of political 
violence, but social exclusion issues as well. Its main objectives are to develop 
different initiatives devoted to peace education; to create local experiences to 
promote culture of peace values, and; to promote understanding between 
organizations related to reconciliation in the Basque Country. The inclusion of 
this organization satisfied the need for a Christian point of view, to see how the 
Basque peace movement organizations affected the catholic environment. As 
stated earlier, one of the most important cultural pillars in the Basque Country is 
religion, and both Lokarri and Gesto por la Paz started as Christian catholic-
based groups.  
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 Spain is a catholic country divided into dioceses that, geographically, match with the 
provincial division. These dioceses are centred on bishoprics and are led by a bishop. The 
Biscayan diocese is based in Bilbao with the Bishop of Bilbao as leader.  
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History and nature of Bakeola 
 Bakeola was established in 2001, but the different issues that Bakeola is 
working on were in place before that. In 1983, the Ahimsa Lan Taldea (Ahimsa 
Work Group) was created, with a clear focus on education, more precisely, 
education for peace64. Bakeola sits within the EDE foundation, a catholic group 
devoted to social issues. This foundation is directly linked to the Biscayan 
catholic diocese and the Bishop of Bilbao appoints its director, however, this 
does not mean that Bakeola is a catholic organization. In fact, none of its 
members are part of the clergy nor does the Catholic Church dictate its issues. 
As the Bakeola interviewee stated: 
 
“We are a diocese organization in the sense that we are not a 100% church organization, but 
we are in the border between church and society. We have a bond with the Christian approach, 
but we work with society. We are not a catholic movement. We are a movement whose issues 
are not dictated by the Church; we work autonomously.” Bakeola Member. Interview 1.  
 
 Bakeola is not a proper social organization in the sense that ordinary 
members of society do not form it. Bakeola consists of a group of professionals 
who work in social projects and with social organizations on the ground, most of 
them Christian charities. The projects that Bakeola is working on are 
educational, but it touches as well upon the different aspects of social 
empowerment, confidence promotion and reconciliation, for example: 
 Training of education professionals (mainly teachers) about social 
conflict prevention. These training programmes are open to members of 
social movements and local non-governmental organizations.  
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 www.bakeola.org (15/05/2010) 
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 Elaboration of coexistence plans in schools and in local areas.  
 Elaboration and implementation of programmes aimed at children to 
teach them about conflict identification and prevention. These 
programmes are mainly based on games with a pedagogic approach.  
The importance of Bakeola in this research 
 Bakeola is not a social organization, but has considerable social 
influence. It is a powerful agent in developing programmes in schools and 
among youth in the Basque Country and is involved in almost all social projects 
about peace education. Furthermore, Bakeola, among other organizations 
mentioned in this research, has been one of the most important social agents 
involved in the creation of the Social Associations Forum, a forum that tries to 
bring together several social organizations in the Basque Country. One 
important fact is that most of the members of Bakeola were in contact with or 
were part of either Gesto por la Paz or Lokarri. During the fieldwork period, the 
importance of the two Basque peace movement organizations within the 
Bakeola philosophy was clear. 
About personal involvement: 
 
“[..] with time I was in contact with Elkarri. [..] in some talks that I made with the local peace 
group, well, there I changed a bit my trajectory in these issues because I was involved in the 
“Basque Conflict.” Bakeola Member, Interview 1. 
 
About the opinion about Lokarri and Elkarri: 
 
“Gesto por la Paz had a group working about peace education that has been growing 
progressively. [..] Lokarri now I believe has made an effort to educate about participation, not 
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only to mobilize and to reflect and encourage participation, but to create a methodology and the 
pillars needed for that. And, for example, its strategy in communications, publications. I believe 
that they have the peace education explicit in it. They have been created very good materials, 
very good publications” Bakeola Member, Interview 1. 
 
 It is important to highlight the connection between Bakeola and the 
Basque Catholic Church. As stated, the Catholic Church is a very potent social 
agent in the Basque Country that needs to be included in this research. To fill 
that gap, Bakeola is involved in almost all social projects about peace 
education. It is a good indicator of the Catholic Church position on the Basque 
peace movement. Finally, Bakeola, among other organizations mentioned in 
this research, has been one of the most important social agents involved in the 
creation of the Social Associations Forum a forum that tries to get closer several 
social organizations in the Basque Country.  
Baketik 
 Baketik (In Peace) is an interesting project founded in 2006 by the former 
leader of Elkarri, Jonan Fernandez, with the support of an important Franciscan 
community, with the aim of linking peace with ethics65. Regardless of its 
Christian support, Baketik defines itself as a non-religious entity. The main 
ideas defended by Elkarri are present in Baketik ideas. The most important 
issue for this research is the continuous flow of information and ideas between 
Baketik and Lokarri. 
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History and nature of Baketik 
 Jonan Fernandez felt motivated to use his knowledge, gained as leader 
of Elkarri, in support of peace building efforts. With the help of the Franciscan 
friars, Fernandez was able to open a centre in a Franciscan Sanctuary66 in the 
Basque Country. By linking peace and ethics, Baketik seeks to deepen the role 
of ethics in the conflict resolution process and to disseminate the project‟s 
experiences to inform the conflict resolution field. Baketik also works to promote 
reconciliation within Basque society, and actively participates in the promotion 
and discussion of issues related to conflict environments around the world.  
 More recently, Baketik has been involved in several initiatives to 
encourage a new approach to peace education. These initiatives include 
workshops, the publication of a book, and the opening of a new course teaching 
how to approach peace education in an ethical way. However, perhaps 
Baketik‟s most important achievement is the contribution to the Basque 
Government initiative to modify the existing plan for Peace Education and 
Human Rights. This contribution stresses the importance of focusing on 
reconciliation and acceptance between social groups in the Basque Country67. 
The Importance of Baketik in this research 
 The main motivation for including Baketik in this research was due to its 
director being the former leader of Elkarri. At the beginning of the fieldwork 
period, Baketik did not appear to be a significant element in this research, but 
preliminary interviews with Lokarri members raised the importance of the figure 
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of Jonan Fernandez. When asked about the differences between Lokarri and 
Elkarri, a member of Lokarri said: 
 
 “[..] with all due respect to everybody in Lokarri and I don‟t want to harm them but, to 
me, the figure of Jonan Fernandez is irreplaceable. To me, Jonan Fernandez is irreplaceable 
because of his ideas and work capacity..” Lokarri Member, Interview 11.  
 
 The reputation of Fernandez, and his contacts at Lokarri, made a visit to 
the Baketik offices important. Baketik‟s work in itself is also valuable for this 
research. Baketik workshops are participated in by members of Lokarri and 
Gesto por la Paz, and some of the interviewees mentioned Baketik as an 
important actor on the Basque peace scene. 
Gernika Gogoratuz 
 Gernika Gogoratuz (Remembering Guernica) is a peace research 
institute established in 1987 in commemoration of the bombing of Guernica, a 
small Basque town, by the German air force in 1937, during the Spanish civil 
war. As a research institute, it is the most important generator of peace and 
conflict knowledge in the Basque Country. Its main objective is to work in the 
different peace areas of research, education and community projects. The 
objectives followed by the organization were taken from ideas generated by the 
different Basque peace movement organizations in the field. Gernika Gogoratuz 
was chosen for this research for its impact on society and its academic base in 
the Basque region. 
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History and nature of Gernika Gogoratuz 
 The idea of the Gernika Gogoratuz research institute is to create an 
ethos of reflection about the future by looking at the past68, and to take this in a 
number of directions. One is to protect the legacy of the past created by 
violence, to inform reflection. Another is to apply these ideas locally and globally 
to promote reflection on past violent events to prevent them being repeated in 
the future.  
 In its primary function as a research centre, Gernika Gogoratuz focuses 
on the role of symbolism in conflict and the role of culture in violent 
environments, researching the role of arts in conflict resolution environments. 
Another main objective of the institute is to create networks and collaborations, 
locally and internationally. Gernika Gogoratuz has been involved in almost all 
endeavours to create collaborative groups in the Basque Country related to 
peace. During my fieldwork, Gernika Gogoratuz was emphasising its role in the 
Peace Education Forum, a group of social organizations focused on issues 
related to bringing peace education to children. It is important to note that 
Lokarri and Bakeola are members of this forum.  
Importance of Gernika Gogoratuz in this research 
 Gernika Gogoratuz is the most important peace research centre in the 
Basque Country. The different methodologies adopted by the different peace 
groups in the last 20 years originated from, or were part of, methodologies 
developed by Gernika Gogoratuz. In almost every conversation I had about 
peace initiatives, the name of that peace institute was mentioned. Since the 
beginning of my research, it was clear that the level of influence of peace 
                                            
68
 www.gernikagogoratuz.org (11/05/10) 
  164 
groups was in some part demonstrated through their ability to influence an 
organization like Gernika Gogoratuz. Most of the members of Gernika 
Gogoratuz are, or were, part of either Gesto por la Paz or Lokarri. They are 
involved in different projects with Lokarri, like the Peace Education Forum and 
regularly attend the events and marches organized by Gesto por la Paz. These 
continuous contacts with the Basque peace movement organizations affect 
which projects Gernika Gogoratuz becomes involved with.  
The nationalist left organizations  
Etxerat 
 Etxerat (At Home) was created to defend the interests of family members 
of ETA prisoners. Since 1977, the Spanish governments have used what is 
called „rule of dispersion‟ with ETA prisoners, dispersing prisoners to different 
prisons all around Spain, far away from the Basque Country. The organization 
situates itself in the nationalist left ideological position and is closer to 
organizations like TAT. Etxerat was part of the pro amnesty association group, 
before the group was declared illegal by the Spanish government and banned 
in 2002, under the new Political Parties Law. It split into two associations, 
Etxerat and Askatasuna. The latter supports and advocates for the freedom of 
all ETA prisoners, as Askatasuna considers them political prisoners. This 
organization is currently banned and its leaders are in jail.  
History and nature of Etxerat 
 Etxerat was created in 1998 with the union of two associations that 
pursued the same goals: Senideak (Parents) and Gureak (Ours). Senideak was 
based in the Spanish Basque Country and Gureak in the French Basque 
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Country. The centralization of resources in one association was in response to 
the ideological assumption that the Basque Country is a single entity divided 
between Spain and France. Another reason was to share methods of lobbying 
the Spanish and French governments regarding ETA prisoners. Both countries‟ 
governments have used the tactic of dispersing ETA prisoners, forcing 
prisoners‟ families to travel long distances to visit their relatives, causing several 
problems, including finance and psychological stress.  
 Etxerat states its objectives in the Basque phrase Etxean nahi ditugu69 
(We want them at home). The main objective is, therefore, the literal application 
of prison law to bring the prisoners to prisons near their places of origin. To 
achieve this, Etxerat acknowledges the need for a conflict resolution scenario 
that involves political decisions. Finally, Etxerat has five different approaches 
towards action: fight for the rights of imprisoned family members; denounce any 
action against those rights; denounce the violence from the Spanish and French 
states against the Basque people; stress the political nature of their imprisoned 
family members; and work with social organizations to achieve the political 
conflict resolution Etxerat defends.  
Importance of Etxerat in this research 
 Etxerat is, perhaps, the most active legal organization that works to 
defend the rights of ETA members. It is proactive in the way that the situation it 
is denouncing is an ongoing one, unlike the TAT, that works on a case-by-case 
basis.  Etxerat is also in regular contact with Lokarri, though it does not 
necessarily agree with Lokarri’s work. Etxerat does not have a very positive 
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opinion about the work of the Basque peace groups, but recognizes some 
aspects of it: 
 
“It is true that sometimes, a short time ago, with the case of two detainees, for example. When 
they have to go to the hospital after being detained, we knew that they felt obliged to give an 
opinion. A representative of Lokarri came the day we called the social groups. And yes, they are 
in favour of prisoners rights and they always were, when we proposed them to adhere to the 
31
st
 of December calling against the dispersion they signed it. But we know that their conflict 
resolution proposal without themselves as protagonists is not existent. It is true that when we 
arrange any meeting they come, but sadly, they are driven by personalism…” Etxerat Member. 
Interview 5.  
T.A.T. (Torturaren Aurkako Taldea) 
TAT, the acronym for Torturaren Aurkako Taldea (Group Against 
Torture), is a social organization created to denounce the torture practiced by 
some members of the police and to provide legal and psychological support for 
the victims of those practices. The organization‟s ideology is very pro 
independence, with serious ties to some banned groups, like the groups that 
defend amnesty for ETA prisoners. This is one of the most important nationalist 
left organizations.  
History and nature of TAT 
 The TAT was created in 1992 as a Basque non-governmental 
organization to eradicate the use of torture. It provides legal and psychological 
assistance to victims of torture in the Basque Country70. The main work carried 
out by the TAT is directed towards the denouncement of the practice of torture. 
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That entails the recording of testimonies of torture and the denouncement of 
those practices, the providing of legal and psychological assistance to victims of 
torture, advocacy in international institutions, and working towards an end to 
those practices.  
 The TAT is part of an initiative called Behatokia or Basque Human Rights 
Observatory. Other associations in this initiative are Etxerat, Gurasoak (an 
association of parents of prisoners) and several others. This initiative was 
created to denounce the practices of the different national governments towards 
Basque people. 
The TAT suffers a tremendous distrust from several sectors of society 
due to its ideological closeness with ETA. This has placed it in difficulties on 
different occasions and it is widely believed that all of the organizations in the 
initiative are part of a large network directed by the armed organizations. The 
links between members of these grassroots organizations are not denied, but 
they reject the notion that ETA controls them. Moreover, while the ideological 
closeness between organizations makes collaboration easier, they do not share 
the same agenda: 
 
“I was not a member of the nationalist left. I had no relation. Here, everybody minds his or her 
own business. I wish I could see members of Batasuna, Etxerat, or Askatasuna meeting and 
agreeing on objectives, once per year. But that doesn‟t happen. They are independent until the 
end. And don‟t touch any of their issues because they are their issues. They work on those 
issues and you don‟t. That shocked me. I thought that was different.” TAT Member. Interview 7 
The importance of TAT in this research 
 As with Etxerat, TAT is one of the organizations that denounce conflict 
issues from the pro independence point of view. Its actions made them to be 
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part in some initiatives with the Basque peace movement organizations. 
Probably it would like to be more involved, but the ideological pressure from the 
different organizations in the nationalist left is greater than their desire to have 
more collaboration.  
 The TAT was one of the organizations that members of Gesto por la Paz 
and Lokarri suggested should be contacted in the nationalist left environment. 
That environment is very isolated and difficult to penetrate and the most 
moderate members belong to TAT. TAT then made it possible for me to contact 
members of Etxerat, but TAT warned about the extreme difficulties in contacting 
other organizations. In terms of methodology, TAT acted as a gatekeeper to 
that environment.  
The Constitutionalist Movement and defenders of victims of 
terrorism rights 
Basta Ya 
 Basta Ya (Enough) is a group created from Gesto por la Paz during the 
kidnapping and assassination of the local politician Miguel Angel Blanco in 
1998. The members of Basta Ya publicly reject the use of dialogue in resolving 
the conflict, and contend the only solution is to stop ETA and its environment. 
The main members of Basta Ya are persons who suffered political violence in 
forms of threats, kidnappings or assassination attempts. Since 2008, Basta Ya 
members decided to pursue their aims using political means and created a 
political party, UPyD (Unity, Progress and Democracy) with moderate success. 
As a result, Basta Ya, as an active organization, lowered its public profile, only 
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appearing on important occasions or relying on personal opinions of its 
members as individuals. 
History and nature of Basta Ya 
 The protests against the kidnapping of Miguel Angel Blanco were so 
fierce and popular that the different Basque peace movement organizations, 
mainly Gesto por la Paz, could not manage the situation without having an 
internal ideological debate. This debate, tied in with the support of different 
political parties for certain currents inside the organization, led to the creation of 
different grassroots groups defending social action against violence, but 
differing in their objectives for the final outcome of the conflict. One of the 
organizations that appeared at this time was Basta Ya.  
 The main difference between Basta Ya and organizations like Gesto por 
la Paz is its defence of one particular political situation in the Basque Country. 
That is, the defence of the actual legal framework that promotes the rule of law, 
the Spanish constitution and the political status of the Basque Country as a 
region inside Spain. Concerning the conflict, Basta Ya totally opposes the 
violence committed by ETA, defends the role of the victims of violence, and 
opposes any solution through dialogue. Another difference between Basta Ya 
and organizations like Gesto por la Paz is related to their methods of action. 
Instead of operating by what they call “reactive mobilization”, Basta Ya defends 
the idea of mobilizing without waiting for a call from the political parties or social 
organizations: 
 
“We wanted to create a supra-party mobilization that was not directly channelled by the political 
parties, and not necessarily promoted by them. And, on the other hand, we wanted the people 
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to go to the streets to defend things they believed in or they found important and not only to 
protest against the violence” Basta Ya Member, Interview 3. 
 
 In the summer of 2007, some of the most prominent members of Basta 
Ya perceived the organization‟s goals needed a more political approach, and as 
a consequence, the organization Basta Ya channelled all of its activism into the 
newly created political party, UPyD (Unity, Progress and Democracy). This 
political party went to the Spanish general elections in 2008 and gained one 
seat in the Spanish congress. From this success, Basta Ya has a means to 
influence Spanish politics71.  
Since 2008, Basta Ya, as an organization, has been decreasing its 
activities. In April 2008, it shut down its website72, although it is still possible to 
access it. Finally, it has left its main actions to be guided by the personal 
opinions of Basta Ya‟s most important members, and the organization only 
appears on specific public occasions, like public talks or important meetings. 
The importance of Basta Ya in this research 
 Basta Ya is one of the few grassroots organizations in the Basque 
Country that defends the interests and opinions of victims of ETA. During the 
fieldwork, contacting these organizations and working to get them involved in 
the research has been difficult, and Basta Ya is the only organization that 
agreed to be involved. The role of the victims of ETA is an important one in the 
Basque Conflict. They have a heavy political influence and the social role of 
victims is not shared equally in society.  
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 Generally, it is socially accepted that a victim of violence is a victim of 
ETA or a victim of terrorism, but does not include victims of State sponsored 
violence. This definition of inclusion in the term „victims of terrorism‟ is a 
success of the mobilization by victims of terrorism organizations. However, it is 
important to evaluate their actions in relation to the Basque peace movement 
organizations. As I show later, these organizations, being very reluctant to 
collaborate or share any of the principles defended by the Basque peace 
movement organizations, have created an agenda in relation to those 
principles. For example, as it is stated before, Basta Ya appeared with a 
methodology designed to criticize the way of working of Gesto por la Paz and 
other social organizations.  
 Finally, some Basta Ya members share a membership with Gesto por la 
Paz. They are an active part of both organizations, creating a fluid, complex and 
unrecognized channel of communication. That dimension is worth exploring and 
it is addressed in chapter 8.   
The Institutional organization  
EGK (Euskadiko Gazteriaren Kontseilua)73 
 The EGK (Euskadiko Gazteriaren Kontseilua) (Basque Youth Council) is 
a semi public institution funded by the Basque Government. It works as an 
umbrella organization for all the Basque youth organizations, targeting Basques 
between the ages of 14 and 30. Its main objectives are to defend the interests 
of young people through having a voice in any governmental decision-making 
process involving or affecting youth; promote youth participation in social and 
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political issues; and importantly for this research, promote dialogue and 
reconciliation between young people in the Basque Country. That is not a minor 
issue, as I stated before the national cleavage cuts all layers of Basque society, 
including young people.  
 The EGK was created in 1986, when the first peace marches were 
called, and importantly, with its agglutination capabilities, the EGK became one 
of the few spaces where different views of the conflict could find a healthy 
debate.  
History and nature of the EGK 
 The Basque Government created the EGK. The idea was to create an 
autonomous platform that works as a channel between Basque youth 
organizations and the Basque government. Though membership in the EGK is 
not compulsory, now around 55 youth organizations are members, and several 
others share ties and communication with it.  
 The EGK has a permanent commission and nine technical areas. The 
permanent commission is the ruling body of the platform, with directive 
positions. The technical areas are in charge of developing and implementing 
the different projects and are as follows: Administration, one for each territory; 
Education; Communication; Material conditions; Justice conditions, and; 
Coordination between areas. Apart from that, the EGK sponsors different 
forums where youth associations can share initiatives or debate between 
themselves.  
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 Finally, it is important to note some of the ruling principles of the EGK. 
These principles can be found in EGK‟s website74. These are, mainly, the 
creation of a space for debate and reflection by youth associations and to work 
for a peaceful society.  
The importance of the EGK in this research 
 The EGK emerged as one of the organizations that were important to 
note in this research. During the early contact with Lokarri and Gesto por la 
Paz, it was clear that one of their fronts of action was the youth. In both, 
contacts were suggested for approaching the EGK, as an important step 
towards understanding youth reaction to the Basque peace movement 
organizations. With all its limitations, the EGK is a good meter for assessing the 
feelings of youth associations in the Basque Country. The fact that its ruling 
members are not civil servants, but limited time appointed members of youth 
associations. 
Finally, as suggested, the contacts between peace groups and the EGK 
are important. During fieldwork, the EGK was promoting an initiative that 
entailed dialogue between youth associations of different ideological settings in 
the Basque Country. Lokarri sponsored this initiative. This initiative, called the 
Bergara forum, was created using inputs from various peace organizations: 
 
“On the third issue, the Bergara forum, we created some sort of technical commission to follow 
the process. We meet once a month. There the director of Lokarri participates and we maintain 
contact with the director of Baketik and the director of Bakeola. Then we have the former EGK 
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president and the peace area director. Some people from Lokarri come as well…” EGK 
Interviewee, Interview 4.  
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CHAPTER 6 – THE BASQUE PEACE MOVEMENT 
ACTION FRAME 
The aim of this chapter is to present the work of the Basque peace 
movement, specifically its way of perceiving the conflict and how this way is 
being projected onto Basque society as a whole. For this purpose, I describe 
what I have called the Basque Peace Frame, using collective action frame 
theory: Snow and Benford (1988; 1992; 2000), Snow et al. (1986), Tarrow 
(1992). These are the set of rules, values and beliefs two Basque peace 
movement organizations, Gesto por la Paz and Lokarri, try to translate into 
action by the rest of society. During this exercise, I find the first clues that allow 
me to establish that the Basque peace movement managed to create a peace 
frame of peace (Snow & Benford, 1992) that permeates the different 
organizations explained in chapter 5. This frame has some of the traist of a 
master frame and it might evolve on that, nut it is not possible to affirm it at this 
point. This frame is almost identical between Gesto por la Paz and Lokarri with 
a few differences. These differences may seem small, but they are key to 
understanding how the different frame processes work. After explaining the 
Basque Peace Frame, I explore the core framing tasks and how they differ 
between organizations. Subsequently, I focus on explaining the different 
strategic framing processes, making an effort to highlight the differences 
between Basque peace movement organizations. Some questions are raised in 
the conclusions about the effect of this frame in important issues like the 
processes of creation of collective identity and the effectiveness of the Basque 
peace movement.  
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After explaining the frame, I expose the different collective identity 
creation processes that are in place in Basque society. I focus on the political 
collective identity because that is the process that explains the Basque peace 
movement. Basque peace activists were part of a submerged network of peace 
during the Dictatorship. This network felt the need to use different methods to 
defend their political goals, mainly rejecting the use of violence. The 
Dictatorship polarized political views in the Basque Country, and the defence of 
the Basque nation was associated with the use of violence. Therefore, ETA was 
a highly regarded political actor. The public space for protest was limited as the 
only protest allowed was to promote Basque nationalism and was contentious 
in nature. It was not until the arrival of democracy that the submerged peace 
network achieved its latent potential. This potential was also released by a 
sector of ETA members who challenged the use of violence. This questioning of 
the use of violence, and the creation of a different repertoire of action designed 
to counterattack the contentious nature of public protest, offered the tools 
needed to create a peace social movement, allowing the promotion of a reality 
that involved politics without violence. In that environment, Basque peace 
movement organizations started to propagate the frame they created. This 
frame used sympathetic collective identity networks as channels of diffusion.  
How Basque peace movement organizations frame the Basque 
conflict 
As part of the work of different social movements, the proposal of a new 
way of seeing the surrounding world is almost mandatory as they create new 
meanings or fields of new cognitive frameworks (Melucci, 1989: 35). The 
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creation of a framework is a consequence of the creation of any given collective 
identity (Melucci, 1996: 348). Social movements become „agents actively 
engaged in the production and maintenance of meaning for constituents, 
antagonists, and bystanders or observers‟ (Snow & Benford, 2000: 613). They 
use what is called collective action frames. A collective action frame is defined 
as an active process-derived phenomenon that drives agency and contention to 
the level of reality construction (Snow & Benford, 2000: 614). Or, using Erwin 
Goffman‟s words (1974), „schemata of interpretation that enable individuals to 
locate, perceive, identify and label occurrences within their life space and the 
world at large‟ (Goffman, 1974: 21). Generally, this approach is applied to 
specific actions or events well defined in place and time. The exercise I propose 
is to go a bit further and, instead of applying this approach to an event, applying 
it to an issue, in this case the Basque Conflict. This point is important as this 
master frame is the basis organizations use to create different collective action 
frameworks and, most importantly, it shapes the processes of collective identity 
that take place inside the organizations. Finally, this frame is not static, and it 
faces changes from the processes of collective identity mentioned above. I 
suggest that the Basque Peace Frame might be considered a master frame 
because, as I argue later, the Basque Peace Frame permeates most levels of 
social mobilization in the Basque Country. However, this is not proved in this 
research. A way to prove it would be to look further in social movements 
present in the Basque Country, like the environmental movement and the global 
peace movement. Master frames work as collective action frames but at a 
larger scale, giving other social actors the same meaning-attribution tools of the 
original social movement (Snow & Benford, 1992: 138; Snow, 2007: 390). 
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Some of this appears in the Basque Peace Frame but, as noted before, further 
research is needed.  
The Basque Peace Frame 
 The violence exerted by ETA and the Spanish State is the main source 
of suffering in the Basque Country. This is important in order to 
understand the nature of the Basque peace movement focusing on one 
specific kind of conflict (Carter, 1992: 15; Overy, 1982: 2) rather than a 
holistic peace movement that also exists in the Basque Country but is not 
part of this research (Ajangiz, 2002; Barcena et al., 1998; Casquette, 
2006: 76-111; Gordillo, 2007).  
 The only plausible move towards a reasonable conflict resolution 
scenario is the end of that violence in two ways: ETA should stop and 
announce its dissolution, and the Spanish State has to respect and 
enforce the democratic principles of the Rule of Law and Human 
Rights75.  
 The Basque social network is torn and divided by the violence derived 
from political goals, specifically national goals.  
 The problems stated before are the main causes for the peace 
mobilization in the Basque Country. Society needs spaces to express 
itself about peace, and the Basque peace movement organizations 
provide them.  
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 The demands of society and the problems stated before can only be 
resolved through a process of absence of violence and of reconciliation 
between the different parts of Basque society. This process has to be 
achieved with the active commitment of the different Basque political 
parties.  
These five points are the common points in the Basque peace movement 
organizations that define the Basque Peace Frame. However, as I said before, 
there are a few main differences between Gesto por la Paz and Lokarri. Gesto 
por la Paz relies on a social contestation of violence, based on symbolic 
actions. Lokarri incorporates a political message to its demands, offering a road 
map for conflict resolution. This road map includes the need of political dialogue 
between all political factions as well as the need of consultation of Basque 
society about its political future76.  
The Basque Peace Frame was created as a contestation to the politics of 
violence, which were in place in the mid 1980s. This frame was created by the 
processes of interrelation of diverse local groups in the Basque Country, what, 
later on, was called Gesto por la Paz. Elkarri, predecessor of Lokarri, adding the 
political project mentioned before, later incorporated this frame. At the 
beginning, the two organizations fed off each other, suffering a process of 
differentiation as time passed. 
Background of the Basque Peace Frame 
The Basque peace movement organizations described in this research, 
Gesto por la Paz and Lokarri, started their history during the mid 1980s. 
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Democracy had just arrived to the Basque Country, and the changes derived 
from the transition period were becoming evident. The Dictatorship period was 
characterized by authoritarian repression all over Spain, with the exception of 
the Basque Country and Catalonia, with a totalitarian approach to the nationalist 
phenomena (Alvarez-Junco, 1994: 313). Social action in that period was 
galvanized around counter-dictatorship movements, with the actions of ETA as 
the clearest manifestation. The different political collective identity processes 
present in Basque society were private and mostly related to nationalism 
(Perez-Agote, 2008: 140). From those dynamics, it is possible to say that 
mobilization during the transition period was monopolized by a particular sector 
of Basque society: the nationalist left that is sympathetic with ETA actions. 
(Casquette, 2003: 20). The different networks that capitalized those collective 
identity processes suffered a mutation with the opening of the political structure, 
or the transition to democracy. Some of them remained as before, leaving the 
social mobilization for contentious political demands, but others, mainly small 
parochial groups, saw an opportunity to make public their demands for peace. 
These demands were submerged during the dictatorship period, when the 
public space was monopolized by contentious action against the Spanish 
regime (Casquette, 2003; 2005). These small groups conformed later what is 
known as Gesto por la Paz (Funes, 1998a: 39). The appearance of the Gestos 
(see Chapter 4) or highly symbolic public demonstrations against violence 
created the conditions to generate a new identity process. This process is 
derived from that new frame of analyzing conflict. Violence is not seen as a 
useful tool to achieve political goals and has to be rejected, as described later in 
this chapter.  
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This had a definitive impact in some social networks that found problems 
in the transition to democracy. These networks started to include identity 
consciousness in several campaigns. The best known was the protest against 
the construction of the Leizaran highway77. This campaign was a success and 
created the conditions in which some of the groups could make themselves 
public. They took the Peace Frame that Gesto por la Paz developed, and they 
added the political proposal as a new variable. The people involved in that 
process created Elkarri, later known as Lokarri. 
Another issue that might be interesting to look to explain the creation and 
success of the Basque Peace Frame is the possible effect of the new 
international scenario post 9/11. It is explained in the introduction the effect that 
the images of the deceased in the Madrid 2004 bombings had in Basque 
society. As the so-called „war on terror‟ has influenced social action globally, I 
find a very limited impact in the Basque peace movement. This impact relates 
only to the total rejection of violence derived from the images of the Madrid 
trains. That was the last qualitative leap that the spiral of violence started by 
ETA years ago, first with the killing of two police officers by a person with only 
circumstantial connections to ETA, in a clear example of socialization of political 
violence (Aretxaga, 2004a), and the first killing of another police officer from the 
Basque Autonomous Police by ETA, in its first action of a new strategy to target 
the Basque police (Aretxaga, 2004b). The Madrid train bombings accelerated 
the symbolic fall of political violence justification in the Basque Country, but this 
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 The Leizaran highway was a project to connect San Sebastian with Pamplona that had fierce 
opposition, mostly from the ecological movement. More information in Chapter 4 and 
LETAMENDIA, F. (1994d) Historia del Nacionalismo Vasco y de E.T.A. Vol 3. E.T.A. y el Gobierno 
del PSOE, San Sebastian, R&B Editores. Annex I.  
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was an effect that was already happening78. It is possible to say, then, that the 
Political Opportunity Structure changed in a direction that was already there.  
It is important to note here that the two groups use almost the same 
collective action frame towards the Basque conflict. Nevertheless, they differ in 
the processes. This is the next step of the analysis.  
The Basque Peace Frame processes, tasks and features 
As defined in the literature, the description of a frame needs something 
else. It is the social movements‟ role to promote and defend their ways of 
perceiving certain phenomena. These tasks are the core framing tasks (Snow & 
Benford, 2000) and the framing processes and features (Snow et al., 1986). In 
the case study analyzed here, all the tasks and processes are present in the 
Basque peace movement.  
Core framing tasks 
Collective action frames need to be reinforced, defended, and made 
tools of mobilization. They define the problem, the culprits and they offer a way 
of fixing it (Snow & Benford, 2000: 615). Snow and Benford (1988) refer to this 
actions as core framing tasks. They identify three main tasks, “diagnostic 
framing” (problem identification and attributions), “prognostic framing” and 
“motivational framing”(Gerhards, 1995: 230; Hunt et al., 1994: 191; Snow & 
Benford, 1988: 199; Snow & Benford, 2000: 616). The Basque Peace Frame is 
not different from others and these processes exist. They do not differ so much 
between organizations, but some particularities take place. These nuances are 
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 The effects of the „war on terror‟ in the different dimensions of Basque politics are discussed 
deeply in ARETXAGA, B., DWORKIN, D., GABILONDO, J. & ZULAIKA, J. (Eds.) (2004) Empire & 
Terror. Nationalism/Postnationalism in the New Millenium, Reno, Center for Basque Studies. 
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based on the different approach that the Basque peace movement 
organizations have to political action.   
Diagnostic framing 
This task involves the identification of a problem and the attribution of 
blame or causality (Snow & Benford, 1988: 200; Snow & Benford, 2000: 616). 
Here, there is little dispute between the two organizations. The problem is 
political violence, and the attribution falls in ETA and the Spanish State. The 
identification of the problem is similar amongst Gesto por la Paz and Lokarri, 
but the role of the attribution requires a more detailed description (Snow & 
Benford, 1988: 200). There is no doubt about blaming ETA for the situation, but 
the role of the Spanish State is debated. Lokarri holds a position of a certain 
mistrust of the Spanish security forces and the Spanish state institutions paying 
attention to any denounce that involves them. As it is explained in chapter 8, 
this position draws Lokarri closer to organizations like the TAT. This position 
appears in the different publications and statements of the organization in order 
to prevent this kind of behaviour79. Gesto por la Paz is more reluctant to 
manifest its position or denounce the actions of the Spanish police forces and 
the Spanish state institutions, at least publicly80. The reason for this difference 
lays in Lokarri’s political proposal that demands a much tougher approach from 
the organization. The discourse of the Spanish state that has an eminent highly 
legitimated rhetoric, and its confrontantional agains the nationalist left, needs to 
be cracked to give an option for dialogue and negotiation. This need does not 
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 See Lokarri‟s Magazine Haritu No 12, No 15 and No 16, and Lokarri denouncing violations of 
Human Rights: http://www.lokarri.org/index.php/es/actualidad-lokarri/prensa/lokarri-denuncia-
las-miradas-parciales-a-los-derechos-humanos (28/09/2010) 
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 But they are some exceptions: http://gesto.org/prensapdf/08-01-
08%20NP%20torturas%20_1_.pdf  (28/09/2010) 
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appear in Gesto por la Paz, but that does not mean that Gesto por la Paz is 
totally oblivious to the actions of the Spanish state. The opposition to the 
terrorism of state episodes of the 1980s-90s and the demands for clarification in 
different moments about police actions are just some examples81.  
 The attribution of blame is another matter. Sectors in both Basque peace 
movement organizations believe that political violence is consequence of a 
political situation that has been unsolved. This is the main position in Lokarri. In 
Gesto por la Paz, the main idea is the differentiation of politics from violence, so 
the political situation is good enough to provide a way to solve things. This 
approach is fully explained in chapter 4.  
Prognostic framing 
 Lokarri and Gesto por la Paz not only highlight a problem, causes and 
perpetrators. They provide a solution and a way to achieve it. This is what 
different authors call prognostic framing (Snow & Benford, 1988: 201; Snow & 
Benford, 2000: 615). Both organizations defend the idea of reconciliation and 
the end of political violence to achieve a peaceful scenario. It is possible to 
draw a direct line between attribution and ways to achieve that scenario. Lokarri 
defends the idea of dialogue between parties. The way of ending this is to sit 
down and achieve a political agreement between political parties and social 
groups of different ideologies. Lokarri also sets some conditions for that to 
happen. It defends the idea of a desirable end of violence before that stage of 
dialogue and the commitment from both violent parties to adhere to a set of 
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 The GAL (Antiterrorist Liberation Groups) was in action at the end of the 80s and was 
responsible of several killings and kidnappings. The Spanish government financed these 
groups. For more information: WOODWORTH, P. (2001) Dirty War, clean hands: ETA, the GAL 
and Spanish Democracy, Cork, Cork University Press. 
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„game rules‟ in that negotiation, the most important issues being openness, 
honesty and putting the will of Basque society before political goals82, amongst 
others. This approach is criticized by Gesto por la Paz as, in its opinion, it gives 
political relevance to ETA. For Gesto por la Paz, ETA is the main problem, as it 
is the actor that uses non-regulated political violence, so the way forward is to 
delegitimize that use of violence. Gesto por la Paz’s approach is more social, 
and Lokarri’s approach is more political. This relates to the nature of the 
organizations as explained in chapter 4. These differences are really clear in 
the next framing task, the motivational framing.  
Motivational framing 
By motivational framing I understand the different rationale that leads to 
mobilization in a social movement, a call to arms (Snow & Benford, 1988: 201; 
Snow & Benford, 2000: 617). Social movements are dynamic organisms that 
need and encourage action. Due to the qualitative difference in their objectives, 
it is in this field where the biggest differences between organizations rest. That 
is why I explain the different mobilization mechanisms of both Lokarri and Gesto 
por la Paz.  
Lokarri 
Lokarri proposes a political scenario that eventually will lead the different 
actors to a dialogued conflict resolution scenario. To achieve that, Lokarri 
highlights the importance of the actions of the different political actors and 
analyzes those actions to see the different social consequences (Funes, 1998a: 
48; Funes, 1998b: 501). This analysis is perceived as useful and a big number 
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 Lokarri‟s document about the agreement: http://www.lokarri.org/files/File/PDF/El_acuerdo.pdf 
(28/09/2010) 
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of individuals, mainly intellectuals, take part in it. This is the main reason why 
Lokarri relies more on new communication technologies than Gesto por la Paz. 
The use of signature collection manifestos or opinion polls related to the conflict 
is one of the main tactics. In this strategy, the use of new technologies is 
central. It is not strange, then, that Lokarri has a vibrant webpage, a blog 
devoted to the peace process and has established several forums where it is 
possible to debate any issue related to the conflict83 (Anton, 2009). The idea of 
debating and contributing to a possible conflict resolution gives Lokarri 
members the feeling that they are talking about „real things‟ and providing „real 
solutions‟, as seen in different meetings (FN. 05/06/2007). The importance of 
the political element in Lokarri‟s discourse can be seen in the way the 
organization approaches the different problems that arise. The main idea is to 
relate these problems with the effect that they will have in the possible political 
outcomes. Therefore, Lokarri will be keen to mobilize its members in campaigns 
denouncing political injustices, like the banned status of the nationalist left 
parties84.  
 
 
Gesto por la Paz 
Gesto por la Paz chooses a more social approach to action. Gesto por la 
Paz was born as a social reaction to the existing mobilization dynamics, 
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 http://www.lokarri.org and http://procesodepaz.org (28/09/2010). See Lokarri in Twitter 
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characterised by a high level of contention in favour of a particular result of the 
conflict, as explained later in this chapter. Gesto por la Paz achieved a great 
level of mobilization using a main message against violence. It developed the 
Gesto or „Gesture‟, a silent mobilization that symbolized the standing of normal 
citizens against violence, explained in chapter 4. The message that Gesto por 
la Paz is trying to send is an antiviolence message. The idea behind the 
mobilization is rebellion. It is a new way of doing politics without using violence. 
Unlike Lokarri, which has a political component, Gesto por la Paz does not try to 
enforce any particular political project. The main objective is the social 
delegitimizing of violence. For that objective, Gesto por la Paz uses a symbolic 
rhetoric. The Gesto, or the wearing of a particular symbol, like the Lazo Azul or 
Blue Ribbon are key instruments to achieve the final goal. The main recipient is 
the social mass, and the main instrument is social empowerment.  
Frame alignment processes 
In the last two points we talked about the different messages, ways and 
ideas two Basque peace movement organizations have. A similar frame 
regarding the conflict, shared by both organizations, has been described. The 
particularities of each organization started to appear when describing the core 
framing tasks. The political proposal included in Lokarri‟s objectives seems to 
shape the way conflict is perceived and the way society has to be mobilized. 
Differences run deeper and are also related to the origins and background of 
both organizations as seen in chapter 4. After describing those two parts (frame 
and core framing tasks), it is important to focus our attention on the way 
organizations connect this frame with their members and their audience. That is 
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what Snow et al. (1986) called „frame alignment processes‟(Snow & Benford, 
2000; Snow et al., 1986; Tarrow, 1992: 188).  
 For this analysis, I follow the different frame alignment processes 
described by Snow et al. (1986). From the three different kinds of framing 
processes (Snow & Benford, 2000: 623) I focus my attention on the strategic 
processes. These are processes with a utilitarian goal and with a specific 
purpose. It is important to note that all these frame alignment processes exist in 
the Basque peace movement organizations to a different extent. These 
processes are Frame Bridging, Frame Amplification, Frame Extension and 
Frame Transformation.  
Frame bridging 
 Frame bridging relates to the linkage between two different, but not 
incompatible, frames (Snow et al., 1986: 467; Snow & Benford, 2000: 624). This 
bridging happens in two different levels, between Civil Society Organizations or 
individuals. In this case, we could agree that happens in both levels. The 
interpretation of the conflict shared by Lokarri and Gesto por la Paz and the way 
these organizations tried to communicate these ideas are two important factors 
to understand the mechanics of this process. With part of Basque society still 
relying on private means of identity creation (Perez-Agote, 2008: 106), it is very 
important to develop mechanisms to attract like-minded people. The case of 
Lokarri is particularly clear. The political component of Lokarri’s discourse gives 
the vehicle that nationalist people need to understand the Basque Peace 
Frame. It is the same mechanism that Funes describe as the agglutination of 
dissidence (Funes, 1998a: 143) or, more theoretically, what McAdam calls 
conscience transformation (McAdam, 1988: 134). This process refers to the 
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slow change of nationalist individuals from a contentious state of mind to a 
pacifist view. Probably, they already had a preference for peaceful means of 
action but the strong association between violence and politics limited their 
strategic choices. With the appearance of the Basque peace movement and 
Lokarri they decided to change their mind (Funes, 1998a: 156).  
 The case of Gesto por la Paz and its bridging mechanisms is less clear. 
For several years, the main objective of Gesto por la Paz was to connect with 
the social groups that did not suffer directly from the conflict, especially the 
parts of Basque society that are normally sympathetic towards a non-nationalist 
project (Perez-Agote, 2008; Castells, 1998). The final objective of the 
organization is the whole society. The main method used was the creation of 
consciousness to build the necessary elements to promote a vision of violence 
that is perceived as unacceptable. The main objective was to create a critical 
mass of pacifist groups to counterattack the traditional view of conflict with 
violence. The attraction of like-minded groups to peace action was a huge 
success in the 1990s and it is possible to assert that the critical mass was 
achieved though not as Gesto por la Paz expected (Anton, 2007: 63). Some of 
the groups took parts of the organization‟s discourse and radicalized it. The 
clearest example is the victims of terrorism organizations like Basta Ya. This 
process is fully explained in chapter 8. The process used tried to make clear 
that the option of public action against violence was possible. This is an option 
that is still on today.  
Frame amplification 
 Frame amplification relates to the efforts of making a particular frame 
stronger, specially when it is connected to relevant events (Snow et al., 1986: 
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469; Snow & Benford, 2000: 624). The kind of amplifications found answers to 
two different categories explained by Snow et al. (1986): value amplification and 
belief amplification. The most common kind of amplification in the Basque 
peace movement is value amplification.  
 The emergence of the Basque peace mobilization responded to the 
oppression that the identity processes endured from violent and contentious 
ideologies (Perez-Agote, 1998: 59; Perez-Agote, 2008). Gesto por la Paz’ 
actions were based on a great value amplification manoeuvre: The Gesto is a 
way of saying „here we are‟ and a highly visible and symbolic way of promoting 
the values of peace. Gesto por la Paz was soon aware of the potential of that 
and decided that that was the way to go forward. The demonstration of peaceful 
values after every killing became part of their identity. It is not strange that other 
campaigns were created using the same logic, like the Blue Ribbon (Funes, 
1998a: 78-79). This message is still in place mainly because of the reluctance 
of some political groups in Basque society to abandon the old processes of 
identity creation. These are the nationalist left groups, and part of their ethos is 
to associate nationalism with the use of political violence (Muro, 2008: 113). 
Although, a slow changing process is happening, disassociating violence from 
politics (Castells, 1998; Perez-Agote, 1998; 2004). This model of values present 
in an important group in Basque society makes paramount the existence of 
mechanisms of frame reinvigoration and reaffirmation in the Basque peace 
movement organizations, mainly Gesto por la Paz (Snow et al., 1986: 429). 
However, Gesto por la Paz is not alone in this task. Lokarri feels that need as 
well. Lokarri was born from the same ideas than Gesto por la Paz, but with a 
political approach. The need of issuing a press release after every violent action 
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demonstrates that violence is not the way to resolve conflict. The more political 
approach of Lokarri, as well as the need of being different from Gesto por la 
Paz define the different mechanisms used for this task. Where Gesto por la Paz 
uses symbolic actions, Lokarri uses conferences and groups of experts 
supported by different mechanisms of direct participation (polls, forums, blogs) 
(Anton, 2009).  
 As it was said before, value amplification is the most important, but 
beliefs amplification is still in place. The idea of reassuring society that violent 
actors (especially ETA) are to blame is shared by Gesto por la Paz and Lokarri. 
The only addition here comes from the closer scrutiny of the Spanish State 
actions by Lokarri. This organization is very concerned with the idea that the 
Spanish State is a fully, all-clear agent, that committed questionable acts in the 
past, but that is now fully democratic, fair and transparent. Gesto por la Paz 
shares the same concern but this issue has little impacts on their actions. The 
role of the Spanish State has full effects on the political proposal made by 
Lokarri. The lack of this kind of approach in Gesto por la Paz makes the use of 
resources in that matter minimal.  
Frame extension 
 The search for other social groups that might be interested in any given 
frame is called frame extension (Snow & Benford, 2000: 625; Snow et al., 1986: 
427). In practical terms, it includes different activities to expand the focus of the 
organization into other areas that are not normally covered by it. In the case of 
the Basque peace movement, this process is especially relevant in Lokarri, 
mainly because of its political nature. This is usually portrayed by the use of 
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external and well-recognized figures that are seen as impartial. The objective is 
to attract individuals that generally do not feel closer to the organization.  
 This is, by far, the least used of processes by both organizations, mainly 
due to the highly contentious nature of the conflict. The Basque peace 
movement organizations lived their lives struggling against a main frame that 
involves an acceptance of violence and a contentious nature of the mobilization. 
The nature of the process of identity creation left few spaces outside that 
process (Perez-Agote, 2008). This is why the next and last of the processes is 
the most important framing process with which Gesto por la Paz and Lokarri are 
involved.  
Frame transformation 
 As it is noted through the text, the history of the Basque peace 
movement seems to be one of struggle between different conceptions of 
processes of collective identity related to the conflict. The traditional concept is 
based on the private stimulation of processes that accept violence as a 
legitimate way of achieving certain political results. The use of the public sphere 
was only intended to reinforce the result of these identity processes, resulting in 
a near monopolization of the public space for contentious marches. This was 
contested with the emergence of Basque peace movement organizations, 
especially Gesto por la Paz. What started as a struggle for public space 
became a full-scale dynamic struggle to define new mechanisms of creating 
identity around the conflict. This is the part both Basque peace movement 
organizations have been playing since their appearance.  
 Gesto por la Paz revolves around the issue of keying (Goffman, 1974: 
43-44). A new way of managing identity comes from the new proposal of the 
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organization about the use of public spaces. Gesto por la Paz not only wants to 
make the peace issue public, it wants to change activities (redefine public 
mobilization). This defines the identity of Gesto por la Paz and keeps members 
informed about what is happening (Goffman, 1974: 45). Even now, when the 
struggle for the public space seems to be over, Gesto por la Paz still tries to 
change different aspects or perceptions, like the image of victims of violence or 
the way politics affects everyday life85.  
 Lokarri shares the same goal. Nevertheless, its main objective is not the 
public and social space, but the political space. Basque society has a strong 
division around the national issue. This division also takes place in the political 
arena. It is true that Lokarri tries to change society‟s vision, but it makes a huge 
effort to conciliate the different political visions of political parties and 
institutions. Both organizations defend the concept of reconciliation. The 
difference is that reconciliation is more social than political in the case of Gesto 
por la Paz and more political than social in the case of Lokarri.  
 This could be seen as a case of transformation of a domain specific 
frame (Snow et al., 1986: 474). In this case, conflict is the specific domain. This 
approach has global connotations. These global connotations come from the 
particularities of Basque society. Both organizations focus their efforts on 
changing the perception of the conflict. They seldom try to change the vision of 
the world, for example. They preach peace, but peace in the Basque Country, 
not in the rest of the world. This does not mean that they do not share global 
ideas, but these are not their main concern. However, as I stated earlier, the 
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63, and 67.  
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particularities of Basque society make the ripple effects of this change broader 
than expected. The change proposed by Gesto por la Paz and Lokarri is not 
only a change in perceptions but a change of identity processes as well. Society 
itself would be affected in its roots, using a more peaceful, reasoned way of 
constructing identities. And this means a total change of rules for autonomous 
behaviour, defining the other and managing relations with peers (Melucci, 1996: 
68-74).  
Collective identity processes in the Basque peace movement 
The Basque peace movement is the result of a combination of different 
processes that were in place long time before it appeared. These processes 
were social in nature, and they were the creation of new protest spaces, the 
creation of a perception to address a historical conflict. Using the words of 
Melucci, Gesto por la Paz and Lokarri are the visual consequence of a different 
set of orientations of action, of elements of structure and motivation that were 
combined in a variable manner (Melucci, 1988: 331). Therefore, to understand 
the different mechanisms of how the frame propagates among different social 
organizations, it is important to understand the different mechanisms of creation 
of collective identity that take place in the Basque Country. Traditionally, these 
collective identities revolved around one issue: the recognition of the Basque 
Country as a nation. In different levels, the Basque Country always had a 
relation with the Spanish State based on a mutual agreement. This relationship 
was not always cordial and violence broke out (Letamendia, 1994b) but always 
under the basic framework of a political agreement. Therefore, the construction 
of political identity in the Basque Country was equally carried out in the private 
sphere (friends, families, grassroots communities) and the public sphere 
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(political parties, open social organizations). The political structure was open 
and recognized. This process existed at two levels: at community level, that is, 
inside the families and the group of friends, and at social level, that is, towards 
external actors, like political institutions, schools and work places. These 
dynamics changed with the Franco dictatorship. During the Franco regime, 
everything that was Basque or related to Basqueness was banned from the 
public sphere. Public demonstrations were banned, and the use of the Basque 
language was forbidden. Basque identity was only maintained and nurtured at 
the communal level, or private level, inside the families and groups of friends 
(Perez-Agote, 2008). During the dictatorship, there was a struggle between two 
political identities, one that legitimated the Spanish State and another that did 
not. The later was the nationalist option, which embraced the disruption of the 
Spanish State using violence (Perez-Agote, 2008: 102). It was during the days 
of the dictatorship when ETA was created, not as an autonomous entity, but as 
an armed movement, consequence of the dictatorial repression. Some authors 
defend the idea that ETA could be better understood as a social movement with 
a violent repertoire than as a terrorist group in that time (Wieviorka, 1993: 169). 
With the arrival of the democratization process, the pacifist identity parted with 
the indissoluble association of nationalism and violence offering a new option: 
the pursuit of a nationalistic project had nothing to do with political violence. The 
rejection of violence was a key element to properly pursue that goal. As seen in 
chapter 4, both Gesto por la Paz and Lokarri have solid principles defending 
this idea. Gesto por la Paz defends the separation of conflicts, one political, 
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another violent86. Lokarri has a well-developed political proposal that is based 
on the rejection of political violence.  
Political collective identities are a recognized way of perceiving the other 
in the Basque Country. The Basque national identity is been constructed 
continuously for centuries and is well established as a defining political feature 
(Castells, 1998: 30). The national identity, therefore, works as an exclusive 
construction, thanks to the different processes of radicalization explained in 
chapter 6 (Perez-Agote, 2008: 135). This trend is changing as noted by various 
authors (Ibarra, 2005b; Perez-Agote, 1998) who have detected trends of 
inclusion in the Basque national identity. This is relevant for this research 
explaining the identity position of the nationalist left as this collective still relies 
in old ways of reproduction of identities. This fact makes the nationalist left less 
prone to defining themselves with any other political position but nationalist.   
 Every social movement starts from a field of common relations, a place 
where new meanings (Melucci, 1989: 58) are constructed. Melucci calls these 
fields “submerged networks” (Melucci, 1989: 60). These submerged networks 
function as a “system of exchanges, in which individuals and information 
circulates” (Melucci, 1989: 60) and they constitute the submerged reality of the 
movements during and after visible events (Bartholomew & Mayer, 1992: 145; 
Melucci, 1988: 338). In the case of the Basque peace movement, its message 
was a new way of understanding and fighting politics. The processes of political 
collective identity created around the Basque identity during the dictatorship 
had a violent component (Perez-Agote, 2008: 101). The Basque peace 
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movement tries to enforce the idea of political identity without that violent 
component. The main difference between the network during the dictatorship 
and the movement that appeared in the 1980s was the arrival of democracy to 
the Basque Country. Before that, the idea of non-violence existed in Basque 
society, mainly in private circles. They lacked the social support to be public. 
During the dictatorship, any political action was meant as a stand for or against 
the national struggle. Most parts of society supported the idea of political debate 
without violence, but the meaning and significance of violence was becoming 
more important for some of the nationalist groups, mainly ETA. As it is 
explained by Casquette, during the dictatorship, political action in the public 
sphere was limited to the nationalist left agenda (Casquette, 2003: 20; 
Casquette, 2006: 125). This public political action took the form of marches and 
riots, and was contentious in nature. The social sector that monopolized this 
kind of protest, the nationalist left, was the closest to the armed struggle and 
ETA (Muro, 2008: 115). The nationalist left sector is explained in chapter 8.  
 The impact of that scenario in the processes of creation of a peace 
collective identity was significant in two ways. Firstly, it created a division 
between members of the nationalists left and pacifists. More specifically, it 
created an implicit division between being a nationalist and a pacifist because 
violence was associated to the former. Secondly, it limited the access of 
pacifists networks to the public space, hampering the emergence of social 
movements as access is one of the necessary elements for growth (Casquette, 
1998: 81; Diani, 1992: 5; Tarrow, 1998: 71; Tilly, 1978; Tilly, 1984: 306). 
Therefore, the Basque peace identity during the dictatorship was characterized 
by questioning the use of violence as a political instrument and a high level of 
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latency (Bartholomew & Mayer, 1992: 145; Melucci, 1989: 60; Melucci, 1996: 
115) due to the lack of public space (Funes, 1998a: 90; Funes, 1998b: 494). In 
this scenario two dimensions emerged that were important to understand the 
generation of a peace collective identity during democracy: national identity and 
political activism. Both were contentious in the Basque peace movement 
organizations because they meant identification with the use of violence. It was 
not a coincidence that Gesto por la Paz defined itself as an apolitical 
organization with no national discourse.87  
 The main factor that drove the transition from latency to visibility 
(Melucci, 1988: 338) in the Basque peace movement was the implementation of 
Democracy. This factor translated in an aperture of the Structure of Political 
Opportunity in the form of civil liberties, new political spaces, and the 
questioning of the use of violence by sectors inside the main armed actor, ETA 
(Letamendia, 1994c: 35; Ibarra, 1987: 104). This aperture of the Structure of 
Political Opportunity gave way to new forms of action for peace networks and, 
more importantly, gave some sectors inside these networks the possibility of 
using the public space to reject violence. As a member of Gesto por la Paz 
explains: 
 “Democracy was installed. The Socialist Party won the elections in 1982. We could say 
that the first democratic term worked as a bridge between the Dictatorship and democracy. It 
could be said that the situation in Europe was democratic. It was not a complete rupture with the 
Dictatorship, and ETA was still active but the people from the political-military fraction went out 
of the organization and said that things were different: one thing was then and another thing 
was now. Some political parties did not face ETA, and others as in the GAL case, used 
                                            
87
 Elements that define Gesto por la Paz: http://www.gesto.org/definicion.htm (28/09/2010) 
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undemocratic methods. Then, well, society became the flag bearer, I think. Society said, “ETA 
cannot do it. No to ETA”. Gesto por la Paz Member. Interview 15.  
  
The opening of the Political Opportunity Structure did not only bring new 
opportunities but also created some grievances, such as the unsatisfactory 
response of the new democratic political parties. However, the new scenario 
was enough to nest the process that made peace submerged networks evolve 
to a new social movement (Kriesi, 2007; Tarrow, 1998; Tilly, 1978).  
 This is the environment where peace collective identity was negotiated. 
The process of collective identity inside the Basque peace movement is based 
on one basic principle: the total rejection of the use of violence as a political 
tool. This principle is derived from the processes previously explained and was 
created to differentiate a new way of doing politics. Therefore, it is intrinsically 
tied to the traditions within Basque politics. With a national identity group that 
sees violence as a valid tool, the Basque peace movement makes the opposite 
stand. That element relates the Basque peace movement organizations with the 
rest of society as a degree of distinction, the Basque peace movement is 
created in opposition to the political identity dynamics that were in place during 
the Dictatorship (Melucci, 1996: 73). The frame explained at the beginning of 
this chapter is tied to this collective identity factor, so the groups that share the 
same identity trait will find it easier to adopt the Basque Peace Frame than 
other frames because, as Melucci states, it will be recognized and assumed as 
valid, while other identity groups will negotiate its status (Melucci, 1996: 73). 
This will be an exercise of recognition that will establish the Basque peace 
movement inside the different networks of relations in the Basque social 
environment (Hunt & Benford, 1994: 489). There are subtle differences at the 
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organizational level. Both organizations, Lokarri and Gesto por la Paz share the 
same fundamental pacifist trait, but the social nature of Gesto por la Paz makes 
the inclusion of national issues very difficult. In contrast, the organizational 
model defended by Lokarri, more functional and politically effective created to 
defend a political solution, makes possible the inclusion of national elements in 
their identity (Funes, 1998b: 501). Other differences come from their activism. In 
Gesto por la Paz a person becomes a member once they take part in a Gesto, 
while in Lokarri the same person has to participate in a campaign to collect 
signatures (See Chapter 4). These differences will be continuously in tension 
and negotiation, enriching the two organizations and their perspectives 
(Melucci, 1996: 76). This is subject to a deeper analysis in the next chapter.  
Mechanisms of frame diffusion  
The mechanisms of frame diffusion are tied to the tensions derived from 
the processes of collective identity explained earlier in this chapter. The 
continuous tension between different identity groups, especially between 
groups that see the use of violence as valid and the Basque peace movement, 
will define those mechanisms. This is explained in more detail in the following 
chapters, but, for now, it is possible to say that the frame will be better adopted 
in groups or networks that share similar identity traits with the Basque peace 
movement. This is a process of analysis based mainly on empirical data as 
works about frame propagation are few (Jennes & Broad, 1994; Jennes, 1995). 
Snow and Bendford explain two different mechanisms: strategic selection and 
strategic fitting (Snow & Benford, 2000: 627), the difference being the active 
role taken by the transmitter of the frame and the adopter. Using the channels 
previously explained, it is possible to say that groups with a closer identity 
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background, such as Baketik, Bakeola, and Gernika Gogoratuz, engage the 
Basque peace movement in a process of strategic selection, and they are the 
active adopters of the Basque Peace Frame. In the rest of the cases, the 
mechanism is strategic fitting, with the Basque peace movement trying to 
change the perceptions of the adopter. These changes will be adopted 
depending on how close the identity process is between the adopter and the 
transmitter. As it is explained in chapter 8, the victims of terrorism organizations 
will be more receptive to Gesto por la Paz’s efforts, due to their close relation 
and shared past, while the nationalist left organizations will be more receptive to 
Lokarri‟s efforts because there is a national component in their process of 
collective identity. 
Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have defined the concepts of the Basque Peace Frame. 
This frame is mainly implemented and enforced by Gesto por la Paz and 
Lokarri. These two organizations defend similar frames differentiated only by 
small differences. The similarities that I found between these Basque peace 
movement organizations suggest that this is a master frame, but this point 
needs to be clarified with research on other social movements. For purpose of 
this research is useful to say that it might be a master frame, stating its power. 
This answers the research question Is there a Basque Peace Master Frame?, 
and is discussed further in chapters 7 and 8. Subsequently, I stated that there 
are small differences between the Basque peace movement organizations 
explained mainly by the core framing tasks. These differences are based on the 
different nature of the Basque peace movement organizations. Gesto por la Paz 
has a more social approach with tactics and a philosophy closer to typical 
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peace movements as explained in chapter 4. That explains the use of symbolic 
methods of action like silent marches or the use of different symbolic material 
resources. Lokarri uses a more political approach because of the political 
project it defends. Its approach to conflict is similar to Gesto por la Paz’s, and 
proposes a political resolution of the conflict based on dialogue. This difference 
defines the approach of these two organizations to different framing processes.  
The scope of this chapter is to present the Basque Peace Frame and its 
different details, but some implications have also been presented. Firstly, we 
have to consider the different effects that the frame has in the processes of 
creation of collective identity. These processes were very important to explain 
the political and social activity in the Basque Country, and it is a very interesting 
how the changes proposed by the organizations will shape those processes of 
collective identity in the future. Secondly, there is the question of effectiveness. 
The radical new proposal of the Basque peace movement organizations has 
been accepted as successful, but the main problem remains. Sometimes it 
seems that the Basque Peace Frame is struggling against deep contentious 
conflict frames inside different sectors of society. This question is not without 
importance. Going deep in the matter will give us clues about the weight of the 
peace social movement in the Basque conflict and how a social movement 
could shape the overall conflict resolution agenda. This is a very interesting 
question to apply in different case studies, not only the Basque Country. Finally, 
there is the research question how has the Basque Peace Frame evolved? As I 
said above, this frame appeared after the transition to democracy. It would be 
really interesting to see how the solidification and the acceptance of democratic 
values affected that view and how the atomization of everyday life and the 
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affects of the post-modern way of perceive reality will influence the work of 
Gesto por la Paz and Lokarri. Finally, I presented the different processes of 
creation of collective identity that exist in the Basque Country. I focused on the 
creation of political collective identity as this is the factor that is addressed by 
Gesto por la Paz and Lokarri. Members of both organizations were part of the 
submerged networks of peace that were in place during the Dictatorship. These 
submerged networks did not have access to public spaces because these 
spaces were monopolized by the national protest, which was contentious in 
nature. The main event that allowed the peace networks to flourish was the 
arrival of democracy and the questioning of the use of violence by former 
proponents of violence, in particular groups of ETA members. With the aperture 
of the public spaces and the development of a repertoire of action that was 
intended to counter the contentious nature of the nationalist protest, these 
peace networks were able to become a full social movement. That 
transformation created a fully articulated frame that was propagated using 
sympathetic collective identity networks. The mechanisms of that propagation 
are the main questions to be addressed in the following chapters.  
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CHAPTER 7 – FRAME EVOLUTION WITHIN THE 
BASQUE PEACE MOVEMENT 
In this chapter, I show the changes to the Basque Peace Frame in both 
organizations presented in the previous chapter. This exercise serves as a 
starting point in order to understand the following sections where I present a 
detailed analysis focusing on Lokarri and Gesto por la Paz.  For this exercise, I 
describe the changes of the framework using a timeline that stretches from the 
beginning of the fieldwork period in 2006 to its end in 2008. The 'hard‟ fieldwork 
period was from May 2007 to February 2008, but I would like to add several 
months to this because I was in permanent contact with people who contributed 
to my research and I took several trips to the area during those two years. In 
addition, the beginning is marked with a major switch in the Basque peace 
movement‟s approach to the conflict, i.e. the end of the ETA ceasefire. 
 This analysis has three different parts. First, I describe the changes in 
the frame as a consequence of variations in the Structure of Political 
Opportunity. I divide this description using a time dimension, presenting the 
differences between the two periods divided by the ceasefire declaration of 
March 2006. The main part is devoted to explaining the different frame 
dynamics in both organizations during the fieldwork period. The last part is 
devoted to explaining the influence of those changes in the organizations 
themselves. The entire chapter attempts to answer the second research 
question presented at the beginning of this thesis, how has the Basque Peace 
Frame evolved?, and argues that the Basque Peace Frame has evolved mainly 
because of the interaction between organizations. In fact, I conclude that the 
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Basque Peace Frame would not have become a robust frame without that 
interaction.  
Frame perception changes 
In this section, I present a chronology of changes in the frame perception 
that the organizations passed through. Although Lokarri and Gesto por la Paz 
passed through similar processes, the nature of the structure of political 
opportunity was the determining factor that moved the changes in one direction 
or another. I divide the changes iton three different parts: changes that 
happened during the ceasefire of 2006, changes that happened after the 
ceasefire during the fieldwork period, and a brief comment on some more 
recent developments. I focus primarily on the changes that took place after the 
ceasefire, for two main reasons: first, this was the period when most of the 
fieldwork was conducted, and; second, it was a time of uncertainty that made 
the two organizations redesign and undertake interesting changes in the 
perception and elaboration of the frame. The ceasefire period provided an 
excellent opportunity for Lokarri to enforce its political goals. When ETA broke 
its ceasefire, Lokarri tried to indicate that nothing had changed, that that was 
the time for conflict resolution88. Gesto por la Paz moved from a state of 
inactivity, where it relied on political actors for progress in the peace process89, 
to a new situation where the organization assimilated the same principles it 
                                            
88
 See the press release by Lokarri, “society must take the initiative”: 
http://www.lokarri.org/index.php/es/actualidad-lokarri/prensa/la-sociedad-debe-tomar-la-
iniciativa (18/08/2010)  
89
 Gesto por la Paz reaction to the ceasefire declaration: http://www.gesto.org/prensapdf/06-03-
23%20NP%20Comunicado%20ETA.pdf (18/08/2010) 
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defended before the ceasefire and called for mobilization90. The changes in 
frame perception are basically a description of the different processes of frame 
alignment that took place in the main frame previously described in chapter 6. I 
connect those changes with three different factors: the actions of Basque peace 
movement organizations, the actions of other social organizations, and the 
Political Opportunity Structure. Although the four mechanisms are present 
(Bridging, Amplification, Extension and Transformation) (Snow et al., 1986; 
Snow & Benford, 2000: 624; Tarrow, 1992: 188), they play a different role 
depending on the time and the Basque peace movement organization 
analyzed. For example, during the ceasefire, Gesto por la Paz stressed the idea 
of the recognition of victims of violence as a clear process of frame 
amplification. At the same time, Lokarri was involved in a strong campaign to 
portray the ceasefire as a great moment to achieve peace. In other words, there 
was a clear intention to transform the frame around the conflict (Anton, 2007: 
67).  
Pre-ceasefire and ceasefire period 
Lokarri 
Lokarri changed its perceptions dramatically during the ceasefire period. 
It started with changing from Elkarri (Funes, 1998a: 48; Zubero, 2000: 204) to 
Lokarri (Anton, 2007: 59). According to Lokarri‟s diagnosis of the political 
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 Outcome of the internal meeting after the Madrid airport bombing: 
http://www.gesto.org/prensapdf/07-01-17%20NP%20Asamblea.pdf (18/08/2010) 
Calling for Gestos after the Madrid airport bombing (03/01/2007 and 05/01/2007): 
http://gesto.org/prensapdf/07-01-03%20NP%20gestos.pdf 
http://gesto.org/prensapdf/07-01-05%20NP%20gestos.pdf 
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situation, important issues, like pluralism and dialogue, were recognised91. The 
idea of a fragmented society was replaced with a new approach that perceived 
the conflict as nearing an end. Lokarri then assumed the role of catalyst seeking 
to speed up the process of ending the conflict. Its main goals constituted a 
defence of Elkarri’s achievements and the facilitation of a role for society in the 
conflict resolution process. Lokarri took an optimistic approach to the situation, 
looking for long-term objectives. The main idea was to reach, as quickly as 
possible, a hypothetical reconciliation scenario, with a well-defined roadmap 
involving three steps: first, the achievement of a political agreement; second, 
the elaboration of a social consultation; and finally, a process of social 
reconciliation (Lokarri, 2006b: 6).   
 Lokarri’s perception differed from Elkarri’s in a number of ways. Lokarri 
frames the conflict in a similar manner, but its prognosis is different, Lokarri’s 
being more optimistic than Elkarri’s. That is derived from the fact that Lokarri 
assumes that most of the work done by Elkarri was successful. This is an 
opinion shared by a number of Lokarri members. During the interviews, when 
asked about Elkarri’s work, some of the interviewees‟ responses were very 
optimistic:  
 
“I would like to stress Elkarri’s advancements, like going from a situation where dialogue was 
demonized to seeing it as a normal thing; from being a movement that nobody knew, to being in 
big meetings and receiving awards.” Lokarri member, Interview 11.  
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 Lokarri, Constitutive Text, 2006. http://lokarri.org/index.php/es/acerca-de-
lokarri/publicaciones/documento-constitutivo-de-lokarri (20/08/2010) 
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“Before the ceasefire, Elkarri understood that society has to assume those principles (Dialogue, 
Human Rights, Non Violence) and the politicians have to make those principles theirs. Elkarri 
then, assumed that its function and objectives are completed. It decided to close down because 
the mission was accomplished.” Lokarri member, Interview 9.  
 
The general agreement on Elkarri’s success ensured the motivational 
drivers of the frame remained unchanged whilst other changes took place. The 
objective was still more political than social, and the members‟ interests still 
relied upon achieving a specific political change. The main problem in the 
motivational framing tasks arose from a change in leadership. Elkarri relied on a 
well-defined leader that embodied most of the ideals and objectives of the 
organization. The leader of Elkarri started his own peace research group, 
Baketik, one of the organizations involved in this research. The impact of that 
individual is explained in the next chapter. Some Lokarri members did not 
welcome the changes in leadership.  
 
“I have to say that, I don‟t know, I respect people in Lokarri and I don‟t want to hurt them, but I 
think that the figure of (Elkarri former leader) is irreplaceable. Not only because of his ideas but 
also because of his working capacity.” Lokarri member, Interview 11.  
 
In fact, one of the biggest efforts made by the new directive body in 
Lokarri was to reclaim the values of its directive members.  
 
“For me, (the director of Lokarri) is a leader. Maybe the shadow of (former director of Elkarri) is 
long. But I defend the figure of the new director. I think he is an absolute brilliant guy” Lokarri 
member, Interview 12.  
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The main changes that took place during the shift from Elkarri to Lokarri 
were due to an internal appreciation of the situation. A new project started, and 
that project needed to be differentiated from the old one. The change of 
leadership is due to that factor, as seen in early Lokarri meetings. The new 
message developed by Lokarri needed a fresh face to communicate it. 
Additionally, in my conversations with the former leader of Elkarri, he made 
clear that he was tired of his role in Elkarri and was looking for new experiences 
(Fn. 23/08/2007). Another factor that explains the change in the perception of 
the conflict is the need for motivation tools. Interestingly, Lokarri achieves this 
by amplifying the scope of the mission. It switches from defending political 
values to a longer-term objective, the achievement of a peaceful society in the 
Basque Country. The vision of the conflict defended by Lokarri, that society was 
ready for reconciliation, was perceived as too optimistic by various members of 
the organization (Lokarri Interviews 8 and 11). This fact led to frustration after 
the ceasefire. 
 To finish this description of the framing processes during the change 
form Elkarri to Lokarri, I take a quick look at the different framing processes, first 
of all, the role of bridging. During the transition from Elkarri to Lokarri, it is 
possible to see a change from peace activists to what I call „peace creators‟. 
The conflict was in one of the most peaceful stages in history92, which resulted 
in some members believing that the work was done93. Accordingly, the change 
in motivational tools described above was tied to new mechanisms that sought 
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 The last ETA killing before the creation of Lokarri was made in 2003 and one year before, in 
2004, the right wing Spanish government was substituted by a more moderate central left 
government.  
93
 Elkarri , VIII Assembly documents. http://www.elkarri.org/actualidad/object.php?o=2210 
(18/08/2010) 
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to present the case that visions of the conflict were in harmony with Lokarri’s 
ideas. The clearest example of this is the feeling in some Basque nationalist 
circles that Elkarri was useless (Medem, 2003). The new organization, with new 
ideas and a fresh start, was to be a vehicle to change the perceptions that were 
in place in those social circles. This leads us to the broadening of the target 
community to whom the message was directed. The idea of doing something, of 
creating something, was communicated to young people. The change from the 
activist model to the volunteer model in social action (De la Peña & Ibarra, 
2004), was clear to Lokarri members. During a signature collection campaign 
with Lokarri, I witnessed the signing in of two young men that were convinced 
that Lokarri was about doing, not talking (Fn. 19/06/2007). Unfortunately, these 
kinds of episodes were not common. The final framing alignment process, 
frame transformation, changed as well, seeking to transform a perception of 
action based on political actors, to another type of action based on social actors 
without leaving the political proposal behind.   
 These changes in the frame perception were due to, as previously noted, 
external factors (change of government, lack of direct violence) and internal 
perceptions of reality. However, Lokarri did not see relevant changes in its 
collective identity processes. A sense of comradeship still lingered between 
members who went through the “ritual” of acceptance. In the case of Lokarri 
there was regular attendance at meetings and, most importantly, participation in 
a signature collection campaign (Fn. 14/06/2007). This set of rituals did not 
change, nor did the profile of the average Lokarri member. This is not an 
indicator of the success of the frame extension, something that would have to 
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have been measured through changes in the perceptions of Lokarri. Internally, 
during the fieldwork period, this was unclear. 
 
“And in Lokarri I think that we didn‟t have any project that we tried and had some impact. I don‟t 
know if the consultation will have some impact. It is going to be a test to see if we have support 
or not. It is too soon to value that.” Lokarri member. Interview 9. 
 
The collective identity processes did not change, and the change in the 
objectives and vision created a divide. This division started to appear following 
the failure of the ceasefire. On one hand, it was possible to perceive an effort 
from the directive body to create a new environment, using the objectives 
devised in the creation of Lokarri, on the other hand, a whole body of members 
tried to return to the “old ways”. 
Gesto por la Paz 
The story of Gesto por la Paz is a bit different. Gesto por la Paz is a well-
established peace organization in the Basque Country. Its nature, goals and 
objectives have been explained in chapter 4. Gesto por la Paz was the direct 
consequence of the raising of the submerged networks (Melucci, 1989: 60; 
Mueller, 1994: 236) explained in chapter 6. It relied on social mobilization, and 
its main objective is to make society aware that political violence is an activity 
that should be rejected. The 2006 ceasefire was a decisive point in its history.  
Gesto por la Paz assumed that its main goal might be reached, and 
Basque society could mature and reject violence. Until that moment, Gesto por 
la Paz enjoys a position as the main referent point in Basque society for peace 
mobilization. It is important to note that, since 1998, as a result of the massive 
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mobilizations of that year, Gesto por la Paz was gradually losing its role as the 
main peace social actor in favour of other organizations (Basta Ya, Foro de 
Ermua94) and political parties (Funes, 1998a: 185; Anton, 2007: 63). Before the 
ceasefire, due to the symbolic nature of the organization, Gesto por la Paz 
shifted from social mobilization to raising social awareness amongst the victims 
of violence. This was a result of a sense internally amongst the group that the 
main objectives of the organization, the social awareness and mobilization, had 
been fulfilled: 
 
“See, Gesto por la Paz never had the objective of perpetuity, or notoriety, or to be the main 
actor, or to be perpetuated for centuries. The main objectives of Gesto por la Paz (social 
awareness and mobilization) have been achieved” Gesto por la Paz member. Interview 18.  
 
The initial reaction of Gesto por la Paz to the ceasefire is one of 
optimism. In a statement, the organization focused on maintaining the same 
messages about the role of the victims of violence, the delegitimizing of the use 
of violence, and the pivotal role that Basque society played to reach that point95. 
In terms of frame changes, Gesto por la Paz started a period of decreasing 
frame motivation. A sense of accomplishment started to spread inside the 
organization along with the possibility of disappearance (Fn. 03/08/2007).  The 
framing processes collapsed to a minimum and no real efforts were made to 
reach other members or to try to create new alliances. Mobilization, the main 
objective of Gesto por la Paz, started to be viewed as part of Basque society:  
                                            
94
 Foro de Ermua is an organization that advocates for police action and no political 
concessions to the nationalist left political parties and organizations. Its profile is similar to Basta 
Ya (described in Chapter 5) but with a more radical approach.  
95
 Gesto por la Paz reaction to ETA ceasefire: http://gesto.org/prensapdf/06-03-
23%20NP%20Comunicado%20ETA.pdf (18/08/2010) 
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“We were created to promote a culture of peace, we were created to promote social awareness 
against violence and mobilization. And now nobody thinks that armed action will not be 
contested with social mobilization. Nobody believes that. So, what will be strange is the 
contrary, an armed action happens and nobody says anything, nobody calls for a march against 
it. That is taken for granted” Gesto por la Paz member, Interview 18.  
 
The mobilization dimension was left aside. This was a direct 
consequence of the assumption that the majority of Basque society shared the 
Basque Peace Frame. Another cause is the social and symbolic component of 
Gesto por la Paz. When the options for conflict resolution started to go through 
a political process of negotiation, its role as a social organization diminished 
Gesto por la Paz’s impact. Gesto por la Paz started to assume a role of 
guardian of past achievements96. The Political Opportunity Structure was 
favourable to organizations with a more political component, like Lokarri. That 
enabled Gesto por la Paz to concentrate on the symbolic side of its nature. The 
organization focused on two messages: the recognition of victims of violence 
and the separation of conflicts, explained in chapter 4. However, internally this 
is not felt as the main objectives:  
 
“Gesto por la Paz was created to mobilize society. Gesto por la Paz was not created to support 
victims of violence or to defend prisoners‟ rights or to promote a culture of peace or peace 
education programmes”. Gesto por la Paz member, Interview 18.  
 
                                            
96
 Gesto por la Paz analysis of the situation in July, 2006, where the organization asked for 
prudence: http://www.gesto.org/prensapdf/06-07-15%20RP%20Situacion%20actual%20C1.pdf 
(18/08/2010) 
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“Due to the ceasefire, we decided to limit our public work to the annual march and to some 
editorials in the newspapers, but we were always ready to do something when something 
happened”. Gesto por la Paz member, Interview 16.  
 
Interestingly enough, in that moment, Gesto por la Paz started to make 
political demands with the hope of influencing the negotiation process97, but 
those efforts were devoid of anything new. The framing mechanisms were 
unchanged during that period. In theoretical terms, it was the resonance of the 
framing mechanisms that changed (Snow & Benford, 1988: 199; Snow & 
Benford, 1992: 140; Snow & Benford, 2000: 619).  Although the mobilizing 
potential of Gesto por la Paz and the Basque Peace Frame was and still is 
remarkable in the Basque Country, the amount of credibility that the 
organization lends to the Basque Peace Frame has decreased. The 
disappearance of political violence and the existence of other foci of 
mobilization are the main reasons for that:  
 
“Today we might have 5 or 10 percent of the violence that we had when Gesto por la Paz 
appeared. Today Gesto por la Paz is less active. It is less active because the demand is lower. 
And society has created new mechanisms like Elkarri, now Lokarri, Foro de Ermua, Basta Ya, 
etc. So, new organizations have been created that are able to respond to certain things.” Gesto 
por la Paz member, Interview 17.  
 
Of the main factors that determine frame resonance, Gesto por la Paz 
has to face a problem of centrality. With the ceasefire, the problems addressed 
by Gesto por la Paz started to lose salience (Snow & Benford, 1988: 205). This 
                                            
97
 Bake Hitzak (Gesto por la Paz magazine) number 61, and their analysis of the situation on 
July 2006 http://gesto.org/prensapdf/06-07-15%20RP%20Situacion%20actual%20C1.pdf 
(18/08/2010) 
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loss of salience was due to the growing perception of the need for politics, 
which gave Lokarri an edge. Another problem deriving from this was the internal 
perception that the Gesto por la Paz‟s ideas were separated from reality. That 
is, the Basque Peace Frame was losing experiential commensurability inside 
Gesto por la Paz (Snow & Benford, 1988: 208; Snow & Benford, 2000: 621).  
The appearance of new organizations and the greater role of the political 
parties in peace mobilization generated greater efforts on the part of Gesto por 
la Paz to maintain a mobilization discourse. At the same time, the long period 
without significant armed actions culminated in the ceasefire announcement, 
and Basque society began to view violence as a distant phenomenon. This 
notion of armed violence as being a thing of the past became common inside 
Gesto por la Paz, leading some members to question the relevance of the 
organization and its efforts to promote the Basque Peace Frame. In short, it 
questioned why should people be ready for mobilization if there is nothing to 
mobilize for. 
Basque peace movement organizations 
During the ceasefire period, Lokarri became the main enforcer of the 
Basque Peace Frame in the Basque Country. The Political Opportunity 
Structure was suitable for its demands, which achieved heightened salience to 
the detriment of Gesto por la Paz. The moment required a more „political‟ focus, 
and, between the two main Basque peace movement organizations, Lokarri 
was the one with a fully developed political agenda. This environment drove 
Gesto por la Paz into retreat, leaving the framing efforts to Lokarri. For its part, 
Lokarri, due to the organizational change, assumed full responsibility. All the 
aspects of the framing efforts were activated. The process of political 
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negotiation was seen as a perfect way to end the political violence. Lokarri took 
the prognostic and motivational aspects of the Basque Peace Frame, offering a 
full route to conclude political violence through a meaningful process of political 
consultation and social participation. For this reason, Lokarri started a pledge 
for society to take part in the process of political consultation and participation. 
This process is also evident in changes in the strategic framing.  Lokarri tried, 
with some success, to attract members of other organizations to the idea of a 
peaceful conflict resolution based on dialogue and social consultation. At the 
same time, Gesto por la Paz used that time to restructure itself. The 
organization started an internal process of debate around the important 
question of whether to end mobilization. Gesto por la Paz abandoned most of 
its framing efforts undermining its potential to make the Basque Peace Frame 
resonate. The existence of an organization that was more suited to a scenario 
of political negotiation (Lokarri) made the role of Gesto por la Paz less 
important. However, that period of internal debate in Gesto por la Paz created 
the mechanisms that defined its framing efforts in the post-ceasefire period 
suggesting parallels with the struggle over social relevance that Lokarri endured 
during the ceasefire. 
Post-Ceasefire period 
Lokarri 
The end of the ceasefire put Lokarri in a strange position. The 
organization devoted its resources and efforts to making society aware of the 
irreversible nature of the peace process. This fact explains Lokarri’s response to 
the armed action that ended the ceasefire. In a press release condemning the 
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bombing of Madrid airport in December 2006, Lokarri clearly stated the 
“irreversibility” of a process suggesting there was no “going back”98.  From that 
moment, the priority in Lokarri was maintaining the conditions to achieve a 
dialogue-based conflict resolution. In subsequent press releases, the demands 
were to publicly acknowledge the need for a complete and open peace process. 
Lokarri demanded ETA engage in an unconditional truce and alerted them to 
the possibility of the political elites once again using past antiterrorist policies99. 
The irreversibility factor was going to be a permanent part of Lokarri‟s message 
and it affected the way the organization framed the conflict. The idea of „no 
return‟ to a pre-ceasefire situation was carefully debated inside the 
organization. This idea appeared in the internal documents describing the 
important issues to be discussed by Lokarri members. The general objectives 
for 2007 were to maintain social expectation to be able to participate, contribute 
to the idea of irreversibility and to facilitate social participation (Lokarri, 2007a: 
3).  Another important factor in the efforts to develop the Basque Peace Frame 
was the role of society. The role of society is one of the key elements in 
Lokarri’s discourse, but during the ceasefire the organization placed too much 
expectation upon the political elites and ETA. With the change of the political 
scenario, Lokarri focused again on the role of Basque society, making it central 
in a hypothetical peace scenario. This is a consequence of an internal process 
of critique that stated the lack of work towards social mobilization and the 
                                            
98
 Lokarri press release, 30 December 2006 http://www.lokarri.org/index.php/es/actualidad-
lokarri/prensa/lokarri (21/01/2011) 
99
 Lokarri press release “society must take initiative” 5 January 2007 
http://www.lokarri.org/index.php/es/actualidad-lokarri/prensa/la-sociedad-debe-tomar-la-
iniciativa (20/09/2010), and press release “ETA has to take a step forward” 10 January 2007 
http://www.lokarri.org/index.php/es/actualidad-lokarri/prensa/eta-debe-dar-un-paso-mas 
(20/09/2010) 
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feeling of pushing towards a specific political agenda, the nationalist left one 
(Anton, 2007: 67), (Fn. 14/02/2007). The need to maintain a coherent position 
towards the new political scenario meant Lokarri faced a dilemma: the idea that 
its initiatives were not adequate for the new political moment and the growing 
feeling inside the organization of “being pushed” towards the original goals, like 
achieving a social consultation. Some members started to demand an internal 
reflection about the objectives: 
 
“The importance of the consultation, of participation, of the people, giving a voice to the people 
and all of that, to me they are very interesting ideas that can be achieved. But it is ok if we stop 
to think about what the organization‟s ideas are.” Lokarri member, Interview 8. 
 
“So we maintain the objective of the consultation, but we make it adequate to the actual context. 
It is not that we are going to make a consultation to reinforce an agreement that does not exist, 
but we are going to make a consultation to make society participate and to say that we do not 
want a return to the past and we do not want to be blocked or excluded, or a return to violence.” 
Lokarri member. Interview  9.  
 
That period was marked by a potential change in the Basque Peace 
Frame. Unlike Gesto por la Paz, which saw its vision of the conflict reinforced, 
Lokarri’s perceptions were challenged. Generally, inside Lokarri it was possible 
to see an enlargement of the problems to be addressed (return to violence, 
social despair). This generated greater flexibility and a wider scope of influence. 
However, the Basque Peace Frame had to be redeveloped for a wider audience 
(the whole of Basque society) in contrast to the audience addressed during the 
ceasefire, i.e. the political elites. The Basque Peace Frame started to lose 
resonance during this period mainly because of the lack of internal credibility of 
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the organization. These issues of violence and social despair were losing 
salience, and interest was returning to Gesto por la Paz. As stated before, 
members started to question the actions of Lokarri, and in some internal 
meetings, some members even suggested the dissolution of the organization 
(Fn. 05/06/2007). However, the main problem was of salience (Snow & Benford, 
2000: 621). Although there was an effort to extend the mobilization potential of 
the Basque Peace Frame to the whole society, it failed to fit with some sectors 
of the population. Indeed, a paradox emerged: at the same time that Lokarri 
started to attract young people, it became clear that the young individuals did 
not realize what the organization stood for. During a campaign to collect 
signatures for a consultation petition, I had an opportunity to talk with some 
young people that gave their signature to the initiative. In response to questions 
on whether they knew of Lokarri or why they signed the petition, they 
responded with general replies indicating that it was because Lokarri „does 
something against the war‟ (Fn. 19/06/2007). This fact was acknowledged 
inside the organization, and as a consequence resulted in the creation of flashy 
initiatives and the use of media to promote the group (Fn. 09/02/2007):  
 
“See, it is complicated to find new initiatives. Very complicated. For example this campaign to 
collect signatures is nothing new, but the general content of the initiative is original” Lokarri 
directive member, Interview 12.  
   
The role of the media deserves special attention. Over the course of the 
history of Lokarri (as Elkarri), access to the media was granted because of the 
special relevance of the Basque conflict (Walgrave & Manssens, 2005: 117). In 
the role as Elkarri, the organization could focus its efforts in framing the peace 
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issue. Now, after years without armed actions and a failure of the peace 
process, Lokarri had to deal with something that was not accustomed to: access 
to media (Gamson, 1998). That had an impact on the diagnostic and prognostic 
framing tasks (Gamson & Meyer, 1996: 287). In the case of Lokarri, 
communicating the problem to the wider audience it was looking for, was 
problematic. The issue was losing salience, and the internal discussions were 
not helping to make the Basque Peace Frame relevant. As some members of 
Lokarri stated during interviews: 
 
“With everything that is happening right now I think that we had to move more. A lot more 
demonstrations, a lot more marches. Everybody has to participate.” Lokarri member. Interview 
11. 
 
“I do not know what is going to happen. If as an organization you are not able to achieve 
anything in a year and suddenly the political tone changes and suddenly you do not know what 
to do, at the end you say „If I do not know what to do, why am I still here?‟” Lokarri member, 
Interview 8.   
 
These problems were overcome by the core sentiment of Lokarri 
members, in part through the cultural inheritance derived from Elkarri. One of 
the most important ideas from Elkarri was called “insistentialism”, or the idea 
that to be successful, Elkarri members had to insist on the idea of peace 
through dialogue. As the former leader of Elkarri describes it, insistentialism 
consists of three points: first, to insist; second, to insist; and third to keep 
insisting on the same ethical principles „in good or bad weather, with the wind 
behind you or against you‟ (Fernandez, 2006: 66). This was a very internalised 
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principle within Lokarri. Its members could have doubts about the organization‟s 
actions, but they still had to insist. This was a key part of their identity as Lokarri 
members. The second issue was that most of the members followed the 
“militant” or traditional membership model (De la Peña & Ibarra, 2004: 100).  
That model describes a highly committed member that is able to devote time 
and resources to follow the organization‟s goals. More importantly, the 
membership is part of his or her identity processes (Funes, 1998a: 85). This 
was a recurrent theme during the interviews. Most of the interviewees stressed 
personal problems inside the organization, but they justified their actions 
through a “sense of duty”. After being very critical over the future of Lokarri, I 
asked one interviewee what they thought they should do. The answer was “The 
same, follow the same road, that is the only remedy” (Interview 11). After being 
asked for their position after the end of the ceasefire, another interviewee 
reflected on this issue in the following way: 
 
“… it is true that we, in the most difficult moments, maintained our identity. At least for 
testimonial purposes, for the idea of being there, as we said in Elkarri, the “insistentialism”. It 
was very difficult but nobody will be able to doubt that we were there.” Lokarri member. 
Interview 8.  
 
In conclusion, due to the changes in the political landscape, Lokarri tried 
to stretch the Basque Peace Frame to include more issues, like social 
frustration and to move from a narrow audience (political parties and armed 
organizations) to a much wider one (the whole of Basque society). This is a 
clear example of frame extension (Snow et al., 1986: 472; Snow & Benford, 
2000: 625). This was confronted with a growing sense of frustration inside the 
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organization, which affected the mobilizing potential of the frame, losing 
resonance and salience. The mobilizing potential was preserved through the old 
members thanks to a culture of “being there” that came from the former 
organization, Elkarri, and thanks to the specific model of membership evident 
inside Lokarri. As I explain now, the end of the ceasefire had a different effect 
on Gesto por la Paz, reinforcing its perception of the conflict.  
Gesto por la Paz 
Gesto por la Paz had a moment of crisis during the ceasefire, which left 
the organization at a crossroads. On the one hand, it was satisfied with the end 
of ETA violence, but, on the other hand, Gesto por la Paz insiders began to 
raise the question: now what? 
 Gesto por la Paz focused on the symbolic dimension to promote its 
ideals. The organization stressed the importance of the messages it had 
previously sent: the disavowing of violence, the separation of conflicts and the 
recognition of victims of violence. At the same time, Gesto por la Paz still 
retained its mobilizing potential, but that mobilizing potential was not fully 
achieved without the exercise of violence from ETA. As it has been described, 
the main symbolic act of mobilization by Gesto por la Paz was the Gesto or 
gesture. This potential was retained after the bombing in Madrid airport, which 
resulted in the killing of two people100. However, Gesto por la Paz faced one 
problem: following a process that started at the end of the 1990s, the political 
elites were using the Gestos as a political tool to reject violence (Funes, 1998a: 
182; Anton, 2007: 67). The first thing that came from the organization was a 
                                            
100
 http://gesto.org/prensapdf/07-01-03%20NP%20gestos.pdf and http://gesto.org/prensapdf/07-
01-05%20NP%20gestos.pdf (both 20/09/2010) 
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message requesting social mobilization101. At the beginning of 2007, several 
demonstrations were organised to protest against ETA. One common 
disagreement between political parties was the motto of these demonstrations. 
Gesto por la Paz used this disagreement to advocate for its role as a unifying 
social force against violence102. This issue was revisited in different documents 
that sought to make Gesto por la Paz a point of reference again, as well as 
political agents103.  Finally, at the beginning of 2007, Gesto por la Paz used its 
traditional march for peace to advocate for awareness of the new situation. The 
calling of this march had a new element, in which the message sent to the 
political parties included an element of cohesion. The second action of Gesto 
por la Paz was to reclaim its other most symbolic element, the Blue Ribbon. 
During the first half of 2007, different political parties suggested the use of the 
Blue Ribbon to show disapproval of nationalistic political positions. Confronting 
this, Gesto por la Paz released a document clarifying the origins and proper use 
of that symbol, reclaiming it to show rejection against political violence104.  
The main points that Gesto por la Paz advocated during that period were 
the struggle to regain the lost potential for mobilization, reclaiming its symbols 
and enforcing the idea of the separation of conflicts. It is possible to say that a 
new cycle of protest started the moment peace expectations emerged (Tarrow, 
1998: 142). For Gesto por la Paz it was an opportunity to once again grasp the 
discourse that was successful in the past. It was a moment of revitalization:  
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 Outcome of the internal meeting after the Madrid airport bombing: 
http://www.gesto.org/prensapdf/07-01-17%20NP%20Asamblea.pdf (18/08/2010) 
102
 Asking for a new motto for marches: http://gesto.org/prensapdf/07-01-
07%20A_Necesitamos%20otro%20lema.pdf (21/01/2011) 
103
 http://gesto.org/prensapdf/07-01-17%20NP%20Asamblea.pdf  (21/01/2011) 
104
 About the use of the Blue Ribbon: http://gesto.org/prensapdf/07-03-
07%20NP%20Lazo%20azul.pdf (18/08/2010)  
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“We say that this is not a good time to close down (the organization). Not after the 
rupture of communication, not after the Madrid bombing, the 30
th
 of December”. Gesto por la 
Paz directive member. Interview 18.  
 
Some members of Gesto por la Paz saw this in a pessimistic light. 
Although the need for the organization was more apparent than before, the 
overall feeling was that Gesto por la Paz did not have to be there. However, the 
organization started to build up its dwindled mobilization potential. This led to a 
different contribution to the Basque Peace Frame, in which Gesto por la Paz 
had an additional problem that had to be addressed, the lack of social 
participation. The organization tried to revive the former role as a catalyst of 
social mobilization. However, this did not find the same support from the society 
that it had before. If diagnosis and prognosis were framed in the same way, 
then the motivation had to be different. The Basque Peace Frame did not 
resonate as before. Gesto por la Paz tried to find a reason for that, and the first 
reaction was to blame the political elites: 
 
“Social response is important. Society is tired. Society says no, it is tired, but it is true that 
nothing happened. ETA breaks the ceasefire and the politicians are not able to articulate 
anything. Or they do not want to” Gesto por la Paz member. Interview 16.  
 
“I was almost sure that the nationalist left was about to keep itself apart from the violence. To 
me, that was very important. I was sure that the use of political means was serious. And it was 
not.” Gesto por la Paz member. Interview 16.  
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Of the different points that can affect a frame resonance (Snow & 
Benford, 1988: 205; Snow & Benford, 2000: 624), Gesto por la Paz had to deal 
with a change in the system social belief, the old frame transformation process 
was there again (Snow et al., 1986: 473; Snow & Benford, 2000: 625). The 
framing efforts where maintained with the same attribution of roles and the 
same path to a solution, but the years without political violence meant the 
problem was seen as a distant issue. Violence had lost its centrality among 
Basque society105. Following frame theory, the issues raised by Gesto por la 
Paz and, to a certain degree, by Lokarri had a lower priority than before (Snow 
& Benford, 1988: 206). These issues worked on another dimension, losing 
credibility with the whole of society (Snow & Benford, 2000: 620). All these 
factors did not cause despair amongst the Basque peace movement 
organizations. They interpreted the situation accurately and took logical steps, 
Lokarri focusing on its contribution on a political solution and Gesto por la Paz 
starting an internal debate about its future.  
However, the change of political scenario opened new options for Gesto 
por la Paz. Gesto por la Paz interpreted the new scenario as a change of pace, 
a new cycle of protest characterised by an intensification of the conflict between 
social actors (Peace Social Movement, nationalist left movement), the political 
elites (institutions, political parties) and the social organizations with similar 
messages (Tarrow, 1998: 144).  It is important to note that this cycle was 
different because it was possible to identify the first signs of exhaustion inside 
the Basque peace movement organizations. Inside Gesto por la Paz the biggest 
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 The reasons of that are out of the scope of this thesis, but it is important to note that the 
media played a major role in that trend. After the major outburst in the late 1990s, media started 
to not portray the consequences of political violence.  
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issue was the task of reviving the potential for mobilization. Lokarri saw in that 
moment that it had to take the role from the political institutions. Gesto por la 
Paz extended the Basque Peace Frame to the whole of society. When ETA 
released the final communication ending the ceasefire, Gesto por la Paz 
interpreted this as a threat against everybody in the Basque Country and called 
for a massive march. In this calling, Gesto por la Paz stated that: 
 „Today, all citizens, regardless of the political party they vote for or even if they 
do not vote, today, all of us have to put aside our personal options and unite 
around the basic idea of defending our right to life and freedom 106.„  
Therefore, Gesto por la Paz recovered the two things that had previously 
seemed obsolete, mass mobilization and conflict with the political elites.  
These changes in the frame efforts were not as well received by the 
social masses as Gesto por la Paz expected. Still, the problem of political 
violence was seen as a far removed problem that did not affect the everyday life 
of Basque society. Gesto por la Paz thus faced a new problem. The 
organization had to change the framing effort and try to align this with the new 
set of beliefs that seemed to have emerged. In theoretical terms, Gesto por la 
Paz, in the last years, has been involved in a task of frame amplification (Snow 
et al., 1986: 469; Snow & Benford, 2000: 624), trying to raise awareness about 
victims of violence, but forgetting the task of making people aware that the best 
resolution of the conflict was through peaceful means. Gesto por la Paz 
became involved in a process of frame transformation (Snow et al., 1986: 473) 
as well as frame amplification, effectively trying to make society aware of the 
danger of violence and trying to convince it of the need to use peaceful means. 
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 http://gesto.org/prensapdf/07-02-02%20RP%20Manifestacion.pdf (18/08/2010) 
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This issue put Gesto por la Paz in a difficult situation due to the resources 
needed for those tasks and the growing feeling of frustration inside the 
organization. It was a moment of invigoration indeed, but an invigoration that 
the organization might not be able to afford.  
Frame influence between Basque peace movement 
organizations 
Lokarri and Gesto por la Paz are a consequence of each other. The 
actions and nature of both organizations are determined by what the other 
does. On one hand, Gesto por la Paz is not likely to adopt a political cause as 
part of its discourse if Lokarri is already working on that issue. On the other 
hand, Lokarri will never adopt a symbolic and social way of working because 
that dimension is being exploited, rather successfully, by Gesto por la Paz. 
Since 1992, when Elkarri was created, the two organizations were living in each 
other‟s shadows with, in some cases, overlapping membership and 
collaboration on different initiatives107. It is true that Elkarri appeared to occupy 
a gap that Gesto por la Paz left unattended, that of the political demands of a 
social movement (Funes, 1998a: 48). Elkarri, on the other hand, did not try to 
encroach upon areas in which Gesto por la Paz was working, such as the 
creation of incentives for social mobilization against violence (Funes, 1998a: 
39). Most of the empirical work done on the relationship between Gesto por la 
Paz and Lokarri was done when the impact of the Basque peace movement 
was at its peak (Funes, 1998a; Funes, 1998b; Zubero, 2000; Tejerina, 2001). 
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 An interesting example is the “Maroño” agreement in 1995. In this agreement, several peace 
groups decided to take a common approach to peace in the Basque Country based on the use 
of peaceful dialogue. http://www.elkarri.org/en/pdf/WhatisElkarri.pdf (pg. 9) (20/09/2010).  
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These analyses focused on the objective factors of the organizations and how 
their models differed. They did not stress the idea of the consequences of their 
interrelated activities and the fact that their mutual influence built the model for 
peace mobilization in the Basque Country. It was their differences that shaped 
their organizational structure, their strategic orientation and repertoire of action. 
The consequence was a highly rich frame that became, with time, the Basque 
Peace Frame described in chapter 6. It is possible to say, for analytical 
purposes, that Gesto por la Paz is the symbolic side of the Basque peace 
movement and Lokarri the instrumental side. There is a sense of specialization 
within both organizations. This sense of specialization is not shared within the 
organizations, and every intention to meddle was met with distrust. One 
example was the intention of Elkarri to prevent the celebration of Gestos during 
1995 (Funes, 1998a: 140). A member of Gesto por la Paz commented on that 
episode: 
 
“It is true that in that time more than one person advised us not to undertake the mobilizations. 
When the counter-mobilizations started, yes, people told us. But we couldn‟t stop. We couldn‟t 
stop because someone was insulting us” – Gesto por la Paz directive member. Interview 18.  
 
 The same perception existed in Lokarri. After all the time spent focusing 
on social awareness, the idea that Lokarri members have of Gesto por la Paz is 
that the latter was unable to find a political solution to the conflict:  
 
“Gesto por la Paz, yes, it was very good. Every time someone was killed, a march, an act of 
mourning has to be called. It was a denouncement, but that was it. I think it was ok and 
sometimes I tried a Gesto but it didn‟t work. However, meant Elkarri something else to me. They 
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explained things to me. You have to learn more than to be against violence and nothing more. 
Yes, you have to be against violence, but you have to analyze.” Lokarri member. Interview 11.  
 
 The perception inside the Basque peace movement organizations is not 
one of interdependence. Amongst Lokarri members there is a feeling that they 
came about as an evolution of the situation, an effort to give the Basque conflict 
what was needed: a solution. Some Lokarri members even suggested that 
Gesto por la Paz was not useful in a scenario without violence: 
 
“For me, as there are not armed actions, they don‟t make too much sense. I know that they had 
the peace education workshops and the thing with the prisoners, but in the end, it was the 
banner that made them mobilize. That was the more important factor about them. Then with the 
ceasefire… They even made some people redundant. They changed offices even.” Lokarri 
member. Interview 8.   
 
From the Gesto por la Paz point of view, Lokarri was seen as a different 
organization, more focused on politics than on peace. This approach was taken 
by some researchers that did not see Lokarri as part of the Basque peace 
movement (Zubero, 2000: 202; Tejerina et al., 1995). This idea deepened the 
concept defended by some researchers and members of Gesto por la Paz that 
Elkarri had political roots in the nationalist left (Funes, 1998a: 47; Funes, 1998b: 
506).  
 
“At the beginning Elkarri was a bit different, it was something that was not in our environment, 
they came from a different world. They wanted to promote dialogue, with a more political 
structure, more debates and things like that. It is an organization we share little with. Our 
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spaces and motives are different. It was clear, the leader came from that world, and he was a 
city councillor for Herri Batasuna
108
.” Gesto por la Paz member. Interview 15.  
 
 This perception of difference between organizations produced a 
paradoxical situation. On paper, the mobilization and symbolic power of Gesto 
por la Paz, combined with the institutional experience and instrumental 
approach of Lokarri might look like a powerful weapon to achieve results, but 
their potential is based on their difference, which they are proud of. The 
headquarters of both organizations are, by coincidence, in the same building 
and members of both organizations have friendly personal relations. During 
fieldwork, I found myself after a meeting with Lokarri members sharing a drink 
with Gesto por la Paz members that decided to go to the same bar. After 
enquiring why they were unable to work together being close, knowing each 
other and having the same perception about the conflict, the response was that 
they had different tempos, different views (Fn. 10/09/2007). They are friends 
condemned to compete, and from that competition comes their potential. 
 From a framing point of view, it seems that the Basque peace movement 
is a strong and vibrant one. Despite the problems faced during the last years, 
the Basque Peace Frame described in chapter 6 is unavoidable for any group, 
organization or individual that tries to become a peace activist in the Basque 
conflict scenario. The difference lies in nuances in the processes of frame 
alignment and in the way the frame convolutes. As described in that previous 
chapter, these nuances make the frame bigger and stronger, so strong, in fact, 
that even the political institutions had to use that same approach to protest 
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against violence. This leads me to the last part of this chapter: the creation of 
cultural codes derived from the frame.  
 The framing efforts of the Basque peace social movement have been 
highly successful. This success has been a consequence of the everlasting 
feedback, pulling and pushing between the two main organizations, Gesto por 
la Paz and Lokarri. Following the literature, the main cultural consequences are 
those related to beliefs, values and opinions (Earl, 2007: 512). The impact is so 
big that peace activism is locked in the Basque context. The frame developed 
by the Basque peace movement defines the ways of action, the repertoire and 
the attribution of a situation so solid that trying to propose alternatives is 
unheard of. This success brought several consequences. At the organizational 
level, both Gesto por la Paz and Lokarri became highly specialized, the former 
in maintaining and creating symbols and the latter in political action. With the 
decrease of political violence, Gesto por la Paz was being drawn to the edge of 
action, defending victims of terrorism rights, stressing the importance of 
meanings and defending the idea of separation of conflicts. This struggle for 
cultural meanings (Melucci, 1996: 99) is what defined Gesto por la Paz since its 
creation. Lokarri became specialized in achieving political outcomes, focusing 
on campaigns looking for a political consultation or calling political parties to 
action.  
 Another consequence of the Basque Peace Frame success, although 
unintended, was a surplus of legitimacy that the political institutions enjoy. 
Blaming ETA for the violence without properly addressing the different problems 
that came from the state apparatus gave the idea that there was only one 
problem. The overall perception made it very difficult for different organizations 
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ideologically near to ETA to operate, as I explain in the next chapter. However, 
the most important problem derived from this idea was the battle that ensued 
with the political institutions when they tried to use the Basque peace 
movement methods to address the conflict. The last time it happened, in 1998, 
the process ended in the fragmentation of Gesto por la Paz and in a steady 
decline of the mobilizing potential of the organization (Funes, 1998a). Lokarri 
had to compete with different initiatives from the political institutions to channel 
social participation in the conflict109. In some cases Lokarri decided to 
collaborate with those initiatives, but in most cases the organization was drawn 
in a competition to create more social impact. This concern was reflected in an 
informal conversation with the director of Lokarri, when he stated that some 
media had detected that the Basque government surpassed them in terms of 
media coverage (Fn. 30/03/2007).  
 This sense of “live and let live” defended by both organizations 
conceals a cultural interdependence that created a very powerful Basque 
Peace Frame that shapes all aspects of peace action in the Basque conflict. 
Even the political institutions take the tools and approaches developed by the 
Basque peace movement organizations when they have to stand against 
violence. If this is true, it raises the question of what happened with other social 
organizations? In the next chapter, I explain how different social organizations 
have incorporated the peace message, in an implicit or explicit way and how 
they shape their messages to achieve social impact taking into account those 
variables.   
                                            
109
 The most important was the “konpondu” (to fix) initiative. A web forum created to collect 
social opinions about the conflict. This initiative was closed after the end of the ceasefire.  
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CHAPTER 8 – THE EXTERNAL IMPACTS OF THE 
BASQUE PEACE FRAME 
 To approach the different organizations explained in chapter 5, I divided 
them into four categories, using their objectives and characteristics as a basis 
for grouping. This differentiation is been explained in chapters 3 and 5. In 
thsese chapters is been stated that this categorization is methodological in 
nature and does not try to eliminate the inherent complexities inside the 
relationships that occur in the Basque society. The first category includes 
organizations that are devoted to peace research or social solidarity. In this 
category are Gernika Gogoratuz, Baketik and Bakeola. The organizations in the 
second category share the same political idea or goal, the nationalist left. These 
organizations are TAT and Etxerat. They appeared to respond to issues directly 
related to left-wing Basque nationalists involved in the conflict. Its ideological 
opposition to the second category organizations defines the third category. 
Basta Ya is an organization created to defend the current political status quo 
and to defend the rights of victims of terrorism violence. Finally, the EGK, which 
has its origins in the political institutions, fulfils the last category.  
 These four categories attempt to represent the main ideological 
tendencies among social organizations that address issues related to the 
Basque conflict.  They represent the entire national ideological spectrum that 
exists in Basque politics and the different positions, inclusive, exclusive, pro or 
anti independence (Perez-Agote, 2008; Letamendia, 1997; Ibarra, 2005b). The 
nationalist left organizations (second category) and the defenders of the status 
quo (third category) represent the most extreme positions, with the rest in the 
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middle. It is important to note that Bakeola, is tied to the Catholic Church, a very 
powerful agent of socialization in Basque society (Perez-Agote, 2008: 145). The 
only organization that cannot be positioned within a nationalistic ideology is the 
EGK. This organization, however, deals with Basque youth issues and, as it is 
described in chapter 5, includes youth organizations that reflect a variety of 
national ideologies. This last category is useful as a test. It shows that common 
identity ground is needed to understand the frame propagation.  
In essence, the organizations in the four categories address different 
conflict issues. These issues include amongst others:  
 Rights of the family members of ETA prisoners;  
 Rights of victims of torture made by the police forces; 
 Research in peace and conflict; 
 Promotion of an ethical vision of conflict resolution to be applied in the 
Basque Country; 
 Peace education; 
 Victims of terrorism rights; and 
 Defenders of the political status quo and youth rights.  
These issues are present in most of the organizations that try to raise 
conflict issues in the Basque Country. However, the four categories of 
organizations identified above are not the only organizations that work on these 
issues. It is important to briefly explain the organizations that are not present in 
this research.  
 I found it difficult to contact organizations that lay at the extremes of the 
national ideological spectrum. To effectively overcome this challenge, it was 
possible to develop a different strategy and access organizations with similar 
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and, in some cases, overlapping knowledge of the issues at hand. The clearest 
examples are Askatasuna110 and the Terrorism Victims Association or AVT111. 
In the first case, it was an issue of practicability (Lofland, 1996: 26). Askatasuna 
is an organization devoted to denouncing the conditions of ETA prisoners112. It 
was, and still is, a banned organization with most of its members in prison or 
with criminal charges of ETA membership. This, according to some people 
close to that organization, made gaining access very difficult (Fn. 02/07/2007). 
A tentative approach was made through the TAT with no success. Askatasuna 
at the same time is the organization with more mobilizing potential among the 
pro-independence Basque nationalist left social organizations. To overcome 
that setback I tried to contact another nationalist left organization that shared 
similar objectives, Etxerat. The logic was that Etxerat was legal.  I collected 
information about Etxerat first, trying to understand the differences with 
Askatasuna:  
 
“Askatasuna, now I can‟t use that name because it‟s banned, is the anti-repressive organism. 
Etxerat is in charge of giving assistance to the family members, of arranging buses. On one 
hand, they (Askatasuna) work denouncing, marching, data collecting and to raise money for the 
prisoners, to pay medical assistance, etc. What happens now is that Gestoras
113
 is illegal, I 
                                            
110
 Freedom in Basque. Banned organization.  
111
 AVT stands for Asociación de Víctimas del Terrorismo, in Spanish.  
112
 Since the beginning of its actions, ETA used its prisoners as another front of struggle. In 
response, the Spanish government devise a policy to maintain ETA prisoners scattered and far 
away from the Basque Country. For more information: IBARRA, P. (1987) La Evolución 
estratégica de E.T.A., San Sebastian, Kriselu.;  LETAMENDIA, F. (1994b) Historia del 
Nacionalismo Vasco y de E.T.A. Vol 1. E.T.A en el Franquismo, San Sebastian, R&B Editores., 
or DOUGLASS, W. A. & ZULAIKA, J. (1990) "On the Interpretation of Terrorist Violence: ETA and 
the Basque Political Process". Comparative Studies in Society and History, 32,(2) 238-257.  
113
 Former name of Askatasuna. The original name was Gestoras pro-amnistia or Pro-amnesty 
promoters in Spanish.  
  236 
can‟t use that name. Askatasuna is illegal too so now we use Amnistiaren Aldeko 
Mugimendua
114
. Inside of that is Etxerat.” TAT member. Interview 7.  
 
 That last fact is highly contentious. In the same interview, the interviewee 
declares that the relations between Askatasuna and Etxerat are far from cordial.  
 
“And I can tell you that Askatasuna and Etxerat don‟t have a good relationship. They always 
have an argument about the time to call a demonstration and things like that” TAT member. 
Interview 7.  
 
 The complexity behind the nationalist left network is explained later. The 
fact that Etxerat was an accessible organization was encouraging and provided 
the further insight necessary for this research.  
 The other organization that proved difficult to approach was the AVT, and 
there were a number of reasons for this. The first problem I found was the 
absence of a gatekeeper. This was compounded by the fact that some of the 
members of the AVT are people that, besides being targets of ETA violence, 
had a past membership with Gesto por la Paz.  Accordingly, the vast majority 
had an unfavourable view of the Basque peace movement organizations. The 
second problem is that the AVT is a Spanish organization, based in Madrid, 
making AVT difficult to reach due the travel required. The third problem was its 
highly complex nature. Although it claimed to be representative of all victims of 
terrorism in the country, some organizations representing regional victims of 
violence did not recognize it. More significantly, it was in an open conflict with 
the newly created victims associations of the 11th of March. This organization, 
                                            
114
 Movement Pro-Amnesty in Basque. This movement does not have a legal structure, it is the 
name given to the same structure that holds Askatasuna.  
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which was created after the bombings on the Madrid trains in 2004, did not 
allow its members to be part of the AVT due to ideological differences. The 
different messages received from different people near the AVT, suggested a 
Basque Country based organization would be better, and I focused my efforts 
on Basta Ya, Foro de Ermua115 and Covite116. I gained access to the first 
organization largely through the personal openness of one member of the 
directive body. In the case of Covite access proved more difficult. I tried to 
contact them several times, using phone, fax, email and even a direct visit to its 
headquarters. I only got a response several months later, when I was in the 
advanced stage of writing up, in late 2009, telling me that Covite was studying 
my proposal. That was the last response. I tried to contact them again in 2010, 
with no luck. After exploring the data obtained from Basta Ya, I decided that, 
due the advancements in the research, it was too late. The Foro de Ermua case 
is simpler. After trying to contact them using the same methods, I received a 
negative response. An interview with a Basta Ya member may account for the 
difficultly in gaining access to Foro De Ermua: 
 
“… Foro de Ermua has a little presence in the Basque Country. It has some known members in 
Bilbao, but, basically, that is it. It is a group that moves a lot to Madrid, that is great, but we 
always insisted in the importance of civic activism on the streets. Not making press releases 
and things like that. These were the things that Foro de Ermua was doing.” Basta Ya member. 
Interview 3.  
                                            
115
 Forum of Ermua in Spanish. It is an organization created after the assassination of a local 
politician from a small town called Ermua, Miguel Angel Blanco, in 1998. The organization 
rejects any kind of negotiation with ETA or any Basque nationalism political party or 
organization. http://www.foroermua.com/web/ (20/10/2010) 
116
 Acronym for Terrorism Victims Collective. It was created in 1998 to defend the rights of ETA 
victims in the Basque Country and to achieve a status of political reference in a hypothetical 
pacification scenario. http://www.avt.org/ (20/10/2010)  
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 It is important to note that, with Basta Ya and Etxerat, it was possible to 
explore the whole scope of social reactions to the conflict in the Basque 
Country. In particular, they gave me the opportunity to include two important 
issues, the victims of terrorism and the ETA prisoners. However, to be able to 
assess with certainty what those collectives think and how they reacted to the 
Basque peace movement, it was necessary to develop a deeper exploration of 
the organizations mentioned. 
 In this part, I have explained the analytic division of the organizations in 
four groups with some limitations that the choice of organizations brought to this 
research. Now, I explain each group in more detail and how they reacted to the 
efforts to frame the Basque peace movement.  
Baketik, Bakeola, and Gernika Gogoratuz 
 These organizations act in the periphery of the Basque peace movement 
because their main objectives are related to peace research and peace 
education, not mobilizing society. Baketik and Gernika Gogoratuz are peace 
research centres. Bakeola is a catholic peace education organization that is 
more concerned with direct work in schools and with impoverished people than 
mobilization. Accordingly, one may question why these organizations were 
identified as important? The peace social movement in the Basque Country, as 
explained in the last chapter, is highly centred in Lokarri and Gesto por la Paz. 
The nature of Gesto por la Paz as a coordinator of local peace groups made it 
the perfect hub for peace action. Whereas the clever use of resources by 
Lokarri (or Elkarri), driven by the “specialization” that comes from the 
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competition between peace groups, made other peace organizations117 with a 
political agenda disappear in the past. The place of these organizations in this 
research is due to different reasons, depending on the point of view, but, for 
now, it is important to say that they are generators of intellectual and cultural 
goods used by the Basque peace movement organizations widely. From 
Lokarri’s point of view, as it used more pressure groups to channel its demands, 
it needed experts to support its perspectives (Funes, 1998b; De la Peña & 
Ibarra, 2004: 97). This is a need that appears in social movement organizations 
with a structural approach to action (Carter, 1992: 20; Overy, 1982; Zald & 
McCarthy, 1987a; Zald & Ash, 1966; Tarrow, 1998; McAdam et al., 1996a). The 
work of Lokarri needed the production of reports that accounted for the current 
political situation118, and accordingly Lokarri used experts in some of its 
initiatives. The social observatory119, for example, started as a document 
explaining the political situation regarding the conflict. A team of experts, 
university professors and personalities well known in the Basque Country 
created this document. This need of qualitative knowledge ensured Lokarri was 
keen to build bridges between the different peace research organizations, not 
least to ensure the accumulation of information. The relationship with Gesto por 
la Paz is more tenuous. The social nature of the organization meant the need 
                                            
117
One example is Bakea Orain, created in 1992. This organization was created by members of 
Gesto por la Paz who felt the need of a more political approach to the Basque conflict. They 
never faced the opposition from Lokarri (Elkarri in that time) and they even collaborated with 
them in several initiatives. Finally, the clever use of resources by Elkarri (being able to struck 
alliances with the political party in power in that time, the PNV) and the lack of mobilization 
spaces filled by Gesto por la Paz, made them to cease activities in the late 90s.  
118
 Best examples: CHAPMAN, S. (2006) Report on the Basque Conflict: Keys to understanding 
the ETA's permanent ceasefire, Bilbao, Lokarri. (http://www.lokarri.org/files/File/PDF/Inform.pdf 
(20/09/2010), and the “Social Observatory” initiative, where some intellectuals describe the 
political scenario regularly. This initiative was open recently to the public. 
http://www.lokarri.org/index.php/es/observatorio-social (20/09/2010)  
119
 For the first Observatory publication: http://www.lokarri.org/files/File/PDF/observatorio.pdf 
(20/12/2010) 
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for peace research was less important. Instead it favoured using popular 
personalities and appealed to cultural values during their events. However, the 
influence of both organizations upon Baketik, Bakeola, and Gernika Gogoratuz 
work is considerable.  This could be explained using social movement network 
theory (Diani & McAdam, 2003; Diani, 2007; Diani, 1998). The analysis of 
networks that exist between the Basque peace movement organizations and 
Baketik, Bakeola, and Gernika Gogoratuz, gives some insights into some of the 
most important issues regarding frame propagation. These are, from the 
Basque peace movement organizations‟ point of view, the effects on 
participation; the assessment of the relative strength of the Basque Peace 
Frame; and the influence of personal networks. I stress the importance of 
shared collective identity networks, as they are the key link to understanding the 
frame diffusion. This last point leads to the issue of leadership, often 
overlooked, but crucial to understanding the work of one of these organizations, 
Baketik, founded and directed by the former director of Elkarri. From Baketik, 
Bakeola, and Gernika Gogoratuz point of view, the important effects are that the 
Basque Peace Frame permeates their discourse and ethos, therefore, the 
importance of that permeation in the research and action direction of them and 
their capacity to create a significant feedback process into the Basque peace 
movement organizations.  
 It is interesting to note that the relationships between organizations are 
not only present at the utilitarian level and they do not just use each other to 
achieve a goal. Rather, these relations are a consequence of the collective 
identity building that happened before. Baketik, Bakeola, and Gernika 
Gogoratuz come from the same submerged networks explained in chapter 6.  In 
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essence this is the result of what Melucci calls “hidden networks”, a 
consequence of an overlapping of ideas, ideologies, and individuals between 
the Basque peace movement organizations and these organizations (Melucci, 
1989: 70; Diani, 2007: 339). The unique characteristics of Basque civil society, 
with its dense identity groups, its dynamic collective action and its limited 
numbers amongst the population, created a perfect environment for the 
existence of those networks. Consequently, it is not a surprise to find that some 
of the individuals involved in Baketik, Bakeola, and Gernika Gogoratuz were 
involved in the early peace groups of the 1980s and 1990s.  
 
“I remember … [in the late 1980s] … I was studying for the exams to access the university and 
something made me make contact con Gesto por la Paz during that time. I started my degree 
and I was very involved with Gesto. After that I started to be in contact with Elkarri as well”. 
Bakeola member. Interview 1. 
 
 The Bakeola interviewee‟s experience is present in the other 
organizations members that were interviewed. Indeed, it is clear when it comes 
to analyzing an organization such as Baketik, that it was created from the 
experiences and personal will of the former director of Elkarri. In the book that 
forms the basis of Baketik’s ethos, the director states that everything is the 
consequence of his life experience in collective action on a range of issues, 
from environmental protest to his role as director of Elkarri (Fernandez, 2006: 
17).  
 The intellectual exercise that we are going to embark upon now includes 
the description of those networks, how they were created and their nature. It 
concludes with an analysis of how those networks affect the Basque peace 
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movement organizations and Baketik, Bakeola, and Gernika Gogoratuz, 
focusing on the different effects described. 
 The people behind Gernika Gogoratuz, Bakeola, and Baketik were part 
of that original populace that was engaged in social action in the early 1980s. 
As explained in the last chapter, these groups were responsible for the creation 
of the local peace groups that were the backbone of Gesto por la Paz and the 
environmental protests that determined the origin of Elkarri. These networks of 
likeminded people served as a communication channel to create the new 
meaning of protest in the early days of democracy. These networks were based 
on the defence of Basque cultural values, created in the private sphere and with 
a highly emotive component (Funes, 1998a: 85). This dense network of 
relations was particularly active at the local and parochial level (Perez-Agote, 
2008: 131). During the Franco years, these networks were key to understanding 
the modern dynamics of the nationalist left. Some authors (Funes, 1998a; 
Tejerina, 2001) describe these networks with two different categories: the 
catholic, parochial level and the pro-independence level. However, I argue that 
the relationship between these two is more complex than it first appears. While 
Funes argues that both Gesto por la Paz and Elkarri networks had impacts 
independent of one another (Funes, 1998a: 89-92), it is perhaps more accurate 
to view these as intertwined in a complicated relationship. The main difference 
is the perception of the use of violence for political means, as explained in 
chapter 6. The peace network rejects the use of violence, but that does not 
mean that pacifists do not share a common nationalist goal. Therefore, they 
struggle with the nationalist left, but they are compelled to understand each 
other. As was noted in the last chapter, Gesto por la Paz was a consequence of 
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the new political scenario. However, I would like to go a little further and 
suggest that an analysis of Gesto por la Paz during its beginnings is more likely 
to conclude this was a countermovement that was both new and novel. The 
field of social protest in the early years of democracy was monopolized by the 
nationalist left, which used public space to advocate for independence. This 
was carried out using contentious and disrupting methods, like marches that 
often evolved into riots and low level urban warfare (Casquette, 2003; 
Casquette, 2006). The local peace groups broke with those dynamics, 
proposing a new means of using the public space that was non contentious and 
highly symbolic. In fact, it was the complete opposite; a silent demonstration of 
social discontent emerging as a consequence of the dynamics that were going 
on in the social network that created those groups. That sense of innovation 
and success encouraged members of those networks to try new experiences 
closer to their own fields. In the case of Gernika Gogoratuz, it was not a 
coincidence that university professors created it: 
 
“That year (1987), Gernika Gogoratuz was created. Gernika Gogoratuz is an association formed 
by men and women tied with the UPV (Basque Country University), mainly with a pedagogy 
background who were involved in the pacifist movement. That group of people were interested 
in concepts like image-enemy and perception of threats. These concepts determine and 
orientate the work of the peace studies research centre”. Gernika Gogoratuz member. Interview 
6.  
 
 Another explanation for the dense nature of the peace network was the 
need for these networks. The network had to overcome a well-established set of 
affective relations that was the nationalist left. Therefore, an even stronger 
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network was needed (Diani, 1998: 246). The consequence of all of this is the 
creation of a network that thrived in the new democratic environment and 
needed innovation and „newness‟ to survive. The realization that something 
new could be done for peace and the tradition for social action based on dense 
social networks generated the perfect scenario for the creation of organizations 
outside the Basque peace movement. These organizations deal with issues 
related to peace, but outside the structures of collective action adopted by 
earlier groups. Baketik was created as a result of the direct experience of an 
individual who was seeking to provide an opportunity to explore new social 
dimensions. The main consequence of the sharing of collective action networks 
and individual overlapping is that the impacts of the Basque peace movement 
organizations on those organizations became more varied, as well as facilitating 
the existence of a significant feedback process between them.  
Baketik, Bakeola, and Gernika Gogoratuz network effects on the 
Basque Peace Frame 
 As previously stated, most of the people involved in Baketik, Bakeola, 
and Gernika Gogoratuz were, or are, part of the Basque peace movement. 
Some are active members of either Lokarri or Gesto por la Paz or they work as 
individuals in any of the local peace groups. This has direct consequences in 
the way action is framed within Baketik, Bakeola, and Gernika Gogoratuz. The 
most important issue regarding this area of research is that these organizations 
share the conflict diagnosis with the Basque peace movement organizations. 
This diagnosis is as follows: the main problem is the political violence, ETA and, 
more significantly, the Spanish state causing this problem. This political 
violence is the extreme consequence of a conflict with historical roots in the 
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Basque national identity. Finally, this conflict and, therefore, the political 
violence, caused a deep divide in Basque society. This division can only be 
healed through a process of mutual understanding and reconciliation.  
 The innovation that the pacifist movement brought into collective action 
in the 1980s created the spaces needed to apply the above diagnosis to new 
dynamics to tackle the conflict. The most interesting thing about this process is 
the capacity that Baketik, Bakeola, and Gernika Gogoratuz developed over time 
to constructively criticize the work done by the Basque peace movement 
organizations. I use Bakeola as an example. During the interview done with 
Bakeola, the interviewee praised the work done by the Basque peace 
movement organizations. However, because the specific ethos of Bakeola, a 
critique is made about how the Basque peace movement organizations 
overstate the importance of political violence in the everyday life of the Basque.  
 
“I think that what is called the Basque conflict is seperated from social reality. You have political 
parties. It is an ideological conflict with, consequently, a lot of pain and suffering in different 
collectives, but the overwhelming majority of the society lives in a different plane. So, the people 
live with everything good and bad in this life and the conflict is upon the people who have their 
freedom compromised; or the people who are in jail and their families; or the people who are 
victims of political violence; or suffered human rights abuses, but the overwhelming majority, the 
rest, I would say 95% of the society, of people, of human beings, of Euskadi and Spain, their 
lives go in another path, it is another thing.” Bakeola member. Interview 1.  
 
 Bakeola does not reject the work done by the Basque peace movement 
organizations; on the contrary, the organization is present in several pacifist 
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initiatives120. A direct effect of this critique is the influence that Bakeola and 
Gernika Gogoratuz have on the Basque peace movement organizations 
initiatives that are not directly related to their ethos. The work of Gesto por la 
Paz about peace education121 and the direct involvement of Lokarri in the 
Basque network of associations for peace education is a perfect example of 
this122.   
 Therefore, it is plausible to say that through their relationships with the 
dense pacifist networks of the 1980s, some members of the Basque peace 
movement organizations and Baketik, Bakeola, and Gernika Gogoratuz have 
created strong feedback channels. Those channels are based upon the 
collective identity processes that existed inside the mentioned peace networks. 
That “Peace identity” is the key ingredient that gives strength to the feedback 
process between the Basque peace movement organizations and Baketik, 
Bakeola, and Gernika Gogoratuz.  
 Before finishing, it is interesting to analyze Baketik, created and directed 
by Elkarri‟s former director, Jonan Fernandez. Baketik is, therefore, a direct 
consequence of the Basque peace movement.  
 
“I had a 14 years experience in Elkarri, which was a social movement for the dialogue, the 
agreement and non-violence in the Basque conflict. From that experience came the opportunity 
                                            
120
 Bakeola director and Lokarri director know each other personally. They work together in 
different initiatives regarding peace education and they have a strong presence in different 
social networks advocating for peace initiatives.  
121
 See the document “Educar para la Paz” (To Educate for Peace) created by Gesto por la Paz 
in 2001 http://gesto.org/pdf/educarparalapaz.pdf (20/10/2010). This document was created 
jointly with Gernika Gogoratuz and Unesco Etxea (UNESCO in the Basque Country).  
122
 “Foro de Asociaciones de Educacion en Derechos Humanos y por la Paz (Forum of 
asociations for education in Human Rights and Peace) 
http://www.bakeola.org/archivos/experiencias/16_es_Foro%20de%20Asociaciones%20liburuxk
a.pdf (20/10/2010) 
  247 
to create a centre that combined ethics and conflict. That was the consequence of what I 
learned during those 14 years of experience in Elkarri and during the 7 years before that when I 
was involved in the Leizaran Highway protests.” Baketik member. Interview 2.  
 
 When I had the opportunity to interview a Baketik member, the 
interviewee and the Baketik team made clear that they were only going to 
speak about Baketik and not about their Elkarri experience (Fn. 23/08/2007). 
Baketik considers it important to avoid being identified with Lokarri, but as I 
exposed in the last chapter, the shadow of the former Elkarri director is long 
amongst Lokarri members. Jonan Fernandez does not like to appear much in 
Lokarri meetings, but his appearance in public acts lends legitimacy to Lokarri 
actions, especially for Lokarri members123. This fact, and his impact on some 
members, could make him a “movement intellectual”, a justification for a 
movement that now produces strategic proposals (Barker & Cox, 2001). 
Another consequence is the high level of appreciation that Baketik’s work has 
inside Lokarri. This is key to understanding possible changes in the Basque 
Peace Frame, because issues brought up by Baketik frequently appear in 
Lokarri meetings. 
 To conclude, the bonds created inside the pacifist networks of the 1980s 
and 1990s were the roots for the channels of interaction between the Basque 
peace movement organizations and Baketik, Bakeola, and Gernika Gogoratuz. 
These channels have consequences at the organizational level (in the case of 
Lokarri) and at the individual level (in the case of Gesto por la Paz). In both 
cases, which are not mutually exclusive, the main bonding factor is the pacifist 
identity created and nurtured inside those pacifist networks. The sharing of that 
                                            
123
 He contributed with some opinion articles to Haritu, Lokarri’s magazine. See Haritu, no. 5. 
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collective identity and the sharing of the conflict diagnosis makes possible a 
fluid communication between the Basque peace movement organizations and 
Baketik, Bakeola, and Gernika Gogoratuz. These communication channels 
have been directly influential in the dynamics of participation, leadership and 
frame propagation. Baketik, Bakeola, and Gernika Gogoratuz are used by the 
Basque peace movement organizations as examples of their success. This is 
perhaps not a conscious linkage, but it is a consequence of some of Baketik, 
Bakeola, and Gernika Gogoratuz members belonging to the pacifist networks. 
This gives the Basque peace movement organizations a strong advantage in 
promoting participation, internally and externally (Diani, 2007: 345). Indeed, the 
linkage “forces” the Basque peace movement organizations to participate in 
different projects outside their sphere of influence, as Lokarri’s work in the 
forum for education on human rights and peace clearly illustrates. The 
leadership is another area that is influenced by the communication channels; 
the clearest example of this is with Baketik. However, some of the prominent 
members of Baketik, Bakeola, and Gernika Gogoratuz were active members of 
the local peace groups and those allegiances are difficult to forget. Finally, the 
Basque Peace Frame has been influenced in an interesting feedback process. 
The issues treated by Baketik, Bakeola, and Gernika Gogoratuz are appearing 
inside the Basque peace movement organizations, providing new ways to 
tackle the conflict and introducing new concepts, like ethics of conflict 
resolution, and academic concepts in the Basque peace movement 
organizations vocabulary. This reinforces the importance of social reconciliation. 
In this regard, it is worth acknowledging the role of the Basque peace 
movement as a source of new ways of understanding society. It provided a new 
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means of understanding politics, without violence, in the context of an 
apparently enduring association between violence and nationalism. The 
absence of violence was the starting point for providing a glimmer of hope for a 
reconciliation scenario. Thus, the Basque peace movement organizations are 
generators of a new analysis of society (Cox & Fominaya, 2009: 4). 
 To finish this section, it is important to note that Gernika Gogoratuz, 
Bakeola, and Baketik are not the only Basque organizations devoted to 
research or solidarity work. There are more, including the previously mentioned 
Unesco Etxea or Bakeaz, another peace research centre. They have slightly 
different ways of acting, but the differences with Baketik, Bakeola, and Gernika 
Gogoratuz  in terms of this research are minimal.  
The nationalist left organizations: Etxerat and TAT 
 It has been stated that the linkage between the Basque peace movement 
organizations and the Basque Peace Non-Movement Organizations is the 
shared pacifist collective identity. In the case of this category, the nationalist left 
organizations, the identity is not pacifist, but nationalist. Political collective 
identities are a recognized way of perceiving the other in the Basque Country. 
The Basque national identity is been constructed continuously for centuries and 
is well established as a defining political feature (Castells, 1998: 30). The 
national identity, therefore, works as an exclusive construction, thanks to the 
different processes of radicalization explained in chapter 6 (Perez-Agote, 2008: 
135). This trend in changing as noted by various authors (Ibarra, 2005b; Perez-
Agote, 1998) that detected trends of inclusion in the Basque national identity. 
This is relevant for this research explaining the identity position of the nationalist 
left as this collective still relies in old ways of reproduction of identities.  
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The organizations that belong to the nationalist left network have been 
constructed as a mirror image of the society they try to overcome (Letamendia, 
1997: 19). This network was the result of the propagation mechanisms that the 
nationalist identity had in place during the Dictatorship years (Perez-Agote, 
2008: 133). The result is a high-density network with few communication 
channels with the outside. This network has organizations devoted to dealing 
with any aspect of the conflict in nationalist left terms. This network had many 
denominations in different academic works124. The nationalist left is a high-
density network with a high structural interdependency (Funes, 1998a: 92; 
Requena, 1994: 38-53). That means that there are plenty of communication 
points between organizations125 in the nationalist left. These organizations 
enjoy smooth and clear channels between them. According to the portrayal 
presented by Funes (Funes, 1998a), this network is perceived by outsiders as 
enjoying a great homogeneity. However in contrast to the view of the cited 
author, that does not mean a perfect homogeneity inside. During this research it 
was possible to see, thanks to interviews and interaction with members of the 
network, the differences between organizations in the nationalist left. The main 
issue was a high level of competition in terms of the ability of different 
organizations to articulate the message of the network. Every organization tries 
to emphasise its message to the other organizations and, therefore, to send its 
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 Two of the most popular are: MLNV (Basque National Liberation Movement) and the more 
generalist, Izquierda Abertzale (nationalist left). The MLNV respond to a need to give political 
objectives to the network, but it is not a machine working homogenously for Basque freedom. 
The second respond to a need of social and political categorization. If the vast majority of the 
people in the network are left-wing nationalists, not all Basque left-wing nationalists are in the 
network. The defining difference is the acceptance of violence as a political mean.  
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 As noted at the start of the description, there are organizations that address almost every 
issue related to the conflict. Some of them are: Askatasuna, which address the political rights of 
ETA prisoners; SEGI, which address the role of young people in the conflict; TAT, used in this 
research that gives protection and legal counsel to victims of police tortures and Etxerat, also 
used in this research, that fights for the rights of ETA prisoners‟ family members.   
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message to the outside. The two organizations in this research, TAT and 
Etxerat, are an example of the least successful organizations in this 
competition. This is because the main component of the network is political and 
these two organizations have a more social agenda. Indeed, although the 
political issue is present in TAT and Etxerat, it is not central. As was noted in 
chapter five, that creates problems between organizations in the nationalist left:  
 
“If you are talking about something and then, cases of torture appear, for example, then you 
have to talk. But that‟s not the rule. That only happens occasionally” Etxerat member. Interview 
5.  
 
 This does not mean that the organizations in the nationalist left are 
disconnected, only that their network is not homogeneous. It is important to say 
that various authors identify the nationalist left as a pyramidal structure, with 
ETA at the top and the social organizations at the bottom, thus presenting a 
robust, hierachical exterior appearance as the defining trait (Llera Ramo, 2003; 
Mata, 1993). This fact has been influenced by the “vanguard” image that ETA 
has had since its origins (Ibarra, 1987; Letamendia, 1994b). However, the 
evidence suggests that this kind of analysis lacks methodological insight and 
does not take into account the complexity of the nationalist left network. This is 
not the same as saying that ETA does not have open communication channels 
to the nationalist left organizations, but negates the monolithic, top-down nature 
of the nationalist left, as presented by those authors.  
 The nationalist left has very solid communication channels among its 
organizations. This leads to a well-developed sense of solidarity between them 
which enables a high degree of social control inside the nationalist left (Funes, 
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1998a: 94). This leads to one of the main problems the nationalist left has: its 
inability to adapt to Political Opportunity Structure changes (Muro, 2008). The 
rigid mechanisms of comfort and control do not make them amenable to 
changes in the political opportunity structure and make it difficult to assess the 
impact of those changes when they do occur. It is difficult for the organizations 
to perceive flaws in their strategy, and change is more difficult. This is 
exacerbated by the non-inclusive nature of the network, a consequence of the 
contentious nature of the network in the Dictatorship (Ibarra, 2005b: 188). This 
puts the organizations in a difficult position and the most common answer is to 
adapt their discourse to the surrounding reality through more difficult 
explanations, making them perceive injustice in almost every aspect of their 
social life.  
 
“Everybody who is kept in isolation is being tortured. For me. Simply a person in that 
environment… The person who is in isolation knows that he cannot communicate with anybody 
and nobody will be able to contact him. That is intimidation. It is fear. Even if they tell you using 
good manners.” TAT member. Interview 7.   
 
“At the beginning we had some rights violated to fight against, like the dispersion. But things 
have changed. The change the law to prevent ETA prisoners enjoying any rights, just like any 
other prisoner” Etxerat member. Interview 5.  
 
 Inside the nationalist left, the two organizations included in this research 
are, perhaps, the most open to change. TAT and Etxerat are two legal 
organizations (unlike most of the organizations in the nationalist left). Their 
message is not exclusively political, but has a great social and emotional 
ingredient. Most importantly, the message is open to all of society, not only the 
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members or sympathizers of the nationalist left. In the case of the TAT, it offers 
its services to all those that feel they are victims of torture, even if the degree of 
success in resolving these claims is limited. To do otherwise would be counter 
to the objectives of the organization.  
 
“We, as a principle, there are lot of people tortured and we contact them. Some of them do not 
want to know about it. Not a lot, maybe 1% of the cases. Maybe because their parents are 
against us, maybe because they don‟t want to give us their testimony. Maybe because the 
Ertzaina takes them and the less relations with us the earlier they will get out. But when the 
people know about us they like our work” TAT member. Interview 7.  
 
 Etxerat, on the other hand, tries to spread its vision of injustice to all 
society. That is not done with a political end in mind, but with an emotional 
component. Etxerat is one of the most symbolic organizations in the nationalist 
left and uses white neck scarves as a badge of its identity126. The most 
important difference between other nationalist left organizations is that they are 
not antagonistic in nature. For this research, these are the most interesting 
organizations because this is where the Basque peace movement organizations 
have more possibilities to enter the nationalist left.  
Frame effects on the nationalist left 
 The nationalist left does not share the same vision of the conflict as the 
Basque peace movement organizations. For them, the conflict is a historical 
struggle for the rights of the Basque people. These rights are national rights that 
have been negated by the Spanish state, which ultimately bears sole 
responsibility for the current situation. ETA is just a consequence of the 
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repressive action that comes from the Spanish state. That repression has been 
particularly hard during the Dictatorship and, for some sectors of the nationalist 
left that did not change with democracy. To solve the conflict, it is imperative for 
the Spanish state to recognize the rights of the Basque people, end the 
repression and let the Basque people decide their own future without external 
influences (Ibarra, 2005b; Letamendia, 1994b; Zirakzadeh, 1991). 
 The Basque peace movement organizations have affected these 
organizations using an action-reaction dynamic. The TAT reacted to Gesto por 
la Paz‟s work for victims of ETA highlighting the torture problem. Gesto por la 
Paz is an example of a negative impact inside these organizations. When asked 
about the lack of contact with Gesto por la Paz, the TAT member was very 
clear: 
 
“I see it is quite difficult. I‟ve seen it. It was an act to support victims of ETA organized by Gesto 
por la Paz. And that is what Gesto por la Paz is. We are not going to go there. We think that the 
victims have to be addressed using other ways. They are making categories” TAT member. 
Interview 7.  
 
 Etxerat has a more negative opinion of Gesto por la Paz and Lokarri. 
Regarding the latter, the feeling inside the organization is that they are well 
funded and do not follow the right objectives. Concerning Gesto por la Paz they 
feel that the organization only focuses on one side of the conflict. 
 
“When someone says that it is a group that works for peace and for making disappear all 
violence expressions, then, they don‟t do it. They don‟t even present them like that. They are 
groups created against violence committed by ETA. And there, we clash.” Etxerat member. 
Interview 5.  
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That does not mean that the relationship between the Basque peace 
movement organizations and the nationalist left is completely negative. Both 
Lokarri, in its various documents devoted to describing the social situation127, 
and Gesto por la Paz128 supported different initiatives to ban torture and to 
acknowledge the rights of the prisoner‟s family members. The relationship with 
Lokarri is more interesting for this research. The origins of Lokarri and its 
political proposal make the organization closer to both TAT and Etxerat. Maria 
Jesus Funes, for example, asserts that Elkarri was a response from the 
nationalist left networks to the Basque peace movement (Funes, 1998a: 47; 
Funes, 1998b: 502). Part of the social base that formed Elkarri had a dualistic 
membership in the nationalist left and pacifist networks, but that does not mean 
that Elkarri was a nationalist project. This is the consequence of the 
homogenous exterior image of the nationalist left. Elkarri was created as a 
consequence of the political situation and the evolution of the Basque peace 
movement. The people that created Elkarri shared similar identity trends as the 
people involved in the nationalist left, but were not part of it. This issue makes 
Lokarri, as the most direct expression of Elkarri, better accepted inside both the 
TAT and Etxerat. Those channels of acceptance work in two ways, as 
explained, Lokarri is better accepted and the demands from TAT and Etxerat 
are easily included in Lokarri’s ethos. 
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 http://gesto.org/delitosterrorismo1.htm (20/10/2010). Gesto por la Paz document advocating 
for a fair treatment of ETA prisoners. And http://gesto.org/prensapdf/08-01-
08%20NP%20torturas%20_1_.pdf (20/10/2010), denouncing a case of possible tortures.  
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“With Lokarri we have a good relationship. They always sign when we ask, they support us. 
Very well. They even asked us to do something and, if we couldn‟t, they didn‟t have any 
problem with that. It is not because we didn‟t want to. It was because we are very slow taking 
decisions” TAT member. Interview 7.  
 
 In conclusion, the impact of the Basque peace movement organizations 
on the nationalist left organizations analyzed in this research is subtle. This is 
because the identity trend is different. With the Basque Peace Non-Movement 
Organizations they share the same contacts and collective identity, but with the 
nationalist left the identity clashes if the issue of violence is raised. The 
acceptance of the use of violence by the nationalist left during the Dictatorship 
is what made the peace networks assume their identity trait rejecting violence. 
There are no open feedback channels and the changes are based in an action-
reaction model. The Basque peace movement organizations reacted to this by 
supporting more initiatives that came from TAT or Etxerat. An interesting case is 
Lokarri. The shared past with the nationalist left gives it a more positive view 
inside TAT and Etxerat. It is important to note the difficulties of the nationalist 
left to react to changes in the Political Opportunity Structure. This makes the 
Basque peace movement organizations use frame amplification processes to 
get inside those organizations. Finally, the analysis of the nationalist left gives 
the most important fact about Basque social interaction: the sharing of a 
collective identity, which is key to understanding the channels of influence. As I 
present in the next part of this chapter, the existence of common identity trends 
that worked for Lokarri and the nationalist left do work similarly for Gesto por la 
Paz and the victims of terrorism organizations.  
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Basta Ya and the fight for victims of ETA rights 
The organizations that defend the victims of terrorism rights lie in the 
opposite end of the ideological spectrum from the nationalist left. They support 
the role of the Spanish State and most of them, including Basta Ya, defend a 
political settlement that does not contain any concessions towards Basque 
nationalism. The most interesting characteristic about these organizations is 
that they are a direct consequence of the amazing success of the Basque 
peace movement, specifically Gesto por la Paz. The majority of members of 
these organizations identify with the local peace groups. They started to 
develop a pacifist identity, the same process explained in the Basque Peace 
Non-Movement Organizations section. They stressed the importance of retaking 
the public space to protest against violence, a process performed by Gesto por 
la Paz, as explained in chapter 4. From the massive public mobilization that 
happened in 1997 (Funes, 1998a: 7) and the existence of an organization that 
was advocating for a political solution (Elkarri), came the perception that 
political demands could be articulated. From that group of factors appeared 
organizations, such as the Foro de Ermua and Basta Ya. Of these two 
organizations, I focus on Basta Ya. The reasons are explained at the beginning 
of this chapter, but also because Basta Ya reflects the two key components of 
this kind of organization: the defence of victims of terrorism, and forthright 
opposition to the nationalist project in the Basque Country. To some 
researchers, Basta Ya belongs to what is called the “Constitutionalist 
Movement” (Chapman, 2006: 14). This denomination stresses the political 
position of those organizations and omits their role for the victims of ETA. In 
contrast, this role is crucial to understand Basta Ya as it is the final 
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consequence of Gesto por la Paz‟s efforts to make the society aware of the 
suffering that some people were going through. The 1997 events however 
politically committed members of Gesto por la Paz decided to abandon the 
organization. This collective of people were those who suffered the violence 
from ETA more directly. They started in Gesto por la Paz because it gave them 
the opportunity to protest against the political violence. But instead of 
developing a pacifist identity; they collectively created an enemy figure. They 
did not only rejected violence, but they rejected the people who supported 
violence in the first place. After 1997, they perceived that the Basque peace 
movement was not enough and they decided to create new organizations that 
stood directly against ETA violence and the nationalist political ideology.   
 
“We created Basta Ya because we were convinced that was a need to organize a civic 
mobilization, in the streets, in the public spaces. More importantly, covering three key issues: for 
the victims of terrorism; to defend the constitutional political frame and against terrorism, 
specifically against ETA, but against any kind of terrorism as well” Basta Ya member. Interview 
3.  
 
 Basta Ya belongs to a network that perceives anything that is Basque 
nationalist as a potential enemy. This network, called here the constitutinal 
movement, has strong channels of communication between its members and 
rejects any kind of inputs that come from nationalist organizations. In the case 
of the nationalist left that rejection is absolute.  Over the course of Basta Ya’s 
evolution, the political side of the organization has been growing and, at the 
moment of writing this thesis, Basta Ya exists only as a brand, its members 
being part of a political party called Union, progress and democracy (UPyD), 
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with moderate success129. The other organizations in the constitutional 
movement work as pressure groups for the Spanish parties, specially the right 
wing parties. They protest against any policy that could advance the cause of 
the Basque nationalist, even the moderate ones. For this research, we have to 
abandon those trends and address an important question: With a common past, 
what is the role of Basta Ya in relation the Basque peace movement 
organizations? 
Frame effects of Basta Ya 
 The Basta Ya’s vision of the conflict is the total opposite of the vision of 
the nationalist left. The only culprit of the political violence is ETA and the 
organizations that surround it. Basta Ya has a narrow vision of the enemy and 
assumes a bivalent view in which people are for ETA or against ETA. If the 
rejection of ETA is ambiguous, it is assumed that ETA is supported. The only 
possible solution for the conflict is the total dissolution of ETA and the penal 
punishment of any ETA member.  
 The most interesting conclusion of my analysis is that these 
organizations can articulate an aggressive message because of the spectacular 
success of the Basque peace movement during the end of the 90s. The efforts 
that Gesto por la Paz made to advocate for the victims of ETA and to break the 
social silence that surrounded the conflict made possible the space for Basta 
Ya to send its message. An interesting consequence of this is the unusual need 
for social support that Basta Ya requires. Such support is not necessarily active 
and real per se, rather presents a perception of overall support for the 
messages it sends. Expressions like “the people are tired”, or “the majority of 
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society needs…” are common in Basta Ya‟s discourse. Therefore, when the 
nationalist groups are mentioned, they are categorized as a small minority.  
 
“The problem here is that we have a small minority of fanatics, very violent, whose expression is 
ETA and they don‟t accept any of the democratic principles on which this society is based” 
Basta Ya member. Interview 3 
 
 The need for this subjective support is key to understanding the 
objectives of Basta Ya. It took the powerful message that was articulated by 
Gesto por la Paz and tailored it to the defence of the victims of terrorism. Basta 
Ya have maintained this message in a very clear, simple way and have 
benefitted from the success of the Basque peace movement is a message that 
is very difficult to question. That has direct effect on the framework generation 
of the Basque peace movement organizations. It is very difficult to speak 
negatively of the victims of terrorism. It is difficult to question their role as 
political figures. The victims have a powerful role as pressure figures and their 
discourse is perceived as politically legitimate. Lokarri felt the need to put the 
rights of the victims up front in its political proposal. Gesto por la Paz 
concentrated in promoting the victims‟ rights during this research. On the other 
hand, the political component of Basta Ya does not enjoy such popular support. 
The sectarian vision promoted by Lokarri of the political approach from Basta 
Ya gave Lokarri a solid ground to affirm its political proposal. This issue ensured 
the Basta Ya had a bad opinion of Lokarri.  
 
“About Lokarri we don‟t have any relations. They tried to involve us in their acts but we always 
said no. Lokarri (in that time Elkarri) has a big problem. They signed the Lizarra accord. That 
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was for us a frontal attack to democracy because that was an accord to exclude half of the 
Basque population. And more importantly, to exclude to the victims of terrorism, the people who 
is persecuted and attacked. And, as far as I know, Lokarri never rectified about it. For us they 
are another organization in the nationalist world. We never shared their idea to resolve the 
conflict” Basta Ya member. Interview 3.  
 
 In conclusion, Basta Ya belongs to a set of organizations that developed 
their collective identity based on the rejection of ETA violence and Basque 
nationalism. This gave them communication channels at the individual level with 
some Gesto por la Paz members, but none with Lokarri. The effects between 
Basta Ya and the Basque peace movement organizations are based in an 
action-reaction dynamic more than a process of dialogue. This dynamic is 
centred in the political messages. The defence of victims of terrorism message 
is the most powerful tool that Basta Ya has, giving the Basque peace 
movement organizations a narrow margin of action about it. Following Basta Ya 
message about it gives a plus of credibility to the Basque peace movement 
organizations frame. For Gesto por la Paz that is not a problem because that 
defence of victims of terrorism was always present, but for Lokarri it raises 
some questions. Inside the organization exists a feeling that the victims of 
terrorism are overestimated in the conflict, but the majority of Lokarri members 
are aware that raising those concerns in public can damage the political 
message Lokarri is sending.  
 
Other organizations: The EGK, a coordinator of youth groups 
 In this category are the organizations that are not part of the other three 
categories explained in this chapter. The main characteristic of the 
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organizations here is that they are created from the institutions to address social 
issues, although they work in an autonomous way. The best example is the 
Basque Youth Council or EGK130. The EGK is an organization created to 
coordinate the different cultural and social youth organizations in the Basque 
Country. As such, the EGK exhibits a number of different interactions that 
happen between those organizations, including the different ideologies and 
ways of seeing the Basque conflict from a youth perspective. During an 
interview with the EGK member, it was made clear to me that the conflict was 
one of the issues that the EGK was working on with the youth organizations. 
The role of the EGK in this issue can be defined as a moderator (Fn. 
21/05/2007).  
 The approach of the EGK to the conflict has been influenced by two 
factors: The conciliatory nature of the organization and the personal position of 
the people running it. By far, the most important is the second factor. At the time 
of writing, the people in the directive of the EGK had experience in the student 
movement and the Basque peace movement. Those persons were looking 
actively towards a conflict resolution approach from a youth perspective.  
 
“In the sphere of peace we have two areas, one is called “Euskadi nearer” that tries to 
encourage people that belong to other youth councils to come here and see how is the 
situation. The second are the dialogue forums trying to promote contact between organizations. 
These two are related to the Basque Conflict” EGK member. Interview 4.  
 
 In all these efforts, the EGK tried to incorporate the Basque peace 
movement organizations in different projects. Those projects have opened 
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channels of communication between the Basque peace movement 
organizations and the youth organizations but these channels are insufficient 
and narrow at best. This is because those channels are all through the EGK 
and because the organizations themselves often have positions on the conflict. 
However, it is important to note that not all youth organizations in the EGK 
address conflict issues and, in the Basque Country, it is not uncommon for a 
cultural organization to explicitly avoid conflict related issues. In reality, the EGK 
works as an aggregator of demands that are not directly addressed by the 
youth organizations. It makes little sense to say that the conflict is a youth issue 
only because the EGK address it. A consequence of this is that every effect 
depends of the personal involvement of the directive body of the EGK. This 
channel, which appears direct and clear, in reality is an artificial channel with 
little effect on cultural factors related to the conflict in the Basque peace 
movement organizations, like the generation of a collective action frame.  
Frame effects of the EGK 
 From the EGK directive body emanates a vision of the conflict taken from 
the Basque peace movement organizations. The EGK rejects any kind of 
political violence, but such rejection is a one-direction process. There are not 
direct channels of communication between the youth organizations and the 
Basque peace movement organizations. This is because those channels are 
not the product of a relational process that emerged from the generation of a 
collective identity. The main difference between the process lead by the EGK 
and the different processes explained in this chapter is that the EGK do not use 
the collective identity networks that were created in the past. The EGK lacks the 
cultural tools that make the message meaningful. Therefore, the effects of the 
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youth organizations on the Basque peace movement organizations through the 
EGK are almost nonexistent. This is a very important fact that shows that the 
Basque society works on the basis of common identity trends created in close 
cultural networks. In terms of this research, it is possible to use the EGK as the 
control indicator, showing that the lack of those cultural foundations makes the 
effect between cultural and social organizations very difficult. A shared identity 
process is essential for social interaction. That interaction may be contentious, 
but still has need of those identity processes to have a meaning effect. 
Conclusions 
 In this chapter, I analyzed the different patterns of interaction between 
the Basque peace movement organizations and the rest of the organizations 
related to the conflict. These patterns of interaction set the context of how the 
Basque Peace Frame interacts with the discourse and ethos of the other 
organizations. Firstly, I presented four different categories of social 
organizations: the Basque Peace Non Movement Organization; the nationalist 
left organizations, the constitutional organizations that defend the rights of 
victims of terrorism and an example of an institutional organization that 
addresses youth issues. In the first category, the pacifist identity created during 
the formation of peace networks in the 1980s is crucial to understanding the 
collaboration between the Basque peace movement organizations and the 
Basque Peace Non-Movement Organizations. This network and their shared 
identity explain the almost identical conflict framework used by the Basque 
Peace Non-Movement Organizations. This issue changes in the next two 
categories, which are based on a national identity, but both have shared links 
with the Basque peace movement organizations. I explained the nature of the 
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nationalist left, and how this network prevents the organizations that are part of 
it developing mechanisms to react to changes in the POS effectively. The TAT 
and Etxerat are the most susceptible organizations to change and have 
assumed part of the Basque Peace Frame, specifically the issues related to 
reconciliation. These effects are possible thanks to the shared channels created 
in the past, more with Lokarri than with Gesto por la Paz.  
Something similar happens with the constitutionalist organizations. 
These organizations are a direct consequence of the success of the Basque 
peace movement during the 1990s. Basta Ya represents this category. The 
organization took the discourse about victims of terrorism and, using the fact 
that the Basque peace movement was becoming successful, developed a very 
aggressive message that is now very difficult to counteract. Finally, the last 
category shows that the existence of a shared network and shared identity 
processes are critical to understanding the impact of relations between social 
organizations in the Basque Country. The EGK uses its position to try to enforce 
the Basque peace movement organizations ideals among youth organizations, 
with little success. The existence of common ground in identity is essential to 
start a meaningful process of interaction in the Basque social environment. 
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CHAPTER 9 – CONCLUSIONS 
 This thesis began with the presentation of three research questions that 
structured my approach to the overarching question of this thesis, which is 
analysing the contribution of the Basque peace movement to framing the 
Basque conflict. The answers to these questions form the foundation of my 
research findings, and having explained the object of study and methodology, 
and analysed the data, it is time to re-state the answers to those questions, 
noted here with their related hypotheses:  
1 – Is there a Basque Peace Master Frame? The Basque peace movement 
organizations have created a Peace Action Frame to understand the conflict. 
This Basque Peace Frame can be considered a Master Frame.  
2 – How has the Basque Peace Frame evolved? The Basque Peace Frame has 
evolved over time. This evolution was caused by the mutual interaction between 
Basque peace movement organizations and the interactions with other Basque 
Civil Society Organizations based on identity networks.  
3 – What is the impact of the Basque Peace Frame on other Basque Civil 
Society Organizations related to the conflict? The Basque Peace Frame created 
an impact on other Basque Civil Society Organizations related to the conflict. 
That impact was possible due to the existence of common collective identity 
networks between the Basque peace movement organizations and the Basque 
Civil Society Organizations.  
 In these conclusions, the findings are revisited based upon the analysis 
presented in this thesis. This represents the final iteration of the theory 
presented in chapter 2 and the analysis presented in chapters 4 to 8. The 
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details of the Basque Peace Frame are presented here with connections to the 
different parts of the thesis, providing a complete picture of the research at 
hand. The findings are derived mainly from two parts of the theoretical body 
presented in chapter 2: collective action frames and social movement impacts. I 
argue there is a master peace frame in the Basque Country; that Basque Peace 
Frame was created in the peak of a protest cycle and has been evolving ever 
since,. Finally, it is important to note that such a powerful element in the 
collective action scenario causes a significant impact on social life. The nature 
of the impact is demonstrated in the social and cultural sphere, and internally on 
the norms and symbol creation mechanisms of Basque society. These 
mechanisms have passed through significant change since the Franco 
dictatorship years, in particular regarding the use of public space. The 
rearranging of the meaning creation mechanisms focuses on the perception of 
the utility of the use of political violence (Ajangiz, 2002: 40). This is not denying 
the existence of a frame impact at the structural level, but, as described in 
chapters 7 and 8, collective identity processes are key to understanding the 
social action and interaction in the Basque Country. In the particular case of the 
Basque peace movement, this thesis shows how collective action was 
developed against a set of cultural values that supported silence and internal 
acquiescence to political violence (Funes, 1998a: 55), in order to create an 
idealistic claim to reject publicly any kind of violence. Now, this claim permeates 
all of Basque society. In the Basque case, the peace social movement is truly a 
generator and creator of new norms (Melucci, 1996: 318). Through this thesis, I 
have sought to address and explore each of the different sub-questions and, 
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thereby, answer the main research question: How has the Basque peace 
movement impacted on the social and political culture of the Basque conflict?  
 The Basque peace movement organizations Lokarri and Gesto por la 
Paz were able to develop a different approach to the conflict. During the 
Dictatorship, the norm of political struggle as associated with violence was 
embedded within Basque society. The Basque peace movement broke with that 
assumption. The arrival of democracy allowed the Basque peace movement 
organizations to use public space to mobilize against the use of violence for 
political means. The questioning of that violence from sectors inside ETA, and 
the availability of political spaces to advocate nationalist issues, facilitated that 
task.   
 This conclusion would not be complete without also considering a further 
philosophical question that emerges from this research: what is the role and 
importance of civil society in a conflict resolution scenario? As a contribution to 
the broad body of social science knowledge, this thesis suggests the possibility 
of a bridge between social movements theory and conflict resolution theory, 
proffering some suggestions of how to design a comprehensive approach for 
societies in conflict. Other central contributions are the application of frame 
theory to a whole social movement. As argued throughout the text, this is both 
plausible and achievable, diverging from the traditional idea of applying frame 
theory to punctual actions or campaigns (Gerhards & Rucht, 1992; Johnston & 
Noakes, 2005). The final contribution is in the field of social movement impacts. 
For methodological reasons stated by various authors (Casquette, 1998: 203; 
Ibarra, 2005a: 300; Tarrow, 1998: 162), the study of social movement impacts 
has been a neglected area of research, and most of the research carried out 
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has tried to measure the degree of impact on public policy (Giugni, 2007; Ibarra, 
2005a: 308; Kriesi & Wisler, 1999; Moore, 1999). This research demonstrates a 
way to explore the cultural impact of social movements. It defends the idea of 
using frame theory as a valid starting point in shedding some light on the 
different outcomes that social movements can achieve in modifying a society‟s 
values and codes of conduct. In the case of the Basque peace movement, 
social movements achieved a high degree of social impact, placing the peace 
movement discourse as part of the „know-how‟ of the culture for dealing with 
political violence issues. While the case of the Basque peace movement cannot 
be extrapolated to elsewhere, the ideas and questions that are central to this 
thesis can be used in different scenarios, with different, but exciting, answers.  
 I conclude this chapter by highlighting the open questions that remain. Is 
the social awareness of these means for confronting political violence a 
consequence of the Basque peace movement‟s actions or did it begin as a 
small interaction that both the social movement and society followed? What are 
the likely future outcomes? These questions are contemplated, but more 
detailed research would be required to pursue them thoroughly. I also suggest 
the use of discourse analysis to understand, in detail, the intentions and 
interactions of the Basque peace movement organizations and the rest of 
society. These questions open up different avenues for developing this 
research and provide new ideas to probe deeper into Basque social life, into 
conflict resolution theory, and into social movements research.   
The creation and maintenance of a master frame 
A master frame is a collective action frame that becomes a multi-
movement action frame. Master frames are modes of punctuation, attribution, 
  270 
and articulation that colour and affect any number of social movement 
organizations beyond the movement for which they were created (Snow & 
Benford, 1992: 138). In essence, a master frame is a meta frame. It conditions 
the creation and contents of other collective action frames inside the same 
social group. In the Basque Peace Frame case, it has some of the elements 
that may lead to suggest that the Basque peace movement has been able to 
create and develop a master peace frame. However, in the scope of this 
research more evidence is needed to categorically make that assertion. It is 
clear that the Basque peace movement, and the Basque Peace Frame have 
had a significant impact on Basque society´s perceptions about the conflict. 
This may lead to the assumption that other social movements have been 
influenced as well, but more data and research is needed to reach this 
conclusion. The idea that ETA and the Spanish state are the main contributors 
to political violence appears even in the discourse of some pro-independence 
organizations, as exposed in chapter 8. This attribution has led organizations 
that supported violence from one actor or the other, to question that violence. 
Victims of terrorism organizations are beginning to question some methods 
used by the police, and the nationalist left organizations (see chapter 8) now 
disregard the use of violence to achieve political means. It is important to note 
this questioning of the use of violence, legal or illegal, is not total. Rejection of 
violence is not motivated by moral, but rather utilitarian, arguments. 
Nevertheless, this rejection of violence can be regarded as a consequence of 
the successful use of public space by social movements. It would be necessary, 
however, to look further into the work of other social movements, that are not 
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directly related to the conflict, like the environmental movement, and the global 
peace movement, widely present in the Basque Country to expand this idea.  
The high regard that victims of terrorism have in Basque society is a 
consequence of the Basque peace movement‟s actions. This is not an expected 
outcome as this fact has been used by some organizations to promote their 
goals (see section dedicated to Basta Ya in chapter 8). However, the promotion 
of victims‟ rights is directly linked to the perception of injustice promoted by the 
Basque peace movement organizations. As argued in chapter 7, the Basque 
Peace Frame used available public space to propagate, starting a process of 
transforming the conflict frames that were in place at that time. This process of 
frame transformation (Snow et al., 1986: 473; Snow & Benford, 2000: 625) was 
helped by a Political Opportunity Structure (POS) that had new democratic 
values, and the rise of a new protest cycle (Tarrow, 1998: 143) that started with 
the new use of public space, giving the opportunity to a silent mass of people to 
express themselves (Funes, 1998a: 63). It looks like, with the data in hand that 
the creation of a master frame is present, and follows the pattern presented by 
Snow and Benford (Snow & Benford, 1992). The organizations that created the 
Basque Peace Frame at the beginning of the protest cycle were the 
organizations that led the evolution of that frame to, possibly, a master frame 
(examples of other organizations are given in chapters 5 and 7). Gesto por la 
Paz and Lokarri were extremely successful in their amplifying efforts that made 
the Basque Peace Frame the competitive frame it is today. Now, in the Basque 
Country, it is very difficult to conceive of any other kind of activism against 
political violence that does not share the Basque Peace Frame explained in 
chapter 6. Even with the decline of the cycle of protest in the Basque Country, 
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that Basque Peace Frame is still in place. The Basque Peace Frame became 
important again with the ceasefire in 2006, with the two organizations 
advocating for the same principles. It is true that, with the diminishing of political 
violence (or a diminishing perception of the importance of political violence), the 
most symbolic aspects of the Basque Peace Frame will lose relevance, as the 
main component of peace groups, the rejection of violence, will lose its 
contentious nature. That makes the future of Gesto por la Paz dubious, but, as 
their members have said, the end of the organization is something assumed 
and welcomed, as shown in chapter 7. 
The Basque Peace Frame propagated among the Basque social 
movement organizations using the networks built in the past. To be meaningful 
ways of communication, these networks needed to be grounded in shared 
collective identity processes. This shared set of ideas are very important in 
understanding the propagation of the Basque Peace Frame (Melucci, 1996: 
349). This process is similar to the process that Gould describes, as the 
relevant information is not channelled through the network, but is defined by it 
(Gould, 1998: 38). This creation of identities, that comes from the Dictatorship 
years and the powerful use of public space by the Basque peace movement, is 
important to our understanding of the generation and sharing of a powerful 
frame (Polletta & Jasper, 2001: 292). The Basque Peace Frame was easily 
adopted by groups that share the same collective identity with the Basque 
peace movement organizations (see section dedicated to the organizations 
focused on peace research and social work in chapter 8) and the Basque 
Peace Frame worked as a shared bond of solidarity (Hunt & Benford, 2007: 
448). In conclusion, the Basque Peace Frame generated by the Basque peace 
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movement organizations is a powerful frame that suggests the possibility of 
being a master frame. However, it is not possible, with the data at hand, to 
categorically make that assertion. For that more research is needed in other 
social movements present in the Basque Country. The mechanisms of 
propagation, based on shared networks and identities still work today. The 
“specialization” of the two main Basque peace movement organizations created 
a very strong frame that not only gave easy access to peace mobilizations in 
the Basque Country, but constrained it as well. Therefore, it is very difficult to 
conceive of any other kind of peace mobilization related to the Basque conflict 
than the one offered and led by Gesto por la Paz or Lokarri. The fact that the 
sources of the problem are shared by the different Basque social organizations, 
as well as the main claims (victims of political violence by Gesto por la Paz; the 
need for some kind of political agreement by Lokarri; and the rejection of 
violence by both) made by the Basque peace movement organizations, is an 
important issue in understanding the nature of the frame. Now it is important to 
understand the mechanisms that mark the evolution of the Basque Peace 
Frame and the effect on other social organizations.  
From submerged networks to meaning creators. The evolution 
of the Basque Peace Frame 
The Basque Peace Frame was created during the first years of 
mobilization, in the 1980s. However, the Basque Peace Frame has been 
evolving ever since. The main ingredients of the Basque Peace Frame have 
been modified by different factors. The main objective of this research was to 
explore the creation of, and the changes in, the Basque Peace Frame. I chose 
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to look at a period of time that began in 2006, with the declaration of the 
ceasefire by ETA. That moment was a moment of “revitalization” for the Basque 
peace movement. Lokarri had to rethink most of its strategy and Gesto por la 
Paz gained centrality amongst social actors. Therefore, looking closely, it was 
possible to identify the mechanisms of change and evolution of the Basque 
Peace Frame, and, following that, the mechanisms of impact on the Basque 
peace movement through other organizations. In this research, I identified two 
sets of mechanisms of frame evolution: internal and external. The internal 
mechanisms, explained in chapter 7, are a consequence of the special 
relationship that Gesto por la Paz and Lokarri have. The symbolic nature of 
Gesto por la Paz gave the social movement the cultural codes and symbols to 
enact the Basque Peace Frame, making the frame alignment processes well 
grounded, especially the frame transformation and amplification processes 
(Snow et al., 1986: 469, 473). The role of Lokarri was largely to make this 
process congruent; to present a solid and credible political option. This made 
Gesto por la Paz specialized in the creation and maintenance of symbolic 
resources and left Lokarri to try to transform the Basque Peace Frame into a 
political tool. This is one of the issues that makes Gesto por la Paz a traditional 
Basque Social Movement organization and Lokarri closer to a pressure group 
(De la Peña & Ibarra, 2004: 85; Funes, 1998b: 501). In theory, this could mean 
a very powerful and productive team, but it is important to note that Gesto por la 
Paz and Lokarri perceive themselves as mutually exclusive. In theoretical 
terms, this results in the appearance of new frame alignment processes, mainly 
the change from frame transformation to frame amplification (Snow & Benford, 
1988; Snow & Benford, 2000). The differences between the organizations could 
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be described as social and political. The motivation Lokarri provides is to 
achieve a political agreement, and Gesto por la Paz provides the means to 
reject violence through social action. These two approaches, tested by the two 
organizations, gave the Basque Peace Frame a significant amount of space to 
articulate itself, and it is that testing between Gesto por la Paz and Lokarri that 
has expanded and strengthened the Basque Peace Frame. The political 
objectives of Lokarri always had a social edge thanks to Gesto por la Paz‟s 
actions and this benefit is reciprocated by Lokarri, as explained in chapter 7. 
One last point to make in this regard is the strange situation in which the two 
organizations co-exist. They are personally very close, with members who are 
personal friends. They even have their headquarters in the same building, using 
different apartments, but this does not make collaboration easier. As I 
personally witnessed, they are so specialized that a joint project is almost 
impossible. The organization and decision making processes needed to 
achieve a political objective are not the same as the mechanisms needed for 
social action. This is explained in chapter 4, as Lokarri requires a different 
organizational model than Gesto por la Paz.  
The other set of factors that define the evolution of the Basque Peace 
Frame are the external factors. These factors are the changes in the POS and 
the influence of other organizations. The POS is defined by Tarrow as the 
„consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions of the 
political environment that provide incentives for collective action by affecting 
people‟s expectations for success or failure‟ (Tarrow, 1998: 76). For the Basque 
peace movement, the consolidation of democratic values and the changes in 
mobilization dynamics were important issues for the framing efforts. 
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Democratization enabled social questioning of ETA and its methods (Ibarra, 
1987; Letamendia, 1994b), which was followed by a decreasing perception of 
ETA as a problem by Basque society and a consolidation of the favourable 
perceptions for the role of political institutions131. The relevance of this issue for 
this research is the gradual shift in terms of blaming efforts, from ETA to a more 
abstract concept of political violence. This is one of the reasons why Gesto por 
la Paz focuses more on the situation of victims of political violence, and Lokarri 
on the conditions for political agreement, than on the situation of ETA itself. The 
second issue is the change of mobilization dynamics. These dynamics are 
changing from a „militant‟ model, with a highly committed activist, which 
stresses collective identity, to a „cooperation‟ model, with a more flexible activist 
that stresses personal and moral rewards. This is particularly well explained by 
De la Peña and Ibarra (2004). The main effect on the Basque Peace Frame is 
the prevalence of the amplification processes over the transformation 
processes. The defence of the victims of terrorism taken by organizations like 
Basta Ya locks the discourse of the Basque peace movement organizations into 
that issue, making it difficult to raise awareness about victims of state violence, 
for example. This issue makes relevant the collaboration of organizations like 
TAT and Lokarri, based on old identity networks, to incorporate the awareness 
of all victims in a plausible political resolution scenario.  
The Basque Peace Frame evolved from the days when the public space 
was barred for peace networks, evolving from a transformative frame to a more 
inclusive frame that tries to include all aspects of mobilization around the use of 
political violence. The main consequence of this evolution is a growth in the size 
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 To explore that is important to follow the surveys made by the Euskobarometro. 
http://www.ehu.es/euskobarometro/ (20/01/2011) 
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and power of the Basque Peace Frame. As recounted in chapter 6, this means 
the Basque Peace Frame is even used by political institutions when they intend 
to protest or make claims against political violence.  
The significance of the Basque Peace Frame on the social 
perceptions of the Basque conflict 
The Basque social perception about the conflict today is different from 30 
years ago. It is not the intention of this research to affirm those perceptions 
have changed as a result of the actions of the Basque peace movement 
organizations. However, it is plausible to say they have contributed to a 
considerable degree. One of the difficulties of this work was finding an 
appropriate methodological framework for analyzing the cultural impact of the 
Basque peace movement. The lack of proper tools in an understudied area 
made me ask the same questions as most of the authors I have read for this 
research (Amenta & Young, 1999; Casquette, 1998; Earl, 2007; Ibarra, 2005a). 
I explain the cultural impacts following Gamson‟s idea of the mediation system 
(Gamson, 1998), but rather than using the media as the other end of the 
constituencies with whom I have worked (the Basque peace movement 
organizations), I use the identity networks explained in chapter 8. It is this field 
of symbolic and personal relations that defines those networks and the linkage 
between the Basque peace movement organizations and society. This is the 
field where the changes are enacted, particularly the perception of the use of 
violence as a political tool, and it is possible to say that the Basque peace 
movement organizations gained much acceptance. During the fieldwork period, 
it was clear that the closer the social organizations were to the Basque peace 
  278 
movement organizations the more dependent upon the Basque Peace Frame 
they were. This demonstrates a high degree of acceptance of the Basque 
Peace Frame (Gamson, 1998: 70), and suggests therefore that the social 
organizations were more prone to be influenced by the Basque Peace Frame. 
In the case of the Basque Peace Non-Movement Organizations, the relationship 
is quite clear, as they share most of the same perspectives. However, even in 
the organizations that are further from the Basque peace movement 
organizations‟ identity cluster, that relationship can be traced. The main 
meaning of the existence of organizations like Basta Ya is the primary demand 
of the Basque peace movement organizations: recognition for the victims of 
violence. Even in organizations that were closer to ETA‟s frame, like TAT or 
Etxerat, the idea of the use of violence for political means is being challenged. 
This is one of the main achievements of the Basque peace movement 
organizations. At the beginning of their protest, the violence was not a 
contested issue. Society had a “rule of silence” in relation to the violence. The 
only use allowed for public space was to protest for political independence. 
Now, this has entirely changed with the public space being used to protest 
against violence and the end of the “rule of silence”. The Basque peace 
movement organizations challenged a whole social form (Melucci, 1993: 248). 
With the creation of the Basque Peace Frame, the Basque peace movement is 
setting the guidelines for understanding any event or issue that derives from the 
conflict. This was one of the structural issues that some organizations faced 
during my fieldwork, as they had to accommodate their discourses to the 
established Basque Peace Frame. This was the case with TAT, who had to 
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include an element of rejection of political violence in their discourse to sustain 
their claims. 
 One cultural outcome that is derived from the action of Lokarri is the 
acceptance of a political agreement as a plausible outcome by the nationalist 
left organizations and political parties. This is a breakthrough, as political action 
by those organizations was previously determined by its contentious and 
antagonistic nature. Finally, the most important outcome, perhaps, is the social 
realization that an alternative to the use of violence exists. When an act of 
political violence occurs, the widespread reaction is that such violent action was 
unnecessary, was ineffective, and that an alternative to the suffering 
experienced is possible. This perception is not new; what is new is the public 
perception of it, derived from the use of public space by the Basque peace 
movement. These cultural impacts also take their toll on the Basque peace 
movement organizations. Their actions have to be coherent with their values; 
therefore they lost some flexibility in reacting to new issues, and their actions 
have to be public. Gesto por la Paz calls for an annual march against political 
violence every January. Lokarri prepares and implements projects based on 
public participation, using new technologies (Anton, 2009). During this research, 
it was clear the Basque Peace Frame created by the Basque peace movement 
organizations is a powerful tool that shapes social action around the conflict in 
the Basque Country. This master frame stepped outside of the boundaries of 
the Basque peace movement organizations and became an independent entity 
that is not only shaped by the organizations, but also shapes the Basque peace 
movement organizations. The Basque Peace Frame changed cultural 
perceptions in Basque society about the conflict, like the perception of the 
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enemy (the Spanish or the Basque nations) and the outcome of violence. 
Without intending to, the Basque Peace Frame also gave the nationalist left 
organizations a new way of making politics by making the adoption of political 
agreements acceptable to their members. For future generations, this factor 
may be profoundly important. What has yet to be determined is the strength of 
these changes.  
How does the Basque peace movement impact on the social 
and political culture of the Basque conflict?  
The Basque peace movement organizations Lokarri and Gesto por la 
Paz emerged from submerged networks created during the Dictatorship. These 
networks have, as a central identity trait, the rejection of the use of violence to 
achieve political goals. These networks had very limited access to the public 
space because political protest was centred on Basque national claims. These 
claims were highly contentious and deeply associated with the use of political 
violence. The arrival of democracy to the Basque Country gave the opportunity 
to these peace networks to become a social movement for two reasons: first, 
the opening of new public spaces of protests, with the legalization of public 
protesting and the introduction of political pluralism, and; second, the 
questioning of the violence from some social sectors132. This new environment 
allowed the perception that the public space was available for protesting. The 
Basque peace movement started to develop a new way of protesting. This new 
way had to fit two purposes, namely, to fit into the new political environment, 
and to confront the social groups that still defended the use of violence. This 
                                            
132
 The split of ETA in 1976 is a consequence of that questioning process.  
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new kind of mobilization was based on the opposite ethos of the contentious 
nationalist mobilization. If the latter was violent and full of noise, the peace 
mobilization was peaceful and silent. This new way of mobilization succeeded in 
winning the public space and created the perception that new ways of political 
protest were possible. This new way of approaching politics, rejecting the use of 
violence, is the main contribution of the Basque peace movement to Basque 
society. Today, the use of violence is no longer seen as a plausible tool to 
achieve political means. The Basque peace movement organizations were able 
to create a frame that permeated most of the social layers that, now, prevents 
even the mere suggestion of using violence. The Basque peace movement 
organizations were able to detach themselves from nationalistic politics and 
propose a new way of approaching those politics. They did that cleverly using 
the social spaces and developing a specialized nature that helped them to work 
efficiently. To explore the Basque Peace Frame is to study that process where 
the rejection of violence impregnated Basque politics and Basque social life.  
Contributions to the body of knowledge 
This research contributes to social movements theory, especially to the 
fields of frame analysis and impacts analysis. The literature around frames is 
mostly theoretical, with a few examples devoted to practical analysis (Gerhards 
& Rucht, 1992; Johnston & Noakes, 2005). This research attempts to give a 
particular example of how to apply frame analysis to a case study. More 
importantly, this research tries to demonstrate that frame analysis can be 
applied to a whole social movement over a significant period of time. This study 
of the Basque peace movement shows that the analysis of a collective action 
frame could be a useful tool in understanding the different types of attribution 
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inside a social movement. It argues for the need to differentiate ideology from 
frame, as the Basque peace movement also tried to distance itself from political 
ideologies. With the conception of a frame as a constant exercise of attribution, 
it is possible to have an indicator of change over time. This exercise, in this 
case, gave valuable information that has shed some light on important issues, 
including social movement impacts, variations in participation, mobilization and 
identity, and could be an interesting approach to use in other environments. 
One problem with this approach, however, is the dependence on the temporal 
dimension, so it will be less useful in understanding the impact of new modes of 
mobilization that have not yet experienced a period of evolution. These 
problems could be addressed; perhaps, using the Strategic Action Fields 
approach, developed in recent years (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011; Armstrong, 
2005; Diani, 2012). This approach holds that collective action actors hold up in 
Strategic Action fields or SAFs. These are a meso level social order where 
actors interact with knowledge of one another under a set of common 
understandings about the purposes of any given field, the relationships in that 
field, and the field‟s rules (Fligstein & McAdam, 2011: 5). This approach has the 
virtue of offering different methodological tools to operate with the complexities 
inherent to social interaction as it conceives social movements on a set of social 
relations instead of a set of aggregates (Diani, 2012: 19). It is an interesting 
proposal for further research about the topic. Social movements impact is the 
second field of knowledge this research is contributing to. The field of impacts 
analysis is a very narrow one, mainly due to the methodological limitations 
explained before. However, some insights can be derived from the comparative 
exercise carried out in this research. It is true that special precautions must be 
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taken to reach the point of assessing some results, such as social movement 
impacts, but the use of other techniques and approaches, like discourse 
analysis, can give some support for these conclusions. My personal motivation 
for this study of social movements impacts is not to give a comprehensive set of 
tools to analyze them, but to encourage the idea that a solution to the conflict is 
possible. The use of frame comparison over time can lead to clarification of 
some of the impacts that social organizations have in social life. Perhaps, as the 
Basque peace movement did, this vision that a solution is possible will open 
new ways to develop a comprehensive approach to the study of cultural impacts 
made by social movements. Finally, I would like to devote some words to the 
contribution of this research to the field of peace studies. The main objective is 
to further understanding of the importance of social action to achieve a given 
conflict resolution scenario. Without the study of social trends, it is not possible 
to comprehend a situation when a conflict resolution plan has to be 
implemented.  
What is the role and importance of civil society in a conflict 
resolution scenario? 
The question that drove this research was to consider the power of civil 
society in a conflict resolution process. Traditionally, the conflict resolution field 
has been dominated by the idea of an agreement between elites, which was 
also one of the solutions the Basque Country was hoping for. However, this 
research has shown that social organizations can change social perceptions 
about a conflict. The study of any given social movement is the study of society 
itself, as the mechanisms that control the mobilization, identity and participation 
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inside that social movement are the same as those working in the rest of the 
society. The Basque peace movement teaches us that, in the Basque Country, 
a shared collective identity network is essential to reaching an agreement and 
achieving recognition. These gaps between social groups are the gaps the 
Basque peace movement tried to bridge. Failing to recognize these 
mechanisms is an element that will make any conflict resolution experience 
difficult. In this particular case, the solution will be to socialize the conflict 
resolution process, using the same networks that helped to enforce the Basque 
Peace Frame. This research attempts to demonstrate that the practice of taking 
into account what society thinks and feels can be extrapolated to other 
scenarios. It is important to note what lies behind „society‟ is not a 
representation of social organizations, but a deep study of social relations, how 
ideas propagate, how civil society works, creates and destroys. In the case of 
the Basque Country, this issue could be the difference between a permanent 
conflict resolution scenario and a temporary situation when political violence is 
not useful, but not totally discarded.  
Open Questions  
This thesis has been an exciting trip that took me almost six years to 
complete. During that time, I had the opportunity to understand, in detail, part of 
the society I am from and the people of the Basque peace movement. The work 
these people have accomplished is remarkable. They helped to achieve an 
outcome that looked almost impossible 30 years before: the achievement of 
peace and end of violence. This research tried to analyze to which extent the 
efforts of peace movements were in vain, or successful. Finally, it is clear that 
some efforts were successful, and other outcomes were unexpected. While 
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there are questions that remain unanswered, I hope to engage with some of 
these in my future research, while I would encourage fellow researchers to 
engage with others, for example: to what extent are the informal networks 
significant in understanding the frame expansion? How can we develop a 
comprehensive approach to analyze the cultural impacts of social movements 
with some validity? How can we analyze the unexpected impacts of social 
movements? Is it possible to develop a model to apply the same principles to 
other environments? 
 Some of these questions are very ambitious and probably, as when I 
started this research, some people will try to answer them. While I have 
concluded that the questions can have no definitive answer, the journey in 
trying to answer them may shed some light on the fascinating world of social 
action. However, that is another research.  
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1 - INTERVIEWS TECHNICAL DATA 
Profile of the interviewees providing: Name of the organization, gender, age, 
education level and date of the interview.  
Order: 
1. BAKEOLA  
BAKEOLA: Male, 31, Higher Education. 12/06/2007. 
2. BAKETIK  
BAKETIK: Male, 45, Higher Education. 23/08/2007. 
3. BASTA YA  
BASTA YA: Male, 47, Higher Education. 02/08/2007. 
4. EGK 
EGK: Male, 24, Higher Education. 21/05/2007. 
5. ETXERAT 
ETXERAT: Male, 46, Basic Education. 05/02/2008. 
6. GERNIKA GOGORATUZ 
GERNIKA GOGORATUZ: Female, 40, Higher Education. 26/06/2007. 
7. TAT 
TAT: Male, 31, Higher Education. 02/07/2007. 
8. LOKARRI  
LOKARRI (Alava - Araba): Male, 45, Higher Education. 20/08/2007. 
9. LOKARRI  
LOKARRI (Bizkaia): Female, 25, Higher Education. 14/06/2007. 
10. LOKARRI  
LOKARRI (Guipuzkoa): Male, 36, Higher Education. 28/06/2007. 
11. LOKARRI  
LOKARRI (Navarra): Female, 52, Higher Education. 27/06/2007. 
12. LOKARRI 
LOKARRI (Coordination Committee): Female, 36, Higher Education. 
27/06/2007. 
13. LOKARRI 
LOKARRI (Barcelona): Female, 36, Higher Education. 31/08/2007. 
14. GESTO POR LA PAZ 
GESTO POR LA PAZ (Alava - Araba): Male, 30, Higher Education. 
31/07/2007. 
15. GESTO POR LA PAZ  
GESTO POR LA PAZ (Bizkaia): Male, 52, Higher Education. 14/07/2007. 
16. GESTO POR LA PAZ  
GESTO POR LA PAZ (Guipuzkoa): Female, 50, Higher Education. 
30/08/2007. 
17. GESTO POR LA PAZ  
GESTO POR LA PAZ (Navarra): Male, 58, Higher Education. 
11/09/2007. 
18. GESTO POR LA PAZ 
GESTO POR LA PAZ (Permanent Commission): Female, 34, Higher 
Education. 03/08/2007. 
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APPENDIX 2 – INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. Introduction 
 Make and introduction showing the interviewees key concepts of the 
research. Ask for authorization about the use of the information. 
Show the document involving informed consent, anonymity and 
video/audio issues (See attach). Assume the commitment to send a 
copy of the transcription of the interview. 
 Some methodological issues: 
a. Try to connect with the interviewee in his/her own experience as a 
member of a specific organization. Try to adequate the language 
depending of the ideological approach of the interviewee and the 
organization he/she belongs. 
b. Make a difference between the specific experience the 
interviewee has about his/her organization and the experience 
he/she has about other organizations, first part is intimate and the 
second is external.  
c. Try to be as casual as possible; don‟t ask the questions as in a 
questionnaire. Try to have the most similar experience to a 
conversation. It‟s possible to affirm something before a question or 
after, or guide the interviewee in certain parts of the interview.  
d. It‟s useful use comparative examples about other similar 
international experiences.  
 
2. Relations / Role of the organization 
 Which organizations lead or leaded the social action related to the 
Basque conflict? Are the same now? How is your organization‟s 
relation with these organizations? If your organization is one of them, 
how is the relation with other social agents? Which social agents are 
closer to your organization? Which are further? Why?  
 To which social sectors (youth, church, seniors, certain kind of 
organization, independent left, etc.) do you think your organization 
should start relationships? Why they are important more than others?  
 Do you think if exist any consensus or disensus between the different 
organizations related to the conflict about the ways to resolve the 
armed conflict? What it is? Which are the points of union between 
organizations? 
 
3. Problems 
 Which were the biggest threats and risks that your organization had 
to face? Are the same now? If not, which are now?  
 
4. History / Structure / Internal Factors 
 Since are you member of this organization? What were the motives 
that made you being part of this organization?  
 Tell me about the start of the organization and its evolution.  
 What was the moment the organization started / you became a 
member? Why do you think it was proper moment?  
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 What is its structure? It has changed since you are a member? Why? 
 Which steps can you identify in the history of the organization? Can 
you describe its moments of success? And failure? Why do you think 
they were a success? And a failure?  
 In your opinion, during which initiatives, moments, the members 
mobilized most? And less? Why? During which initiatives, moments, 
you mobilized most? And less? Why? 
 What were the motivations to make the initiatives you mentioned 
before?  
 Do you think it was a clear strategy and a clear goal in the 
organization‟s actions? What is this strategy and goal? Do you agree 
fully? Why? 
 Which are the cultural and ideological values of your organization? 
Did they change in the past? Do you think they‟re going to change? 
Why? 
 What is the women‟s role in your organization? Describe it. There‟re 
specific issues that the women make relevant? 
 What is your opinion about the use of violence? Do you think is 
justification to use violence? How the violence shaped the work of 
your organization?  
 
5. Effects / Impacts 
 Do you think that the alliances and the different social initiatives made 
by your organization with other organizations helped the strategy of 
your organization? And theirs?  
 How the external action shaped the actions of your organization? 
Influx from other organizations? Influx from the political sphere? 
Basque? Spanish? International? How important are they? 
 How your organization shaped the external factors? How it shaped 
the actions of the following organizations? How it shaped the political 
sphere? Basque? Spanish? International? In your opinion, what is the 
importance of your organization referring to the conflict? Is a primal 
reference? Needs more attention? 
 Which the following political ideologies affect your organization 
(Nationalism, Left wing nationalism, socialism, right wing, Left wing, 
“non-nationalism”). Why?  
 What do you think was the role of your organization in the cease-fire 
declaration? Direct, indirect? Do you think your organization helped to 
create the conditions to that? Can your organization create similar 
conditions now? Why? 
 What is the impact of your organization in the society? Do you 
evaluate it as positive? Why? Do you think about it as an 
accomplishment of your organization alone? 
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APPENDIX 3 – STATEMENT OF INFORMED CONSENT FOR 
INTERVIEWS 
Statement of Informed Consent 
Effects of Basque Peace Social Movement Organizations 
Research Project 
 
This consent form is to make sure that you understand what is involved in this research 
project, and how we intend to use the information you are giving. 
 
I will not use any names or other identifying features when I write about what I have 
found out. All identities will be kept confidential, unless you specifically give permission 
to acknowledge you. I will not do anything with this information that you do not give 
permission to do.  
 
I understand that my participation in this research project is voluntary and I understand 
that I can withdraw at any point without giving a reason. I have had the opportunity to 
ask questions about my involvement in this research project. 
 
I agree to the researcher transcribing the interview, keeping it safely on computer, and 
using it for the purposes of this study. I understand that only the researcher and his 
supervisors will be allowed access to the interview transcript. 
 
Providing my identity is kept confidential, I give permission for University of Bradford 
researcher to use the information that I am about to give in the following ways: 
 
 In preparation of a PhD thesis to be defended at the University of Bradford. 
 
 In any events or written reports which tell the communities who have 
contributed to the research about the research findings. 
 
 For academic or policy related purposes, which help to make the findings of the 
research known. 
 
I understand that I will be sent a copy of the transcript of the interview when this is 
available, and a short summary of the final thesis. 
 
I hereby assign the copyright in my contribution to the University of Bradford. 
 
Signed: _______________________      
 
Name: _____________________________ Date: ___________________ 
 
I would like my copy of the interview and report sent by:   Post   □  Email  □ 
 
Address:        Email: 
 
 
I have explained the purposes of this research. I agree to keep all interview details 
confidential. 
Name:  ________________________ Signature: _____________________  
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APPENDIX 4 – FIELD NOTES  
09/02/2007 – Conversation with the director of Lokarri.  
 
14/02/2007 – Visit to Lokarri‟s Headquarters. 
 
30/03/2007 – Conversation with the director of Lokarri.  
 
10/04/2007 – Meeting with Gesto por la Paz member (gatekeeper). 
 
21/05/2007 – Interview with EGK.  
 
05/06/2007 – Lokarri provincial internal meeting (Bizkaia). 
 
14/06/2007 – Interview with a member of Lokarri.   
 
19/06/2007 – Work with Lokarri members in a signature collection campaign to 
support a social consultation. 
 
02/07/2007 – Visit to the TAT and Interview.  
 
14/07/2007 – Interview with Gesto por la Paz member. Bizkaia. 
 
03/08/2007 – Interview with a member of Gesto por la Paz. Directive.    
 
23/08/2007 – Interview and visit to Baketik Headquarters. During that visit I had 
the opportunity to talk with the former leader of Elkarri.  
 
10/09/2007 – Meeting with in Lokarri headquartes. Aftewards sharing a beer 
with Lokarri and Gesto por la Paz members.  
 
24/09/2007 – Lokarri General Assembly. 
  
23/12/2007 – Visit to Etxerat in San Sebastian. They were protesting locked in 
San Sebastian cathedral for a week. 
 
05/02/2008 – Interview with Etxerat.  
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